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II 
Abstract	
This	 dissertation	 was	 written	 as	 part	 of	 the	 LLM	 In	 Transnational	 And	 European	
Commercial	 Law,	 Banking	 Law,	 Arbitration/	 Mediation	 at	 the	 International	 Hellenic	
University.		
The	 present	 paper	 discusses	 the	 accumulation	 of	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 (NPLs)	 on	
banks’	 balance	 sheets,	 particularly	 after	 the	 recent	 financial	 crisis	 and	 recurrent	
recessions,	which	adversely	 affects	banks’	 performance	and	 intensifies	 systemic	 risk.	
For	this	reason,	bank-specific	measures	and	systemic-wide	policy	initiatives	have	been	
proposed	and	followed,	with	the	objective	of	effectively	managing	existing	high	stocks	
of	NPLs	and	preventing	their	future	excessive	build-up.	Particularly	in	Europe,	various	
policy	actions	have	been	adopted	in	an	effort	to	effectively	address	this	legacy	of	the	
crisis.	 Such	 legislative	 initiatives	 are	 complementary	 and	 form	 a	 comprehensive	
package,	aimed	at	enhancing	the	Banking	and	Capital	Markets	Union,	thus	promoting	
the	 establishment	 of	 an	 integrated	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union.	 Within	 the	
Council’s	 Action	 Plan	 and	 the	 Commission’s	 NPL	 legislative	 package,	 there	 has	 been	
proposed	 a	 Directive	 on	 a	 common	 distinct	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	
enforcement	mechanism,	which	enables	credit	institutions	to	efficiently	recover	value	
from	 the	 collateral	 pledged	 in	 secured	 business	 loans	 out-of-court.	 The	 contractual	
agreement	 on	 the	 voluntary	 use	 of	 this	 debt	 recovery	mechanism	 shall	 constitute	 a	
directly	enforceable	title	and	collateral	enforcement	shall	be	expedited,	under	specific	
formalistic	 conditions.	 However,	 certain	 legal	 aspects	 of	 the	 proposed	 enforcement	
procedure	 are	 being	 questioned.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	
framework	 highlights	 its	 deficiencies	 and	 the	 dangers	 it	 entails,	 particularly	 with	
respect	to	its	potentially	detrimental	effects	on	debtors’	interests.	Since	the	proposed	
mechanism	 appears	 greatly	 disruptive	 to	 the	 existing	 ‘traditional’	 collateral	
enforcement	procedures,	 its	 consistency	with	national	pre-insolvency	and	 insolvency	
proceedings	 and	 the	 Financial	 Collateral	 Directive	 is	 being	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper.	
Concluding	 remarks	 summarise	 the	 author’s	 opinion	 on	 the	 future	 of	 collateral	
enforcement	of	NPLs	in	Europe.	
Keywords:	Non-Performing	Loans,	enforcement,	extrajudicial,	collateral	
Platsa	Kyriaki	Marina	
31/01/2019	
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I	NON-PERFORMING	LOANS	IN	EUROPE	
1.	Non-Performing	Loans	
High	levels	of	public	and	private	debt	inherited	from	the	recent	crisis	have	resulted	in	
excessive	stocks	of	‘Non-Performing	Loans’	in	the	banking	sector1,	i.e.	loans	designated	
as	being	default	or	with	a	very	high	likelihood	of	default.	
1.1.	Definition	of	Non-Performing	Loans	
The	term	‘Non-Performing	Loan’	(hereafter	‘NPL’)	refers	to	a	loan	where	the	borrower,	
either	a	company	or	a	physical	person2,	is	not	able	to	repay	a	bank	loan,	i.e.	to	make	
scheduled	 payments	 of	 the	 agreed	 instalments	 to	 cover	 interest	 or	 capital	
reimbursements3.	 Loans	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 non-performing	 (non-current)	when	 ‘any	
scheduled	 loan	 payment	 is	 past	 due	 for	 more	 than	 90	 days’	 4.	 A	 loan	 can	 be	 non-
                                                
1	Reflection	Paper	on	the	Deepening	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union,	COM/2017/291,	31.05.2017	
[hereafter:	Reflection	Paper],	p.	14.	
2	 A	 borrower	 may	 be	 a	 natural	 person,	 acting	 as	 entrepreneur	 or	 as	 a	 consumer-householder.	 This	
distinction	 between	 professional	 and	 non-professional	 borrowers	will	 be	 crucial	 in	 Chapter	 III,	 as	 the	
proposed	 Accelerated	 Extrajudicial	 Collateral	 Enforcement	 Mechanism	 shall	 be	 available	 only	 if	
contractually	 agreed	 upon	 between	 the	 bank	 creditor	 and	 the	 secured	 business	 borrower,	 i.e.	 a	
company	or	an	entrepreneur,	with	the	explicit	exclusion	of	consumer	loans	from	its	scope	of	application.	
3	 See:	 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 European	 Council,	 the	
Council	and	the	European	Central	Bank	 -	Second	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	Non-Performing	
Loans	 in	 Europe,	 COM/2018/133/Final,	 14.03.2018,	 p.	 3,	 fn	 3	 [hereafter:	 Second	 Progress	 Report];	
Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	amending	Regulation	(EU)	
No	575/2013	as	 regards	minimum	 loss	coverage	 for	Non-Performing	Exposures,	COM/2018/134/Final,	
14.03.2018,	 Procedure	 reference	 2018/0060	 (COD)	 [hereafter:	 the	 Proposed	 Directive],	 Explanatory	
Memorandum,	p.	1.		
4	See:	Commission	Implementing	Regulation	(EU)	2015/227	of	9	January	2015	amending	Implementing	
Regulation	(EU)	No	680/2014	laying	down	implementing	technical	standards	with	regard	to	supervisory	
reporting	of	 institutions	according	to	Regulation	(EU)	No	575/2013	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	
the	Council,	 Text	with	EEA	 relevance,	OJ	 L	48,	20.02.2015:	 ‘NPLs	denote	 loans	where	 the	borrower	 is	
unable	 to	 make	 the	 scheduled	 payments	 to	 cover	 interest	 or	 capital	 reimbursements.	 When	 the	
payments	 are	 more	 than	 90	 days	 past	 due,	 or	 the	 loan	 is	 assessed	 as	 unlikely	 to	 be	 repaid	 by	 the	
borrower,	 it	 is	 classified	 as	 an	 NPL’.	 Also,	 see:	 ‘Non-Performing	 Loans:	 Council	 approves	 position	 on	
capital	 requirements	 for	banks'	bad	 loans’,	Press	Release	594/18,	Council	of	 the	EU,	31.10.2018.	Also,	
  
2 
performing,	not	only	because	it	is	past	due,	but	also	because	it	is	considered	unlikely-
to-pay	in	the	future,	albeit	it	is	still	paying	currently.	In	this	case,	the	loan	is	assessed	as	
unlikely	 to	 be	 repaid	 by	 the	 borrower	 from	 a	 forward-looking	 approach5,	 thus	 also	
classified	as	non-performing6.	
1.2.	Non-Performing	Loans	and	banks’	performance		
Credit	assets	are	generally	evaluated	based	on	their	quality,	 i.e.	the	borrower’s	initial	
credibility,	 their	 performance	 and	 the	possibility	 of	 lender’s	 further	 recourse7	 to	 the	
borrower.	For	instance,	loans	are	considered	to	be	of	subprime	credit	quality	according	
some	criteria	related	to	payments	and	borrower’s	course	of	business8.		
	
                                                                                                                                          
see:	‘What	are	Non-Performing	Loans	(NPLs)?,	ECB,	12.09.2016,	available	at:		
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me/html/npl.en.html:	 ‘A	 bank	 loan	 is	 considered	 non-
performing	 when	 more	 than	 90	 days	 pass	 without	 the	 borrower	 paying	 the	 agreed	 instalments	 or	
interest’.		Non-Performing	Loans	are	also	called	‘bad	debt’.	
5	Creditors	are	not	expected	 to	 receive	 the	 full	 value	of	 loans	designated	as	non-performing.	 In	 cases	
where	the	bank	still	receives	full	payment	from	the	borrower	without	excessive	delay,	the	losses	for	the	
bank	are	 in	general	expected	to	be	 lower,	 thus	 lower	 loss	coverage	 is	applicable.	The	new	accounting	
standards,	IFRS	9,	effective	since	January	2018,	replace	the	existing	‘incurred	loss	model’	(IAS	39	model)	
with	a	three-stages	‘forward-looking	model’,	resulting	in	the	earlier	recognition	of	credit	losses.		
6	See:	Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	amending	Regulation	
(EU)	 No	 575/2013	 as	 regards	 minimum	 loss	 coverage	 for	 Non-Performing	 Exposures,	
COM/2018/134/Final,	 14.03.2018,	 Procedure	 reference	 2018/0060	 (COD)	 [hereafter:	 CRR	 II],	
Explanatory	Memorandum,	pp.	1,	8	and	11	and	Article	47(c).	
7	 Non-Recourse	 Loans,	 for	 instance,	 are	 loans	 in	 which	 the	 lender	 may	 not	 have	 recourse	 to	 the	
borrower	 after	 foreclosure,	 when	 the	 realised	 price	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 the	 mortgaged	 property	 is	
insufficient	to	cover	the	outstanding	debt.	See:	Felsenheimer	J.	&	Gisdakis	P.	(2008),	Credit	Crises:	From	
Tainted	Loans	to	a	Global	Economic	Meltdown,	WILEY-VCH	Verlag	GmbH	&	CO	KgaA,	Weinheim,	pp.72-
76.	
8	Namely,	when	two	or	more	loan	payments	paid	past	60	days	due	in	the	last	12	months,	one	or	more	
loan	payments	paid	past	90	days	due	in	the	last	36	months,	judgement-	foreclosure-repossession-	non-
payment	of	a	loan	in	the	prior	48	months,	bankruptcy	in	the	last	7	years.	See:	Felsenheimer	J.	&	Gisdakis	
P.	(2008),	pp.72-76.	
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NPLs	are	considered	to	be	credits	no	longer	accruing	income9,	in	need	for	restructuring	
to	 reflect	borrowers’	modified	 circumstances.	 Loans	 classified	as	non-performing	are	
recorded	 on	 banks’	 books10	 with	 the	 deduction	 of	 any	 accrued	 and	 not	 actually	
received	 interest	 from	 loan	 revenues,	 until	 cash	 payment	 is	 actually	 realised11.	
Similarly,	Non-Performing	Assets	are	income-generating	assets,	including	loans,	which	
are	past	due	90	days	or	more.	Charge-offs	are	loans	declared	worthless	and	written	off	
the	 lender’s	 books.	 When	 ratios	 of	 Non-Performing	 Exposures12	 rise,	 credit	 risk13	
exposure	also	grows	and	failure	of	a	lending	institution	may	be	imminent14.	
	
High	 stocks	 of	 such	 NPLs	 thus	 adversely	 affect	 a	 bank's	 short-	 and	 longer-term	
performance15,	 as	 they	 reduce	net	 interest	 income,	 they	 increase	 impairments	 costs	
                                                
9	In	contrast:	‘A	performing	loan	will	provide	a	bank	with	the	interest	income	it	needs	to	make	a	profit	
and	 extend	 new	 loans’.	 See:	 ‘What	 are	Non-Performing	 Loans	 (NPLs)?,	 ECB,	 12.09.2016,	 available	 at:	
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me/html/npl.en.html.	
10	 According	 to	 paragraph	 148	 of	 Commission	 Implementing	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 680/2014,	 the	
classification	of	exposures	as	non-performing	should	be	done	without	taking	into	account	the	existence	
of	 any	 collateral.	 Consequently,	 fully	 collateralised	 exposures	 in	 unlikely-to-pay	 situations	 should	 be	
classified	 as	 non-performing,	 even	 when	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	 customer	 is	 willing	 to	 realise	 the	
collateral	on	a	voluntary	basis	in	order	to	avoid	a	legal	enforcement	by	the	credit	institution.		
11	See:	Rose,	P.	S.	&	Hudgins,	S.	C.	(2010),	Bank	Management	&	Financial	Services,	8th	Ed.,	McGraw-	Hill	
International	Edition,	p.137.		
12	‘Non-Performing	Exposures	(NPEs)	include	NPLs,	non-performing	debt	securities	and	non-performing	
off-balance-sheet	 items.	NPLs	 represent	 the	 largest	 share	of	NPEs	and	 this	 term	 is	 commonly	used	as	
pars	 pro	 toto’.	 See:	 CRR	 II,	 Explanatory	 Memorandum,	 p.	 1	 and	 Article	 47(a)	 on	 Non-Performing	
Exposures.	
13	 Credit	 risk	 is	 the	 probability	 that	 some	 assets	 of	 a	 financial	 institution,	 particularly	 its	 loans,	 will	
decline	in	value	and	become	worthless.	See:	Rose,	P.S.	&	Hudgins,	S.C.	(2010),	p.137.		
14	See:	Rose,	P.S.	&	Hudgins,	S.C.	(2010),	p.182.	
15	See:	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	and	the	European	
Central	 Bank-	 First	 Progress	 Report	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 In	 Europe,	
COM/2018/037/Final,	18.01.2018,	pp.	1-2	[hereafter:	First	Progress	Report];	Second	Progress	Report,	p.	
3;	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	Council,	the	Council	
and	the	European	Central	Bank-	Third	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	Non-Performing	Loans	and	
further	 risk	 reduction	 in	 the	 Banking	 Union,	 COM/2018/766/Final,	 28.11.2018,	 p.	 2	 [hereafter:	 Third	
Progress	Report];	CRR	II,	Explanatory	Memorandum,	p.	1.		
  
4 
and	 they	 result	 in	 lower	 ratings	 and	 increased	 cost	 of	 funding.	 Furthermore,	 they	
require	 higher	 levels	 of	 provisioning	 to	 cover	 incurred	 and	 expected	 losses16.	 Such	
default	 loan	 provisions	 reduce	 bank	 profitability17	 and	 reduce	 the	 bank's	 regulatory	
capital.	In	case	of	excessive	build-up	of	NPLs,	financial	fragility	may	endanger	the	mere	
viability	 of	 the	 affected	 institutions	 and	 consequently	 the	 financial	 stability	 of	 the	
whole	 economy.	Moreover,	 NPLs	 occupy	 significant	 amounts	 of	 a	 bank's	 resources,	
both	human	and	financial.	Additional	management	time	and	servicing	costs	reduce	the	
bank's	 risk	appetite	 for	new	 lending	and	 its	 capacity	 to	provide	 financing	 to	 the	 real	
economy,	 particularly	 to	 Small	 and	 Medium-Sized	 Enterprises	 (SMEs),	 which	 rely	
heavily	 on	 bank	 lending,	 with	 grave	 implications	 to	 the	 economic	 growth	 and	 job	
creation	of	a	country.	
                                                
16	 Additional	 capital	 requirements	 for	 high-risk	 weighted	 assets	 under	 ‘Pillar	 I’	 of	 the	 Capital	
Requirements	Regulation.	
17	 See:	 Communication	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 Council,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank,	 the	
European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	the	Committee	of	the	Regions	on	completing	the	Banking	
Union,	 COM	 (2017)	 592	 final,	 11.10.2017,	 p.	 15	 [hereafter:	 Communication	 to	 complete	 the	 Banking	
Union]:	 ‘Non	 Performing	 Loans	weigh	 on	 the	 profitability	 and	 viability	 of	 affected	 banks	 and	 thereby	
constrain	 those	 banks'	 ability	 to	 lend	 and	 might	 ultimately	 hamper	 economic	 growth’.	 Also,	 see:	
Commission	 Staff	 Working	 Document:	 Impact	 Assessment	 ‘Accelerated	 Extrajudicial	 Collateral	
Enforcement’	(Part	2/2),	SWD/2018/76/final,	14.03.2018,	accompanying	the	document	“Proposal	for	a	
Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	credit	servicers,	credit	purchasers	and	the	
recovery	of	collateral”,	COM/2018/135/Final’	 [hereafter:	 Impact	Assessment,	Part	2/2]:	 ‘High	 levels	of	
Non-Performing	Loans	(NPLs)	affect	financial	stability	as	they	weigh	on	the	profitability	and	viability	of	
the	affected	institutions	and	have	an	impact,	via	reduced	bank	lending,	on	economic	growth’.	Also,	see:	
the	 Proposed	 Directive,	 Explanatory	Memorandum,	 p.	 1.	 Also,	 see:	 ‘What	 are	 Non-Performing	 Loans	
(NPLs)?,	 ECB,	 12.09.2016,	 available	 at:	 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-
me/html/npl.en.html:	‘When	customers	do	not	meet	their	agreed	repayment	arrangements	for	90	days	
or	more,	the	bank	must	set	aside	more	capital	on	the	assumption	that	the	 loan	will	not	be	paid	back.	
This	reduces	its	capacity	to	provide	new	loans.	To	be	successful	in	the	long	run,	banks	needs	to	keep	the	
level	of	bad	loans	at	a	minimum	so	they	can	still	earn	a	profit	from	extending	new	loans	to	customers.	If	
a	bank	has	too	many	bad	loans	on	its	balance	sheet,	its	profitability	will	suffer	because	it	will	no	longer	
earn	enough	money	from	its	credit	business.	In	addition,	it	will	need	to	put	money	aside	as	a	safety	net	
in	case	it	needs	to	write	off	the	full	amount	of	the	loan	at	some	point	in	time’.	
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1.3.	Secured	and	unsecured	loans	
Loans	 in	 general	 may	 be	 secured	 or	 unsecured.	 In	 secured	 loans18	 the	 borrower	
pledges	 to	 the	 creditor	 a	 collateral	 in	 the	 form	of	movable	 or	 immovable	 assets	 (by	
mortgages,	 pledges	 and	 other	 comparable	 contractual	 or	 legal	 devices),	 in	 order	 to	
secure	 the	 credit	 against	 the	 possibility	 of	 default.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 NPLs	 secured	 by	
immovable	 collateral	 (commercial	 or	 residential	 real	 estate),	 it	 can	 be	 reasonably	
assumed	that	 immovable	property	will	have	a	remaining	value	for	a	 longer	period	of	
time	 after	 the	 loan	 turned	 non-performing.	 Thus,	 a	 lower	 loss	 coverage	 level	 is	
required	 in	 this	 case.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 unsecured	 NPLs	 require	 higher	 and	 timelier	
minimum	 loss	 coverage	 to	 ensure	 banks’	 financial	 soundness,	 because	 they	 are	 not	
backed	by	collateral	or	guarantees.	Overall,	secured	NPLs	are	less	risky	than	unsecured	
NPLs,	as	they	give	banks	a	specific	claim	on	an	asset	or	against	a	third	party19.	
	
2.	Non-Performing	Loans	and	the	recent	financial	crisis	
The	 recent	 global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2009	 and	 ensuing	 recessions,	 along	 with	
numerous	micro-	 and	macro-economic	 variables20	 and	 structural	 factors,	 sometimes	
                                                
18	See:	Article	3	para.	1,	point	(6)	of	the	Proposed	Directive:	'secured	credit	agreement'	means	a	credit	
agreement	concluded	by	a	credit	institution	or	another	undertaking	authorised	to	issue	credit,	which	is	
secured	by	either	of	the	following	collateral;		(a)	a	mortgage,	charge,	lien	or	other	comparable	security	
right	commonly	used	 in	a	Member	State	 in	 relation	to	 immovable	assets;	 (b)	a	pledge,	charge,	 lien	or	
other	comparable	security	right	commonly	used	in	a	Member	State	in	relation	to	movable	assets’.	
19	See:	CRR	II,	Explanatory	Memorandum,	p.	11.	
20	 For	 national	 and	 regional	 analysis	 of	 such	micro-	 and	macro-	 economic	 determinants	 of	NPLs,	 see:	
Rubinoff,	 J.,	 Fanti,	G.	&	de	Remedios,	 J.M.	 (2017),	NPLs	 in	 Southern	Europe,	 online	article	 in	White	&	
Case,	 05.10.2017,	 available	 at:	 https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/npls-southern-europe;	
Dijkman,	M.	 (2017),	NPLs	 in	 CESEE,	 in:	Nonperforming	 loans	 in	 CESEE:	macroeconomic	 dimension	and	
resolution	 strategies,	 81st	 East	 Jour	 Fixe	 of	 the	 Oesterreichische	 Nationalbank	 (OeNB),	 18.09.2017,	
Vienna,	available	at:	
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=2ahUKEwiMjN7P0tnfAh
Vh1eAKHQc1AikQFjACegQIBBAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oenb.at%2Fdam%2Fjcr%3Ae3adac82-
3680-40a0-b9e9-216ca5aba277%2FDijkman_Session1.pd;	Anastasiou,	D.,	Louri,	H.	&	Tsionas,	M.	(2016),	
Determinants	 of	Non-Performing	 Loans:	 Evidence	 from	 Euro-area	 countries,	 Finance	 Research	 Letters,	
Institute	of	Public	Finance,	Vol.	18,	August	2016,	pp.	116–119;	Beck,	R.,	Jakubik,	P.	&	Piloiu,	An.	(2015),	
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accompanied	by	 inadequate	 loan	origination	practices21,	predatory	 lending	practices,	
poor	supervision	and	short-terminism	in	banks’	corporate	governance,	have	resulted	in	
high	 levels	 of	 Non-Performing	 Loans,	 with	 significant	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 banks’	
profitability	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 lend,	 particularly	 to	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	
(SMEs).	The	inability	of	borrowers	to	pay	back	their	loans	was	also	aggravated	during	
the	 subsequent	 recessions	 and	 prolonged	 economic	 downturn.	 Phenomena	 as	 the	
dreadful	declines	in	income,	unemployment,	high	interest	of	housing/	entrepreneurial	
credit,	 aggressive	 credit	 promotion	 practices,	 as	 well	 as	 unfortunate	 events	 in	
borrowers’	 life,	 along	 with	 the	 absence	 of	 consultative	 support	 institutions	 have	
created	 over	 indebted,	 high-leveraged	 borrowers,	 facing	 increased	 incidents	 of	
bankruptcy	or	continued	payment	difficulties.	
	
As	a	consequence,	many	banks	suffered	an	excessive	build-up	of	NPLs	on	their	books	
and	they	found	themselves	unable	to	recover	the	value	of	their	credit.	Commission’s	
reports	on	NPL	trends	 in	Europe	appear	optimistic,	however	NPL	amounts	and	ratios	
                                                                                                                                          
Key	 Determinants	 of	 Non-performing	 Loans:	 New	 Evidence	 from	 a	 Global	 Sample,	 Open	 Economies	
Review,	 Springer,	 Vol.	 26(3),	 July	 2015,	 pp.	 525-550;	Makri,	 V.,	 Tsagkanos,	 Ath.	&	Bellas,	 Ath.	 (2014),	
Determinants	of	Non-Performing	Loans-	The	Case	of	Eurozone	PANOECONOMICUS,	Vol.	2,	March	2014,	
pp.	193-206;	Škarica,	B.	(2014),	Determinants	of	Non-Performing	Loans	in	Central	and	Eastern	European	
countries,	 Financial	 Theory	 and	 Practice,	 Institute	 of	 Public	 Finance,	 Vol.	 38(1),	 pp.	 37-59;	 Klein,	 N.	
(2013),	Non-Performing	Loans	in	CESEE:	Determinants	and	Impact	on	Macroeconomic	Performance,	IMF	
Working	Paper	13/72,	March	2013;	Beck,	R.,	Jakubik,	P.	&	Piloiu,	A.	(2013),	Non-performing	Loans:	What	
matters	in	addition	to	the	economic	cycle?,	ECB	Working	Paper	Series,	No	1515,	February	2013;	Messai,	
A.S.	&	Jouini,	F.	(2013),	Micro	and	Macro	Determinants	of	Non-performing	Loans,	 International	Journal	
of	Economics	and	Financial	Issues	Vol.	3(4),	January	2013,	pp.852-860;	Kauko,	K.	(2012),	External	deficits	
and	Non-Performing	Loans	in	the	recent	financial	crisis,	Economic	Letters,	Vol.	115,	pp.	196–199;	Louzis,	
D.,	 Vouldis,	 An.	 &	 Metaxas,	 V.	 (2012),	 Macroeconomic	 and	 bank-specific	 determinants	 of	 Non-
Performing	Loans	 in	Greece:	A	comparative	study	of	mortgage,	business	and	consumer	 loan	portfolios,	
Journal	of	Banking	&	Finance,	Vol.	36,	pp.	1012–1027;	Fonseca,	A.R.	&	González,	F.	(2006),	Cross-country	
determinants	 of	 bank	 income	 smoothing	 by	 managing	 loan-loss	 provisions,	 Journal	 of	 Banking	 &	
Finance,	 Vol.	 32,	 2008,	 pp.	 217–228;	 Household	 Debt	 Sustainability:	 What	 Explains	 Household	 Non-
Performing	Loans?	An	Empirical	Analysis,	ECB’s	Working	Paper	Series,	No	570,	ECB,	January	2006.	
21	Council	conclusions	on	Action	Plan	to	tackle	Non-Performing	Loans	in	Europe,	Press	Release	459/17,	
Council	of	the	EU,	11.07.2017	[hereafter:	Action	Plan].	
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have	 been	 detrimental	 to	 the	 economies	 of	 Member	 States	 individually	 and	 the	
internal	 market	 as	 a	 whole22,	 while	 they	 have	 incurred	 heavy	 costs	 for	 taxpayers23.	
NPLs	reaffirm	the	general	economic	and	social	dysphoria	and	disorder:	they	reflect	the	
aggravated	social	consequences	of	the	financial	crisis,	which	hamper	the	consolidation	
of	 the	 internal	market	 from	an	economic	point	of	view	and	may	be	even	considered	
unacceptable	from	a	social,	human-centered	perspective24.		
	
                                                
22	For	further	statistic	information,	see:	First	Progress	Report,	which	reported	a	downward	trend,	a	total	
volume	of	NPLs	amounting	to	€950	billion	and	uneven	NPL	ratios	within	the	EU	(ranging	from	0.7%	to	
46.9%);	 Second	 Progress	 Report,	which	 reported	 a	 continuously	 falling	 trend	 of	NPL	 ratios,	 improved	
quality	of	banks'	loans	portfolios,	a	total	volume	of	NPLs	amounting	to	€910	billion	(still,	well	above	pre-
crisis	levels)	and	uneven	NPL	ratios	within	the	EU	(ranging	from	0.7%	to	46.7%);	Reflection	Paper,	Annex	
III,	p.	35,	Table	‘Trends	in	the	share	of	Non-Performing	Loans	as	a	share	of	total	gross	loans’:	‘The	rise	of	
Non-Performing	Loans	–	loans	that	are	in	default	or	close	to	it	–	in	the	balance	sheet	of	banks	is	both	a	
symptom	 of	 the	 crisis	 years	 and	 a	 source	 of	 vulnerability.	 These	 loans	 are	 much	 more	 prevalent	 in	
southern	 European	 Member	 States	 than	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 euro	 area’.	 Also,	 see:	 Communication	 to	
complete	 the	Banking	Union,	 p.	 15,	 Table	 ‘Gross	 non-performing	debt	 instruments’:	 ‘It	 is	 a	 good	 sign	
that	levels	of	Non	Performing	Loan	are	going	down.	Even	in	the	most	affected	Member	States,	levels	of	
Non	Performing	Loan	have	been	materially	reduced.	This	trend	should	be	accelerated,	and	the	build-up	
of	new	Non	Performing	Loans	must	be	prevented’.	Recently,	the	Third	Progress	Report,	p.	7,	reported	a	
steady	decline	trend	of	NPL	ratios,	with	a	total	volume	of	NPLs	amounting	to	€820	billion	(near	pre-crisis	
levels)	and	uneven	NPL	ratios	within	the	EU	(ranging	from	0.6%	to	44.9%).	
23	 See:	Opinion	of	 the	 European	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Committee	on	 Proposal	 for	 a	 Regulation	of	 the	
European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	amending	Regulation	(EU)	No	575/2013	as	regards	minimum	
loss	coverage	for	Non-Performing	Exposures	and	on	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	
and	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 credit	 servicers,	 credit	 purchasers	 and	 the	 recovery	 of	 collateral’,	 EESC	
2018/01109,	OJ	C	367,	10.10.2018	[hereafter:	Opinion	of	the	EESC],	point	3.2.	
24	 See:	 Opinion	 of	 the	 EESC,	 point	 3.5:	 ‘The	 EESC	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 social	 consequences	 of	 the	
financial	 crisis	 in	 terms	 of	 exclusion,	 social	 justice	 and	 obstacles	 to	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 internal	
market.	In	some	Member	States,	NPLs	are	a	reflection	of	how	severely	families	and	SME	entrepreneurs	
have	been	affected,	including	being	at	risk	of	losing	their	homes	or	subject	to	foreclosure’	[italics	by	the	
author].	
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3.	Addressing	Non-Performing	Loans	
For	 all	 the	 aforementioned	 reasons,	 there	 has	 been	 acknowledged	 the	 urgency	 of	
addressing	 the	 risks	 related	 to	 this	 ‘legacy	 of	 the	 crisis’25	 and	 preventing	 its	 re-
emergence.	Addressing	high	stocks	of	NPLs	may	include	various	ad	hoc	(bank-specific)	
measures	or	system-wide	policy	initiatives.		
3.1.	Management	and	resolution	of	Non-Performing	Loans	(bank-specific	measures)	
Credit	institutions	develop	comprehensive	strategic	plans26	based	on	best	practices	for	
effectively	managing	 and	 resolving	NPLs27,	 such	 as	 setting	 up	 separate	dedicated	 in-
                                                
25	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	p.	11.	
26	Strategy	shall	differ	for	each	asset	class	(retail	loans	–	consumer	and	mortgage	loans	on	one	hand	and	
non-retail	 loans	–commercial	 real	 estate,	 SME	and	corporate	 loans	on	 the	other)	 and	be	 realistic	 and	
achievable	by	creating	sustainable	 long-term	workout	solutions	 in	a	capital-efficient	and	cost-effective	
manner.	Consulting	agencies	design	and	 implement	NPL	strategies	 for	 their	clients,	while	 they	publish	
guideline	brochures	on	their	NPL	management	methodology.	Indicatively,	see:	Alvarez	&	Marsal	(2016),	
Best	Practices	for	Effectively	Managing	Non-Performing	Loans;	Deloitte,	CEE	NPL	markets	in	full	swing:	A	
record	 year	 in	 2016;	 PwC	 (September	 2017),	 Non-performing	 Loans:	 Leveraging	 the	 right	 strategy	 to	
optimise	 your	 company's	 balance	 sheet;	 Grant	 Thornton	 (2018),	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 (NPLs):	 The	
challenges,	opportunities	and	our	 services.	Also,	 the	ECB	has	published	a	 ‘Draft	guidance	 to	banks	on	
Non-Performing	Loans’	(September	2016),	available	at:		
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/npl/npl_guidance.en.pdf,	
see	mainly:	Annex	V-	Common	NPL-related	policies,	pp.	107-112.	
27	About	 the	 factors	 influencing	 the	design	of	 the	best	NPL	 strategy,	 see:	 ‘Draft	guidance	 to	banks	on	
Non-Performing	Loans’,	ECB,	September	2016,	p.10:	‘National	as	well	as	European	regulatory,	legal	and	
judicial	 frameworks	 influence	 the	banks’	NPL	 strategy	and	 their	ability	 to	 reduce	NPLs.	 [...]	Therefore,	
banks	need	to	have	a	good	understanding	of	 the	particularities	of	 legal	proceedings	 linked	to	the	NPL	
workout	for	different	classes	of	assets	and	also	in	the	different	jurisdictions	in	which	they	operate	where	
high	 levels	 of	 NPLs	 are	 present.	 In	 particular,	 they	 should	 assess:	 the	 average	 length	 of	 such	
proceedings,	 the	 average	 financial	 outcomes,	 the	 rank	 of	 different	 types	 of	 exposures	 and	 related	
implications	for	the	outcome	(for	instance	regarding	secured	and	unsecured	exposures),	the	influence	of	
the	 types	 and	 ranks	 of	 collateral	 and	 guarantees	 on	 the	 outcomes	 (for	 instance	 related	 to	 second	or	
third	 liens	 and	 personal	 guarantees),	 the	 impact	 of	 consumer	 protection	 issues	 on	 legal	 decisions	
(especially	for	retail	mortgage	exposures),	and	the	average	total	costs	associated	with	legal	proceedings’	
[italics	 by	 the	 author].	 Debt	 recovery	 should	 include	 the	most	 appropriate	 actions	 taken	 in	 a	 timely	
manner	to	improve	debt	collection	and	maximise	debt	recovery/minimise	loss.		
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house	NPL	units;	identifying,	categorising	and	provisioning	NPLs	more	rigorously;	early	
warning	 and	 detection/recognition	 of	 NPLs;	 standardising	 and	 improving	 collateral	
valuations,	 private	 workout	 (consensual	 enforcement)28,	 legal	 enforcement29	 and	
underwriting	 processes;	 developing	 additional	 restructuring	 products,	 such	 as	
forbearance30;	developing	effective	management	of	foreclosed	assets	(if	relevant);	and	
reporting	and	monitoring	of	NPLs	and	effectiveness	of	NPL	workout	solutions.		
                                                                                                                                          
The	ECB	in	its	‘Draft	guidance	to	banks	on	Non-Performing	Loans’,	pp.109-110,	has	stipulated	indicative	
options	 for	 debt	 recovery,	 namely:	 ‘voluntary	 asset	 sale	 (borrower	 re-engages	 and	 agrees	 to	 sell	 the	
asset);	forced	asset	sale	via	receivers/court	proceedings	(assets	are	not	held	on	the	balance	sheet	of	a	
credit	institution);	foreclosure	of	asset	(assets	are	held	on	the	balance	sheet	of	a	credit	institution);	debt	
collection	(internal	or	external);	debt	to	asset/equity	swap;	sale	of	loan/loan	portfolio	to	a	third	party’.	
Within	this	framework,	‘the	recovery	option	should	take	into	account	the	existence	of	collateral,	type	of	
legal	 documentation,	 type	 of	 borrower,	 local	 market	 conditions	 and	 macroeconomic	 outlook,	 the	
legislative	 framework	 in	place	and	potential	historical	 recovery	 rates	per	option	vs.	 the	costs	 involved	
per	option’.	
28	 Consensual	 debt	 recovery	 involves	measures	 such	 as	 foreclosure,	 restructuring	 the	 loan	 with	 new	
terms,	debt	to	equity	swapping,	debt	to	asset	swapping,	collateral	substitution,	cash	settlement	via	cash	
generated	by	the	underlying	business	or	via	the	sale	of	underlying	collateral	with	borrower’s	consent	or	
via	the	sale	of	other	assets	or	other	cash	sources	of	the	borrower,	repossession	of	the	assets	securing	
the	loan	by	borrower’s	consent	and	out	of	court	restructurings.	
29	 Legal	enforcement	could	 take	 the	 form	of	enforcing	 the	underlying	collateral	 if	 the	borrower	 is	not	
cooperative,	 recovery	 through	 in-court	 restructuring	 schemes	 or	 through	 insolvency,	 liquidation,	 and	
administration	 process.	 In	 Chapters	 III	 and	 IV	 there	 will	 be	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 proposed	 Accelerated	
Extrajudicial	 Collateral	 Enforcement	 mechanism	 in	 comparison	 with	 traditional	 in-court	 enforcement	
procedures,	 the	 existing	 pre-insolvency	 and	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 and	 the	 enforcement	 under	 the	
Financial	Collateral	Directive.	
30	Forbearance	measures	include	a	concession	by	an	institution	towards	an	obligor	that	is	experiencing	
or	 is	 likely	 to	experience	deterioration	 in	 its	 financial	 situation.	A	concession	may	entail	a	 loss	 for	 the	
lender	and	may	consist	of	a	modification	of	the	terms	and	conditions	of	a	debt	obligation	or	a	total	or	
partial	 refinancing	of	 a	 debt	 obligation,	where	 such	modification	or	 refinancing	would	not	 have	been	
granted	had	the	financial	situation	of	the	obligor	not	deteriorated.	Forbearance	measures	can	be	either	
short-term	 (e.g.	 reduced	 payments,	 grace	 period,	 etc.)	 or	 long-term	 (e.g.	 extension	 of	 maturity,	
rescheduled	repayments,	interest	rate	reduction,	etc.)	and	aim	at	ultimately	helping	borrowers	recover	
from	financial	difficulties	and	achieve	sustainable	payments.	Measures	are	considered	as	a	tool	for	NPL	
resolution,	 alternative	 to	 traditional	 in-court	 collateral	 enforcement	 proceedings.	 For	 the	 actions	
considered	as	forbearance	measures,	see:	CRR	II,	Article	47b	(Forbearance	measures).	
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Credit	 restructuring	 through	private	workout	 on	behalf	 of	 credit	 institutions	 or	 their	
specialised	 credit	 servicers,	 could	 be	 followed	 voluntarily	 or	 pursuant	 to	 national	
legislation31.		
3.2.	Policy	initiatives	to	address	Non-Performing	Loans	
At	national	and	at	European	level,	as	elaborated	in	the	next	Chapters,	policy	initiatives	
to	tackle	distressed	debt	focus	on	the	development	of	efficient	secondary	markets	for	
NPLs,	so	that	banks	could	off-load	non-performing	assets	from	their	balance	sheet	via	
secondary	markets	 for	credit32,	 thus	 focusing	their	managerial	capacity	on	evaluating	
and	engaging	 in	new	lending	business,	by	outsourcing	their	distressed	asset	to	credit	
servicers	 specialised	 in	 debt	 collection,	 collateral	 administration	 and	 credit	
                                                
31	 In	 Greece,	 there	 has	 been	 established	 a	 debt	 re-negotiation	 and	 restructuring	 procedure,	
implementing	 the	 Law	4224/2013	 (Government	Gazette	 FEK	A’	 288/31.12.2013),	 namely	 the	 Code	 of	
Conduct	for	Banks	(No	116/1/25.08.2015	Decision	of	the	Credit	and	Insurance	Issues	Committee	on	the	
‘Establishment	 of	 the	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Law	 4224/2013’,	 Government	Gazette	 FEK	 B’	
2289/27.08.2014),	 as	 amended	 with	 the	 Decision	 195/1/29.07.2016	 (Government	 Gazette	 FEK	 B’	
2376/02.08.2016).	 The	amended	Code	of	Conduct	establishes	general	principles	 for	 credit	 institutions	
and	 borrowers,	with	 the	 objective	 of	 restructuring	 or	 finally	 settling	 distressed	 debts,	 according	 each	
borrower’s	 particular	 circumstances.	 The	 terms	 of	 ‘non-cooperating	 debtor’	 and	 ‘reasonable	 living	
expenses’	 are	 also	 defined.	 Banks	 shall	 follow	 the	 proposed	 procedure,	 before	 initiating	 any	 legal	
procedure,	 but	 in	 case	of	 non-conformity	 only	 administrative	 penalties	 by	 the	Bank	of	Greece	will	 be	
applicable.	 Among	 the	 proposed	 solutions	 of	 debt	 restructuring,	 there	 are	 short-term	 ones	 (arrears	
capitalisation,	arrears	repayment	plan,	reduced	payment	above	IO,	Interest	Only-	IO,	reduced	payment	
below	 IO,	 grace	 period),	 long-term	 ones	 (interest	 rate	 reduction,	 loan	 term	 extension,	 split	 balance	
partial	debt	forgiveness/write	down,	operational	restructuring,	debt/equity	swap)	and	final	settlement	
solutions	 (put-of	 court-	 settlement,	 voluntary	 surrender,	 mortgage	 to	 rent/lease,	 voluntary	 sale	 of	
property,	 settlement	 of	 loans,	 auction-collateral	 repossession,	 full	 debt	 write-off).	 These	 solutions	
constitute	a	practical	example	of	 forbearance	measures,	but	 in	 this	 case	as	prior	 to	 the	 traditional	 in-
court	enforcement	proceedings	 (banks’	non-conformity	 induces	 -at	 least-	administrative	 sanctions	 and	
may	constitute	a	case	of	abusive	exercise	of	rights	on	behalf	of	banks,	along	with	other	factors)	and	not	
as	 alternative	 to	 them	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 CRR	 II	 (where	 banks’	 non-participation	 in	 the	 forbearance	
procedure	seems	to	have	no	legal	consequence)	[italics	and	comparison	by	the	author].	
32	 Indeed,	the	purchase	of	distressed	loan	portfolios	 is	considered	as	an	attractive	investment	strategy	
for	 many	 investors,	 depending	 on	 the	 national	 regulatory	 framework	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings,	
enforcement	rights,	NPLs	transfer	requirements,	and	taxation.	
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restructuring.	NPL	portfolios	 could	 also	be	 further	 sold33	 to	 credit	 purchasers34,	 thus	
cleaned	 up	 from	 credit	 institutions’	 balance	 sheets,	 so	 that	 banks	 could	 be	 better	
prepared	 to	 provide	new	 credit	 to	 the	 economy	and	 increase	 their	 profitability.	 The	
underlying	objective	is	the	transfer	and	dissemination	of	the	contractually	undertaken	
credit	 risk	 from	 systemically	 important	 credit	 institutions	 to	 other	 entities,	 so	 that	
systemic	 risk	 of	 banks’	 failure	 and	 spill-over	 effects	 are	 diminished.	 However,	 strict	
underwriting	 practices	 followed	 at	 national	 level	 and	 the	 existing	 undue	 regulatory	
impediments	 to	 loan	 servicing	 by	 third	 parties	 and	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 loans	 result	 in	
disappointingly	low	effectiveness	rates.	
	
Swift	extrajudicial	repossession	of	collateral35	pledged	to	secure	NPLs	is	another	policy	
measure	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 secured	 creditors	 from	 borrowers’	 default.	 Effective	
recovery	of	value	from	secured	loans	could	help	to	avoid	future	build-up	of	NPLs	and	
increase	 corporate	 lending	 flows.	Under	 such	 initiatives,	 debtors'	 protection	may	 be	
                                                
33	 Selling	 NPL	 portfolios	 could	 take	 the	 form	 of	 direct	 sale,	 where	 banks	 or	 asset	 management	
companies	(AMCs)	sell	NPLs	in	dedicated	markets;	securitisation,	where	banks,	special	purpose	vehicles	
or	 AMCs	 pool	 and	 tranche	 loans	 and	 sell	 the	 securitised	 products	 in	 dedicated	 markets;	 or	 sale	 to	
centralised	AMCs,	where	dedicated	companies	buy	bad	assets	from	the	problem	banks.	See:	Baudino,	P.	
&	 Yun,	 H.	 (2017),	 Resolution	 of	 non-	 performing	 loans	 –	 policy	 options,	 FSI	 Insights	 on	 policy	
implementation,	 No	 3,	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements,	 October	 2017,	 p.	 11,	 available	 at:	
https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights3.pdf.	
34	For	instance,	in	Greece,	within	the	context	of	Greece's	Third	Economic	Adjustment	Program,	there	has	
been	 introduced	 a	 new	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 sale,	 transfer	 and	management	 of	 claims	 from	Non-
Performing	 Loans	 and	 credit	 agreements,	 namely	 the	 Greek	 Law	 4354/2015	 (the	 ‘NPL	 Law’)	 on	
‘Management	of	Non-Performing	Loans,	wage	provisions	and	other	urgent	provisions	implementing	the	
agreement	 on	 budgetary	 objectives	 and	 structural	 reforms	 (Government	 Gazette,	 FEK	 A'	 176/16-12-
2015).	The	establishment	and	operation	of	Debt	Management	Companies	and	Debt	Transfer	Companies	
is	 there	 regulated.	 Transfer	 of	 NPLs	 could	 also	 be	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 Greek	 Law	 3156/2003	 (the	
‘Securitisation	 Law’)	 on	 ‘Bond	 loans,	 securitisation	 of	 claims	 and	 rights	 from	 real	 estate	 and	 other	
provisions’	(Government	Gazette,	FEK	A’	157/	25-06-2003),	as	amended	by	the	Law	4416/2016.	
35	 For	 out-of-court	 NPL	 resolution	 and	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement,	 see:	 Mako,	 W.P.	 (2003),	
Facilitating	out-of-court	workouts	in	a	crisis:	lessons	from	East	Asia,	1998–2001,	in:	Maximising	value	of	
nonperforming	 assets,	 Proceedings	 from	 the	 Third	 Forum	 for	 Asian	 Insolvency	 Reform,	 Seoul,	 10–11	
November	2003,	pp.	37-51.	
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also	 promoted,	 in	 the	 light	 of	 safeguards	 for	 consumers	 and	 over-indebted	
households.	 However,	 the	 legal	 frameworks	 for	 collateral	 enforcement36	 across	
Member	 States	 are	 divergent	 and	 out-of-court	 resolution	 is	 not	widely	 preferred	 or	
even	possible	at	national	level37.	
	
It	 is	 the	 bitter	 truth	 that	 restructuring	 of	 NPLs	 and	 debt	 recovery	 through	 pre-
insolvency	 preventive	 restructuring	 and	 insolvency	 proceedings	 are	 highly	 divergent	
among	 Member	 States,	 not	 providing	 legal	 certainty	 and	 may	 be	 time-consuming,	
unpredictable	and	 inefficient.	 Therefore,	 a	 European	 strategy	 for	NPLs38,	 drawing	on	
experience	 gained	 during	 the	 crisis	 and	 best	 practices	 effectively	 implemented	 in	
                                                
36	For	instance,	in	Greece,	collateral	enforcement	procedure	depends	on	the	type	of	the	security	and	the	
legal	 instrument	 of	 its	 creation.	 Collateral	 enforcement	 may	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 a	 judicial	 procedure	
leading	 to	 the	 liquidation	of	 the	debtor's	assets	 through	public	auction	or	 through	direct	collection	of	
any	pledged	assets	by	 the	secured	party	or	 through	direct	sale	of	 the	mortgaged	assets	under	certain	
circumstances	and	exclusively	for	the	enforcement	of	mortgages	established	over	aircrafts	and	vessels.	
With	respect	to	the	enforcement	of	financial	collaterals,	in	the	event	of	default,	the	secured	party	may	
either	realise/appropriate	the	financial	collateral	without	any	prior	judicial	or	enforcement	proceedings	
or	apply	a	 close-out	netting	by	 setting	off	 the	value	of	 the	 financial	 collateral	against	 the	outstanding	
amount	 of	 secured	obligations.	Unfortunately,	 timeframes	 for	 enforcement	 are	 largely	 unpredictable,	
depending	on	the	type	of	security	and	the	enforcement	procedure	followed,	but	usually	enforcement	is	
time-consuming,	costly	and	complicated.	
37	See:	European	Commission	-	Fact	Sheet	‘Frequently	asked	questions:	Action	Plan	on	the	Reduction	of	
Non-Performing	 Loans	 in	 Europe’,	 14.03.2018,	 available	 at:	 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-18-1803_en.htm:	 ‘Out-of-court	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 provide	 secured	 creditors	
with	 legal	 instruments	 to	 enforce	 collateral	more	 quickly.	 However,	 these	 solutions	 currently	 do	 not	
exist	in	all	Member	States	for	all	types	of	collateral’.		
38	 See:	 Council	 conclusions	 on	 Action	 plan	 to	 tackle	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 in	 Europe,	 Press	 Release	
459/17,	Council	of	the	EU,	11.07.2017,	which	underlines	the	urgency	for	a	European	strategy	to	address	
‘cross-border	 spill-overs	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 overall	 economy	 and	 financial	 system	 of	 the	 EU’	 that	 ‘alter	
market	perceptions	of	 the	European	banking	 sector	 as	 a	whole,	 especially	within	 the	Banking	Union’.	
Also,	it	is	noted	that	‘while	banks	are	primarily	responsible	for	restructuring	their	business	models	and	
resolving	their	NPLs	 issues	 in	a	timely	manner,	 further	measures	to	address	the	existing	stock	of	NPLs	
and	 to	 prevent	 the	 future	 emergence	 and	 accumulation	 of	 NPLs	would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
whole	by	contributing	to	enhanced	growth	and	reducing	financial	 fragmentation’.	For	further	analysis,	
see	the	following	Chapter.
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Member	 States,	 could	help	 to	 address	 this	 issue	across	 the	EU	and	 support	national	
actions	 in	 the	 countries	 concerned39.	 More	 specifically,	 strengthening	 the	 ability	 of	
secured	 creditors	 to	 recover	 value	 from	 secured	 loans	 to	 corporations	 and	
entrepreneurs	 became	 a	 top	 priority	 for	 the	 Commission40,	 within	 a	 comprehensive	
package	of	legislative	measures	it	recently	adopted	(the	so-called	‘NPL	package’).		
	
For	these	reasons,	before	analysing	the	proposed	and	existing	collateral	enforcement	
framework	 for	 NPLs	 in	 Europe,	 it	 is	 of	 outmost	 interest	 to	 further	 investigate	 the	
previous	actions	taken	at	European	level	to	address	high	stocks	of	NPLs	and	to	prevent	
their	future	accumulation,	in	the	following	Chapter.		
	
	
                                                
39	See:	Reflection	Paper,	p.	19.	
40	 Consultation	 Document:	 Development	 Of	 Secondary	 Markets	 For	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 And	
Distressed	 Assets	 And	 Protection	 Of	 Secured	 Creditors	 From	 Borrowers’	 Default,	 10.07.2017,	 p.	 3,	
available	 at:	 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-non-performing-loans-consultation-
document_en.pdf	
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II	 PREVIOUS	 POLICY	 INITIATIVES	 IN	 EUROPE	 TO	 ADDRESS	 NON-
PERFORMING	LOANS	
In	Europe,	several	policy	initiatives	have	been	adopted	with	the	objective	to	effectively	
address	the	current	high	stocks	of	NPLs	and	to	prevent	their	excessive	accumulation	in	
the	future41.	The	most	significant	ones	are	elaborated	in	the	present	Chapter.			
1.	Reflection	Paper	on	the	Deepening	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	
In	 May	 2017,	 the	 European	 Commission	 published	 a	 Reflection	 Paper	 on	 the	
Deepening	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	(EMU).	In	this	Paper,	the	Commission	
referred	 to	 the	 story	 of	 the	 Euro	 so	 far	 and	 made	 some	 reflections	 on	 a	 possible	
roadmap	 towards	 the	 completion	of	 the	 EMU	by	 2025	 and	 its	 necessary	 toolbox.	 In	
this	 roadmap,	 progress	 should	 have	 been	made	 by	 certain	 years	 in	 the	 axes	 of	 the	
Financial	Union	 (Banking	and	Capital	Markets	Union),	 the	Economic	and	Fiscal	Union	
and	the	Democratic	Accountability-	Effective	Governance	policy.		
	
The	Reflection	Paper	underlined	that	a	resilient	to	adverse	shocks,	transparent,	more	
integrated	and	well-functioning	financial	system	is	essential	for	an	effective	and	stable	
EMU.	It	reaffirmed	the	need	to	address	remaining	sources	of	financial	vulnerability	and	
fragility,	 in	 order	 to	 further	 promote	 financial	 integration.	 In	 the	 crisis	 turmoil,	 bank	
lending	 and	 provision	 of	 credit	 to	 the	 real	 economy	was	 diminished,	with	 tightened	
lending	 terms	and	 falling	 lending	volumes.	The	problem	was	exacerbated	due	 to	 the	
overwhelming	reliance	on	banks	as	a	source	of	funding,	particularly	for	SMEs,	and	the	
relative	absence	of	other	sources	of	financing,	such	as	equity	markets.	Therefore,	the	
completion	 of	 a	 genuine	 Financial	 Union	 shall	 be	 pursued	 with	 several	 measures42,	
                                                
41	 In	 Bibliography	 there	 is	 a	 list	 of	 all	 Institutional	 Documents	 reviewed	 in	 this	 and	 in	 the	 following	
Chapter.	
42	The	Commission	stressed	the	significance	of	resolute	and	coordinated	action	at	the	EU	level	and	set	
forth	reforms	in	key	policy	areas.	For	the	period	2017-2019,	other	measures	towards	the	completion	of	
the	 Banking	 and	 Capital	 Markets	 Union	 under	 the	 Pillar	 of	 completing	 the	 Financial	 Union	 include:	
‘setting	 up	 of	 a	 common	 backstop	 for	 the	 Single	 Resolution	 Fund,	 agreeing	 on	 a	 European	 Deposit	
Insurance	 Scheme,	 reviewing	 European	 Supervisory	 Authorities	 and	 working	 towards	 establishing	
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including	 the	 implementation	 of	 further	 risk-reducing	 measures	 for	 the	 financial	
sector43,	 a	 shift	 from	 public	 to	 private	 risk-sharing,	 a	 strategy	 to	 reduce	 Non-
Performing	Loans	and	the	finalisation	of	Capital	Markets	Union	initiatives.	
	
Regarding	 Non-Performing	 Loans,	 in	 particular,	 the	 Commission	 reflected	 the	
imperative	need	for	a	comprehensive	European	strategy	for	NPLs	by	June	2017,	along	
with	a	comprehensive	toolbox	and	practical	 implementation,	 in	order	to	address	this	
crisis	 legacy	 and	 to	 support	 national	 actions	 in	 the	 countries	 concerned.	 The	
Commission	recognised	that	NPLs	weigh	on	the	performance	of	the	euro-area	banking	
sector	 and	 result	 in	 financial	 fragility.	 This	 strategy	 should	 aim	 at	 addressing	 the	
existing	high	stocks	of	NPLs	and	their	possible	future	accumulation,	as	an	essential	step	
to	 complete	 the	 Banking	 Union,	 to	 ensure	 competition	 in	 the	 banking	 sector,	 to	
preserve	financial	stability	and	to	encourage	lending	within	the	Union44.	An	integrated	
financial	 system	 will	 enhance	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 EMU	 to	 adverse	 shocks	 by	
facilitating	 private	 cross-border	 risk-sharing,	while	 reducing	 the	 need	 for	 public	 risk-
sharing.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 Banking	Union	 shall	 be	 completed	 and	 the	 Capital	Markets	
Union	further	developed.	
                                                                                                                                          
Sovereign	Bond-Backed	Securities	for	the	euro	area’.	See	Reflection	Paper,	Annex	I.	A	possible	Roadmap	
towards	the	Completion	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	by	2025,	p.	31.	
43	Risk	reduction	and	banks’	resilience	shall	be	pursued	through	the	Banking	Package	of	November	2016	
with	further	risk-	reducing	measures	along	four	key	policy	areas:	(i)	Supervision,	(ii)	Secondary	markets,	
(iii)	Structural	issues	(including	insolvency),	(iv)	Restructuring	of	the	banking	system.	For	the	last	tool,	a	
commitment	 was	 made	 to	 agree	 upon	 such	 a	 strategy	 at	 the	 ECOFIN	 Council	 of	 June	 2017.	 See:	
Reflection	 Paper,	 4.3.	 A	 genuine	 Financial	 Union	 –	 advancing	 in	 parallel	 on	 risk-reduction	 and	 risk	
sharing,	p.	21,	Table	‘Elements	to	complete	the	Financial	Union’.	
44	See:	Reflection	Paper,	3.2.	The	need	to	tackle	remaining	sources	of	financial	vulnerability,	p.	14,	Table	
‘Why	further	steps	towards	Financial	Union?’:	‘Further	steps	are	needed	to	reduce	and	share	risks	in	the	
banking	 sector	 and	 to	provide	better	 financing	opportunities	 for	 the	 real	 economy,	 including	 through	
capital	markets.	The	completion	of	the	Banking	Union	and	of	the	Capital	Markets	Union	is	paramount	to	
achieve	this’.	
  
17 
1.1.	Communication	to	complete	Europe’s	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	
After	the	Reflection	Paper,	the	Commission	communicated	a	crystallised	roadmap45	to	
strengthen	and	complete	Europe’s	Economic	and	Monetary	Union.	In	this	roadmap,	it	
set	a	pragmatic	path	 for	a	swift	agreement	on	outstanding	 issues.	On	 the	 top	of	 the	
Commission’s	 agenda	 was	 action	 towards	 risk-reduction,	 with	 the	 objective	 of	
strengthening	the	resilience	of	EU	banks.	The	Commission	recognised	that	NPLs	remain	
a	challenge	in	the	European	banking	sector.	
1.2.	Communication	to	complete	the	Banking	Union	
The	 Commission	 communicated	 a	way	 forward	 to	 complete	 the	 Banking	 Union46	 by	
promoting	risk	reduction	and	risk	sharing,	which	called	for	a	comprehensive	package47	
on	 tackling	 NPLs	 within	 the	 Union.	 One	 of	 the	 significant	 additional	 measures	 to	
further	 reduce	 risks	 in	 the	Banking	Union	 is	 to	put	 forward	 risk	 reduction	efforts	on	
NPLs48.	 The	 Commission	 welcomed	 the	 comprehensive	 approach	 adopted	 by	 the	
Council’s	 Action	 Plan	 of	 July	 201749,	 consistent	 with	 the	 Commission’s	 own	
longstanding	calls	to	tackle	NPLs,	thus	the	Commission	will	take	the	necessary	actions	
within	 its	 competence.	The	Commission	held	 that	progress	 in	 this	Action	Plan	would	
support	the	completion	of	the	Banking	Union	and	render	European	banks	more	stable	
and	competitive50.		
                                                
45	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	Council,	the	Council	
and	 the	 European	Central	 Bank	 -	 further	 steps	 towards	 completing	 Europe's	 Economic	 and	Monetary	
Union:	a	Roadmap,	COM/2017/821/Final,	06.12.2017	[hereafter:	Roadmap	to	complete	the	EMU].	
46	Communication	 to	 the	European	Parliament,	 the	Council,	 the	European	Central	Bank,	 the	European	
Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	the	Committee	of	 the	Regions	on	completing	the	Banking	Union,	
COM/2017/592/Final,	11.10.2017	[hereafter:	Communication	to	complete	the	Banking	Union].	
47	See	below	under	II.2.		
48	 See:	 Communication	 to	 complete	 the	 Banking	 Union,	 p.	 15:	 ‘Non-Performing	 Loans	 weigh	 on	 the	
profitability	 and	 viability	 of	 affected	 banks	 and	 constrain	 banks'	 ability	 to	 lend,	 ultimately	 hampering	
economic	growth,	thus	the	build-up	of	new	NPLs	must	be	prevented’.	
49	See	below	under	II.2.	
50	Communication	to	complete	the	Banking	Union,	p.	17.	
  
18 
1.3.	Communication	to	complete	the	Capital	Markets	Union	
The	Commission	also	set	as	 its	objective	 the	 reduction	of	NPLs,	as	crucial	 for	 the	EU	
economies'	 capacity	 to	 stabilise	 and	 absorb	 economic	 shocks	 through	 deep	 and	
integrated	capital	markets51.	For	a	well-functioning	Capital	Markets	Union	(CMU)	with	
established	 secondary	 markets	 for	 NPLs,	 essential	 is	 the	 enhanced	 management	 of	
NPLs	 within	 more	 efficient	 and	more	 predictable	 loan	 enforcement	 frameworks	 for	
value	 recovery	 by	 secured	 creditors52;	 value	 recovery	 from	 collateral	 in	 a	 swifter	
manner	 through	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 procedures	 will	 facilitate	 the	
provision	of	new	credit	 flow	 from	banks	 to	 the	economy,	particularly	 to	SMEs,	 i.e.	 it	
will	facilitate	access	to	finance	for	companies.		
2.	Action	Plan	to	tackle	Non-Performing	Loans	in	Europe	
Indeed,	 reflecting	 the	 shared	 agreement	 on	 the	 need	 to	 continue	 and	 extend	 the	
actions	already	initiated	by	the	Commission,	in	July	2017	the	Council	adopted	‘Action	
Plan	 To	 Tackle	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 in	 Europe’53.	 The	 Council	 recognised	 that	 the	
financial	 crisis	 and	 ensuing	 recessions	 have	 resulted	 in	 high	 ratios	 of	 NPLs.	 It	 also	
highlighted	the	negative	effects	of	current	high	NPL	ratios	 in	a	substantial	number	of	
Member	 States	 and	 the	 subsequent	 risk	 of	 cross-border	 spill-overs	 to	 the	 overall	
economy	and	financial	system	of	the	EU.	Market	perception	of	the	EU	banking	sector	
                                                
51 See:	 Communication	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 European	
Council,	the	Council,	the	European	Social	and	Economic	Committee	and	the	Committee	of	the	Regions:	
Completing	 the	 Capital	 Markets	 Union	 by	 2019	 -	 Time	 to	 accelerate	 delivery,	 COM/2018/114,	
08.03.2018	 [hereafter:	 Communication	 to	 complete	 the	 Capital	 Markets	 Union],	 p.	 1:	 ‘Deep	 and	
integrated	capital	markets	foster	cross-border	private	risk-sharing	in	the	euro	area,	thereby	boosting	the	
productive	and	innovative	use	of	private	capital,	broadening	and	diversifying	the	sources	and	means	of	
funding	to	the	real	economy,	and	reducing	the	need	for	public	sector	risk-sharing’.	
52	 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 Council,	 the	 European	
Economic	 and	 Social	 Committee	 and	 the	 Committee	 of	 the	 Regions	 on	 the	Mid-Term	 Review	 of	 the	
Capital	Markets	Union	Action	 Plan,	 COM/2017/292/Final,	 08.06.2017	 [hereafter:	Mid-Term	Review	of	
the	CMU],	4.4.	Using	capital	markets	to	strengthen	bank	lending	and	stability,	p.	13.	
53	Council	conclusions	on	Action	plan	to	tackle	Non-Performing	Loans	in	Europe,	Press	Release	459/17,	
Council	 of	 the	 EU,	 11.07.2017,	 available	 at:	 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/07/11/conclusions-non-performing-loans/pdf	[hereafter:	Council’s	Action	Plan].	
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has	been	adversely	affected,	while	high	NPL	levels	heavily	reflect	on	investment,	hence	
on	 the	economy.	For	 these	 reasons,	 in	Council’s	opinion,	 the	need	 to	 swiftly	 resolve	
NPLs	is	imperative,	in	order	to	reduce	financial	fragmentation	and	to	facilitate	capital	
flows	within	the	single	market.	
	
Aiming	 at	 restoring	 NPLs	 ratios	 to	 sustainable	 lower	 levels	 and	 at	 encouraging	 pro-
active	actions	on	behalf	of	credit	institutions,	the	Action	Plan	set	out	a	comprehensive	
approach,	 combining	 various	 complementary	 policy	 actions,	 at	 national	 level	 and	 at	
Union	 level	where	 appropriate,	 in	 four	 areas:	 (i)	 bank	 supervision	 and	 regulation	 (ii)	
structural	 reforms	 of	 restructuring,	 insolvency	 and	 debt	 recovery	 frameworks,	 (iii)	
development	 of	 secondary	 markets	 for	 distressed	 assets,	 and	 (iv)	 fostering	
restructuring	of	the	banking	system.	Actions	in	these	areas	should	be	taken	at	national	
level	 and	 at	 Union	 level	 where	 appropriate,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 subsidiarity	
principle.	Some	measures	will	have	a	stronger	impact	on	banks'	risk	assessment	at	loan	
origination,	while	others	will	foster	swift	recognition	and	better	management	of	NPLs,	
and	 further	measures	will	 enhance	 the	market	 value	 of	 such	NPLs.	 These	measures	
mutually	reinforce	each	other	and	would	not	be	sufficiently	effective,	if	 implemented	
in	isolation.	
	
Under	 this	 Action	 Plan,	 the	 Council	 called	 upon	 various	 institutions,	 namely	 the	
Commission,	the	ECB	Banking	Supervision,	the	European	Banking	Authority	(EBA),	the	
European	 Systemic	 Risk	 Board	 (ESRB)	 and	 Member	 States,	 to	 take	 appropriate	
measures	 to	 further	 address	 the	 high	 number	 of	 NPLs	 in	 the	 Union54.	 Within	 this	
framework,	there	should	be	carried	out	a	benchmarking	exercise	on	the	efficiency	of	
national	 loan	 enforcement	 regimes	 from	 a	 bank	 creditor	 perspective,	 providing	
precise,	 reliable	 and	 comparable	 metrics	 for	 recovery	 rates,	 recovery	 times	 and	
recovery	costs	across	Member	States,	along	with	dedicated	peer-reviews	on	insolvency	
regimes	across	the	EU.	The	Commission	was	called	to	further	analyse	the	possibility	of	
enhancing	the	protection	of	secured	creditors.	This	objective	is	crucial	for	the	analysis	
                                                
54	For	a	list	of	measures	taken	by	each	institution,	see:	Annex	II.	
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of	the	proposed	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism55,	as	it	seems	that	any	
EU-wide	 policy	 initiative	 that	 is	 creditor-friendly	 in	 essence	 may	 not	 explicitly	 be	
detrimental	to	borrowers’	rights	but	practically	have	such	implied	outcome.	
3.	First	Report	on	the	implementation	of	the	Action	Plan	
The	 Commission	 published	 the	 First	 Progress	 Report56	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	
Council’s	Action	Plan	to	tackle	NPLs	 in	January	2018.	According	to	this	report,	one	of	
the	 actions	 to	 be	 followed	 is	 the	 enhanced	protection	 of	 secured	 creditors	 by	more	
efficient	 methods	 of	 value	 recovery	 from	 secured	 corporate	 loans	 through	 the	
expedited	and	efficient	Accelerated	Extrajudicial	Collateral	Enforcement	(AECE)57.	This	
first	assessment	congratulated	the	overall	significant	progression	risk	reduction	in	the	
EU	 banking	 sector	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 NPL	 ratios	 in	 the	 Union.	 The	 need	 for	
continued	concerted	action	at	EU	level	was	stressed,	with	view	to	a	dedicated	package	
of	measures	to	be	adopted	by	the	Commission	in	March	201858.	
	
Progress	on	the	benchmarking	exercise	on	the	efficiency	of	national	loan	enforcement	
(including	 insolvency)	 regimes	was	 presented	 to	 and	 discussed	with	Member	 States	
experts	at	the	September	and	December	2017	meetings	of	the	expert	group	on	NPLs,	
noting	 a	 lack	 of	 access	 to	meaningful	 data59.	 It	 was	 noted	 that	 the	management	 of	
NPLs	 would	 benefit	 from	 more	 efficient	 and	 predictable	 loan	 enforcement	 and	
                                                
55	See	below	in	Chapter	III.	
56	 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 Council	 and	 the	 European	
Central	 Bank-	 First	 Progress	 Report	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 In	 Europe,	
COM/2018/037/Final,	18.01.2018	[hereafter:	First	Progress	Report].	
57	Ibid,	p.	5.	
58	Ibid,	p.	6,	Conclusions.	The	report	underlines	that	high	NPL	ratios	remain	an	important	challenge	for	
the	Union	as	a	whole,	however	–overall-	important	progress	is	being	made.	This	pace	of	progress	should	
be	maintained	in	the	future,	with	aims	to	effectively	address	the	challenge	of	NPLs,	in	terms	of	reducing	
existing	stocks	to	sustainable	levels	and	preventing	any	future	accumulation.	
59	 Commission	 Staff	 Working	 Document,	 accompanying	 the	 document	 ‘Communication	 from	 the	
Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 Council	 and	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank-	 First	 Progress	
Report	on	 the	 reduction	of	Non-Performing	Loans	 In	Europe’,	 SWD/2018/033/Final/2,	23.01.2018,	12.	
Benchmarking	 exercise	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 national	 loan	 enforcement	 (including	 insolvency)	 regimes	
from	a	bank	creditor	perspective,	p.	19.	
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insolvency	 frameworks,	 therefore	this	benchmarking	exercise	of	such	regimes	should	
establish	 a	 reliable	 picture	 of	 the	 delays	 and	 value	 recovery	 that	 banks	 experience	
when	faced	with	borrowers60.	
4.	Second	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	NPLs	in	Europe			
Indeed,	 in	 March	 2018	 the	 Commission	 adopted	 a	 ‘comprehensive	 package’	 of	
complementary	legislative	proposals,	addressing	NPLs	with	the	aim	to	foster	financial	
stability	 in	 the	 EU61.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	 enable	 Member	 States	 to	 address	 NPLs	 in	 a	
determined	way	and	avoid	excessive	build-up	of	NPLs	in	the	future62.	
	
As	 part	 of	 banks’	 prudential	 requirements,	 banks	 will	 be	 required	 to	 put	 aside	
sufficient	 resources	 (own	 funds)	 to	 address	 Non-Performing	 Exposures	 when	 new	
loans	 become	 non-performing,	 appropriately	 incentivised	 to	 identify	 and	 manage	
impaired	assets	at	an	early	stage,	so	as	to	avoid	too	large	accumulations	of	NPLs63.	 If	
loans	eventually	become	non-performing,	more	efficient	enforcement	mechanisms	for	
secured	 loans	will	 allow	 banks	 to	 recover	 value	 from	 collateralised	 NPLs,	 subject	 to	
appropriate	 safeguards	 for	 debtors	 and	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 loans	 granted	 to	
consumers.	For	too	high	stocks	of	NPLs,	it	is	imperative	that	efficient,	competitive	and	
transparent	secondary	markets	be	created,	so	that	banks	will	be	able	to	outsource	the	
management	or	sell	NPL	portfolios	to	other	operators64.	Where	NPLs	have	become	a	
significant	 and	 broad-based	 problem,	Member	 States	 may	 set	 up	 effective	 national	
                                                
60	Ibid,	p.	13.	
61	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	Council,	the	Council	
and	the	European	Central	Bank	-	Second	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	Non-Performing	Loans	in	
Europe,	COM/2018/133/Final,	14.03.2018	[hereafter:	Second	Progress	Report].	
62	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	3.	A	Comprehensive	Package	to	address	remaining	and	future	NPLs,	p.	7.	
63	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	3.	A	Comprehensive	Package	to	address	remaining	and	future	NPLs,	p.	7.	
See	below	under	II.4.1.	
64	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	3.	A	Comprehensive	Package	to	address	remaining	and	future	NPLs,	p.	7.	
See	below	in	Chapter	 III	 the	analysis	on	the	proposed	Accelerated	Extrajudicial	Collateral	Enforcement	
mechanism.		
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Asset	Management	Companies	(AMCs)	or	other	measures	under	current	State	aid	and	
bank	resolution	rules65.	
	
All	 legislative	 proposals	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 package	mutually	 reinforce	 each	 other	
and	 would	 not	 be	 as	 effective,	 if	 implemented	 in	 isolation66.	 The	 package	 covers	 a	
major	 part	 of	 the	 Council’s	 Action	 Plan	 and	 aimed	 to	 create	 the	 appropriate	
environment	 for	 addressing	 existing	NPLs	 on	 banks’	 balance	 sheet	 and	 reducing	 the	
risk	 of	 their	 future	 accumulation67.	 It	 is	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 actions	 by	 the	
Commission,	the	ECB,	the	EBA	and	the	ESRB	will	create	important	synergies68.		
	
Overall,	significant	progress	has	been	made	in	risk	reduction	in	the	EU	banking	sector	
and	the	stock	of	NPLs	is	in	decline.	NPL	reduction	and	prevention	is	an	important	step	
towards	 completing	 the	 Banking	 Union69,	 to	 address	 financial	 fragmentation	 and	
establish	 an	 economically	 beneficial,	 more	 stable	 and	 more	 integrated	 EU	 banking	
sector.	
                                                
65	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	3.	A	Comprehensive	Package	to	address	remaining	and	future	NPLs,	p.	7.	
See	below	under	II.4.2.	
66	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	7.	A	strong	package	with	mutually	reinforcing	measures,	p.	11:	‘Some	of	
the	 proposed	 measures	 will	 have	 a	 stronger	 impact	 on	 banks’	 ex-ante	 risk	 assessment	 at	 loan	
origination,	some	will	foster	swift	recognition	and	better	management	of	NPLs,	and	others	will	enhance	
the	market	value	of	NPLs’.	
67	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	7.	A	strong	package	with	mutually	reinforcing	measures,	p.	11.	
68	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	p.	13:	‘The	proposed	statutory	minimum	coverage	requirements	would	
provide	strong	incentives	for	banks’	management	to	prevent	the	accumulation	of	future	NPLs	through	
better	NPL	management	and	stronger	loan	origination	practices.	This	will	reinforce	the	expected	effects	
of	the	ongoing	work	by	the	ECB	and	the	EBA	on	banks’	loan	origination,	NPL	management,	monitoring	
and	 internal	 governance	practices.	Work	on	NPL	 information	and	market	 infrastructure	would	 further	
enhance	the	functioning	of	secondary	markets	for	NPLs’.	
69	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	8.	Conclusions,	pp.	13-14.	
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4.1.	The	proposed	Capital	Requirements	Regulation	II	
The	 Commission	 has	 put	 forward	 various	 measures	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 create	 the	
appropriate	 environment70	 for	 credit	 institutions	 to	 deal	with	NPLs	 on	 their	 balance	
sheets	 and	 to	 prevent	 the	 risk	 of	 under-provisioning	of	 future	NPLs71.	 The	 amended	
Capital	Requirements	Regulation	(referred	to	as	‘CRR	II’)	provides	for	deductions	from	
banks’	 own	 funds	 in	 case	 of	 insufficient	 provisioning	 for	 (now	 commonly	 defined72)	
Non-Performing	 Exposures	 (‘NPEs’)73.	 The	 amendment	 introduces	 the	 so-called	
‘statutory	prudential	backstops’,	i.e.	common	minimum	loss	coverage	for	the	amount	
of	money	banks	need	to	set	aside	to	cover	losses	caused	by	future	loans	that	turn	non-
performing74.		
	
	Within	this	framework,	credit	institutions	will	be	required	to	put	aside	sufficient	own	
funds,	 in	order	to	cover	 incurred	and	expected	 losses	on	newly	originated	 loans	that	
                                                
70	See:	Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	amending	Regulation	
(EU)	No	575/2013	as	 regards	minimum	 loss	 coverage	 for	Non-Performing	Exposures,	COM/2018/134/	
final,	14.03.2018,	Procedure	reference	2018/0060	(COD)	[hereafter:	CRR	II],	Explanatory	Memorandum,	
p.	2.		
71	Insufficiently	provisioned	NPLs	often	pile	up	on	banks'	balance	sheets,	which	in	turn	may	cast	doubt	
on	the	bank's	future	profitability,	solvency	and	thus	its	long-term	viability.	See:	First	Progress	Report,	p.	
2:	 ‘NPLs	require	higher	levels	of	provisioning.	Loan	provisions	reduce	bank	profitability	and	reduce	the	
bank's	 regulatory	 capital.	 In	 the	 most	 severe	 cases,	 the	 necessary	 accounting	 for	 NPLs	 can	 put	 in	
question	the	viability	of	a	bank	with	potential	implications	for	financial	stability’.	
72	Common	definitions	establish	a	sound	legal	basis	and	ensure	consistency	in	the	prudential	treatment	
of	Non-Performing	Exposures.	 See:	 CRR	 II,	 Explanatory	Memorandum,	p.	 5.	 The	 common	definition	 is	
based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 NPEs	 set	 forth	 by	 Commission	 Implementing	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 680/2014,	
already	commonly	applied	for	supervisory	reporting	purposes.	See:	CRR	II,	Explanatory	Memorandum,	p.	
9.	
73	Non-Performing	Exposures	are	defined	in	Article	47a	of	the	CRR	II.		
74	 See:	 Second	 Progress	 Report,	 pp.	 11-12:	 ‘The	 prudential	 backstop	will	 ensure	 that	 credit	 losses	 on	
future	NPLs	are	sufficiently	provisioned	for,	thus	making	their	resolution	easier.	These	effects	would	be	
complemented	by	more	developed	 secondary	markets	 for	NPLs,	which	would	 strengthen	demand	 for	
NPLs	and	raise	their	market	value.	This	will	allow	banks	to	sell	NPLs	more	easily	in	light	of	more	stringent	
provisioning	rules’.	
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become	 non-performing75.	 This	 would	 appropriately	 incentivise	 banks	 to	 address	
insufficiently	 provisioned	 NPLs	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 and	 prevent	 their	 future	 excessive	
accumulation	 on	 banks'	 balance	 sheets.	 Competent	 authorities	 of	 credit	 institutions	
will	guide	them	in	this76,	based	on	their	existing	bank-specific	‘Pillar	2’	powers,	under	
the	existing	Capital	Requirements	Regulation	(CRR)	77.	
	
The	Council	 approved	position	on	 capital	 requirements	 for	banks	with	NPLs	on	 their	
balance	sheets	 in	October	201878,	 thereafter	starting	negotiations	with	the	European	
Parliament.	The	Council	recognised	that	addressing	bad	loans	and	consolidating	banks'	
balance	sheets	 is	essential	 for	 the	reconsolidation	of	public’s	 trust	and	confidence	 in	
the	 financial	 system.	 This	 objective	 requires	 solid	 prudential	 rules	 and	 effective	
                                                
75	 See:	 CRR	 II,	 Explanatory	 Memorandum,	 pp.	 10-11:	 ‘Different	 coverage	 requirements	 would	 apply,	
depending	on	the	classifications	of	the	NPEs	as	‘unsecured’	or	‘secured’.	[...]	Secured	NPEs	are	in	general	
less	 risky	 for	 a	 institution	 than	 unsecured	 NPEs	 as	 the	 credit	 protection	 securing	 the	 loan	 gives	 the	
lender	a	specific	claim	on	an	asset	or	against	a	third	party	without	reducing	his/her	general	claim	against	
the	defaulted	borrower.	[...]	Recovery	rates	are	on	average	significantly	higher	for	secured	NPEs	than	for	
unsecured	ones.	However,	 it	 takes	 some	 additional	 time	 to	 enforce	 the	 credit	 protection	 and,	where	
applicable,	realise	the	collateral.	Unsecured	NPEs	should	therefore	require	higher	and	timelier	minimum	
loss	coverage	by	the	creditor	bank	than	secured	NPEs.	However,	after	a	certain	number	of	years	without	
being	 successfully	 enforced	 (i.e.	 the	 collateral/guarantee	 could	 not	 be	 realised),	 the	 credit	 protection	
should	not	be	 seen	as	 effective	 anymore.	 In	 such	 case,	 also	 full	 coverage	of the	exposure	 amount	of	
secured	 NPEs	 is	 deemed	 necessary’.	 The	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 CRR	 II	 held	 that	 timely	
resolution	 of	 secured	 NPEs	 should	 be	 facilitated	 by	 the	 use	 of	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	
procedures	 for	 collateral,	 because	 banks	 using	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedures	 tend	 to	
restructure,	 recover	 or	 dispose	 of	 their	 NPEs	 earlier	 and	 at	 a	 higher	 rate.	 Therefore,	 would	 be	 less	
affected	by	the	need	to	increase	their	loss	coverage	for	NPEs.	
Likewise,	 different	 coverage	 requirements	would	 apply,	 depending	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 collateral	 as	
‘movable’	or	immovable’,	since	immovable	property	(commercial	or	residential	real	estate)	is	reasonably	
expected	to	have	a	remaining	value	for	a	longer	period	of	time	after	the	loan	turned	non-performing.		
76	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	p.	7.	
77	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 575/2013	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 26	 June	 2013	 on	
prudential	requirements	for	credit	 institutions	and	investment	firms	and	amending	Regulation	(EU)	No	
648/2012,	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	OJ	L	176,	27.6.2013.	
78	‘Non-performing	Loans:	Council	approves	position	on	capital	requirements	for	banks'	bad	loans’,	Press	
Release	594/18,	Council	of	the	EU,	31.10.2018.	
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monitoring	 tools,	 as	 provided	 by	 the	 proposed	 regulation.	 The	 Council	 expressed	 its	
optimism	that	through	this	new	prudential	backstop	the	Banking	Union	may	ultimately	
be	strengthened.	
4.2.		The	Blueprint	on	Asset	Management	Companies	
As	 part	 of	 the	 comprehensive	 NPL	 package,	Member	 States	 are	 provided	with	 non-
binding	 guidance	 on	 how	 they	 can	 set	 up,	 where	 appropriate,	 national	 asset	
management	companies	(AMCs)79.	Where	NPLs	become	a	significant	and	broad-based	
problem,	Member	States	should	be	able	to	set	up	national	AMCs	or	other	alternative	
measures80.	 The	 permissible	 design	 of	 AMCs	 is	 in	 full	 compliance	 with	 EU	 banking	
legislation,	 i.e.	 with	 the	 BRRD81,	 the	 SRMR82	 and	 State	 Aid	 rules.	 The	 Commission’s	
AMC	 Blueprint	 sets	 out	 common	 principles	 for	 the	 relevant	 asset	 and	 participation	
perimeters,	asset-size	thresholds,	asset	valuation	rules,	appropriate	capital	structures,	
the	governance	and	operational	features,	both	private	and	public.	It	provides	practical	
recommendations	for	the	design	and	set-up	of	AMCs	at	the	national	level,	building	on	
                                                
79	Commission	Staff	Working	Document	‘AMC	Blueprint’,	accompanying	the	document	‘Communication	
from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	Council,	the	Council	and	the	European	
Central	 Bank	 -Second	 Progress	 Report	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 in	 Europe’,	
SWD/2018/072	final,	14.03.2018.	
80	 See:	 Second	 Progress	 Report,	 p.	 7.	 Also,	 see:	 European	Commission	 -	 Fact	 Sheet	 ‘Frequently	 asked	
questions:	Action	Plan	on	the	Reduction	of	Non-Performing	Loans	 in	Europe’,	14.03.2018,	available	at:	
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-1803_en.htm:	 AMCs	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 repair	 of	
the	banks'	balance	sheets	and	to	the	sale	of	NPLs	to	private	investors,	by	‘improving	transparency	in	the	
secondary	 market	 for	 NPLs’	 and	 by	 ‘encouraging	 new	 investors	 to	 enter	 the	 market’,	 currently	
dominated	by	a	few	large	buyers	with	significant	pricing	power.	
81	Directive	2014/59/EU	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	of	15	May	2014	establishing	a	
framework	 for	 the	 recovery	 and	 resolution	 of	 credit	 institutions	 and	 investment	 firms	 and	 amending	
Council	 Directive	 82/891/EEC,	 and	 Directives	 2001/24/EC,	 2002/47/EC,	 2004/25/EC,	 2005/56/EC,	
2007/36/EC,	 2011/35/EU,	 2012/30/EU	and	2013/36/EU,	 and	Regulations	 (EU)	No	1093/2010	and	 (EU)	
No	648/2012,	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council,	 Text	 with	 EEA	 relevance,	 OJ	 L	 173,	
12.6.2014	(‘BRRD’).	
82	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 806/2014	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 15	 July	 2014	
establishing	uniform	rules	and	a	uniform	procedure	for	the	resolution	of	credit	institutions	and	certain	
investment	firms	in	the	framework	of	a	Single	Resolution	Mechanism	and	a	Single	Resolution	Fund	and	
amending	Regulation	(EU)	No	1093/2010,	OJ	L	225,	30.07.2014	(‘SRMR’).	
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best	practices	from	past	experiences	in	Member	States83,	and	is	fully	consistent84	with	
other	actions	taken	to	address	NPLs	in	Europe.	
5.	Third	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	NPLs		
Recently,	 in	November	2018,	the	Commission	delivered	the	Third	Progress	Report on	
the	reduction	of	NPLs	and	further	risk	reduction	in	the	Banking	Union85,	in	which	it	re-
affirmed	the	package	of	substantial	and	complementary	measures	to	reduce	risk86	and	
                                                
83	See:	Second	Progress	Report,	6.	A	technical	Blueprint	for	how	national	Asset	Management	Companies	
(AMCs)	can	be	set	up,	p.	11.	
84	 Although	 AMCs	 have	 historically	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 tool,	 their	 usefulness	 is	 diminished,	 if	
secondary	markets	for	NPLs	are	undeveloped,	as	one	important	tool	of	an	AMC	is	the	sale	of	its	loans	to	
third-party	investors.	The	AMC	and	many	other	potential	credit	purchasers	are	highly	dependent	on	the	
availability	of	independent	companies	to	service	and	manage	the	loans	on	their	behalf.	Therefore,	AMCs	
will	 be	 more	 effective,	 if	 supported	 by	 the	 Commission’s	 proposal	 on	 credit	 servicers	 and	 credit	
purchasers.	See:	7.	A	strong	package	with	mutually	reinforcing	measures,	p.	12.	
85	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	Council,	the	Council	
and	the	European	Central	Bank-	Third	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	Non-Performing	Loans	and	
further	risk	reduction	in	the	Banking	Union,	COM/2018/766/Final,	28.11.2018	[hereafter:	Third	Progress	
Report].	
86	For	the	banking	‘risk	reduction	package’	proposed	by	the	Commission,	reviewing	the	Bank	Recovery	
and	 Resolution	 Directive	 (BRRD),	 the	 Single	 Resolution	 Mechanism	 Regulation	 (SRMR),	 the	 Capital	
Requirements	Directive	IV	(CRD	IV)	and	the	Capital	Requirements	Regulation	(CRR),	with	the	objective	of	
further	reducing	remaining	risks	in	the	banking	sector,	see:	EU	Banking	Reform:	Strong	banks	to	support	
growth	 and	 restore	 confidence,	 Commission	 -	 Press	 release,	 Brussels,	 23.11.2016,	 available	 at:	
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3731_en.htm.		
Recently,	 the	 European	 Commission	 Services,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 and	 the	 Single	 Resolution	
Board	 have	 delivered	 a	 ‘Monitoring	 report	 on	 risk	 reduction	 indicators’,	 available	 at:	
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37029/joint-risk-reduction-monitoring-report-to-
eg_november-	2018.pdf,	in	which	they	elaborate	on	the	main	developments	in	the	area	of	risk	reduction	
in	the	EU	banking	sector.	With	respect	to	NPLs,	it	is	noted	that	‘the	average	NPL	ratio	has	decreased	to	
4.4%	in	Q2	2018.	NPL	ratios	have	decreased	for	almost	all	MS,	with	 larger	decreases	for	MS	with	high	
NPL	ratios’	(p.	2).	As	to	structural	measures,	in	parallel	with	the	legislative	initiatives	at	European	level	
(the	NPL	package),	at	national	level	‘several	EU	MS	have	adopted	or	amended	legislation	with	the	aim	of	
reducing	 NPLs.	 About	 half	 of	 the	 MS	 have	 implemented	 legal	 reforms	 relating	 to	 insolvency	 and	
foreclosure	(CY,	GR,	ES,	IT,	IE,	LV,	HU,	PT	and	SK),	the	cooperative	or	savings	bank	sectors	(ES,	IT	and	LT),	
legislation	governing	new	sales	of	loans	legislation	(IE,	CY)	or	the	introduction	of	a	subsidy	scheme	(CY)’	
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enhance	the	resilience	of	the	European	banking	sector.	Recent	developments	of	NPLs	
are	summarised	in	declined	NPL	ratios	in	the	first	half	of	2018,	within	the	overall	trend	
of	 improvement	over	 recent	years87.	Generally,	NPL	 ratios	are	approaching	pre-crisis	
levels	again	and	the	stability	 in	the	financial	system	is	being	restored,	enabling	banks	
to	 enhance	 their	 internal	 capacity	 to	manage	 and	 resolve	 NPLs.	 In	 parallel	 with	 the	
post-crisis	 regulatory	 improvements,	 banks	 and	 credit	 servicers	 have	 acquired	
substantial	knowledge	and	experience	in	resolving	NPLs.	Nevertheless,	NPLs	continue	
to	 pose	 risks	 to	 economic	 growth	 and	 financial	 stability,	 mainly	 due	 to	 structural	
impediments	such	as	slow	and	unpredictable	debt	restructuring,	 insolvency	and	debt	
recovery	processes.		
	
Regarding	the	progress	in	the	implementation	of	the	aforementioned	Council’s	Action	
Plan,	 the	 report	 stated	 that	 other	 objectives	 have	 been	 delivered,	 while	 a	
benchmarking	 exercise	 in	 loan	 enforcement	 and	 insolvency	 frameworks88	 is	 still	
ongoing89.	 Overall,	 risk	 reduction	 in	 the	 EU	 banking	 sector	 continues	 at	 a	 sustained	
                                                                                                                                          
(p.	13).	Also,	see	in	p.	21:	‘Measures	to	address	NPLs’	 in	‘Annex	I:	State	of	play	as	regards	selected	EU	
banking	legislative	measures	relevant	for	risk	reduction	and	risk	sharing’.	
87	For	figures	and	further	data,	see	p.	4	of	the	Third	Progress	Report.	
88	See:	Third	Progress	Report,	12.	Benchmarking	exercise	on	the	efficiency	of	national	loan	enforcement	
(including	insolvency)	regimes	from	a	bank	creditor	perspective,	p.	11:	‘The	management	of	NPLs	would	
benefit	 from	 more	 efficient	 and	 predictable	 loan	 enforcement	 and	 insolvency	 frameworks.	 The	
Commission	services	are	therefore	undertaking	a	benchmarking	exercise	of	national	 loan	enforcement	
regimes,	 encompassing	 both	 individual	 enforcement	 and	 collective	 enforcement	 or	 insolvency	
proceedings.	 The	 objective	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	 reliable	 picture	 of	 the	 delays	 and	 value	 recovery	 rates	 that	
banks	 face	when	borrowers	default.	These	outcomes	are	heavily	 influenced	by	 judicial	 capacity	 in	 the	
respective	Member	States.	Progress	on	the	benchmarking	exercise	was	presented	to	and	discussed	with	
Member	States	at	meetings	on	21	February	and	20	June	2018,	 including	the	 issue	of	 lack	of	access	 to	
meaningful	data’.	
89	 Along	 with	 the	 benchmarking	 exercise,	 focus	 has	 been	 placed	 upon	 national	 corporate	 insolvency	
frameworks,	which	have	been	analysed	in	several	country	reports.	Since	2013,	several	country-specific	
recommendations	have	been	adopted	on	insolvency	issues	for	twelve	Member	States,	whereas	in	2018,	
country-specific	recommendations	were	adopted	for	six	Member	States.	In	May	2019,	the	Commission	
will	issue	its	proposals	to	the	Council	for	country-specific	recommendations.	See:	Third	Progress	Report,	
13.	Develop	the	focus	on	insolvency	issues	in	the	European	Semester,	p.	11.	
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pace	 and	 the	 robust	 downward	 trend	 of	 NPL	 ratios	 is	 very	 encouraging,	 but	 still	 a	
challenge	in	some	Member	States.	The	Action	Plan	should	be	fully	implemented	by	all	
actors,	in	order	to	effectively	address	existing	high	stocks	of	NPLs	and	to	prevent	their	
future	accumulation90.	
	
	
	 	
                                                
90	See:	Third	Progress	Report,	4.	Conclusions,	p.	12.	
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III	PROPOSAL	FOR	A	DIRECTIVE	ON	EXTRAJUDICIAL	RECOVERY	OF	
COLLATERAL	
In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 Council’s	 Action	 Plan	 and	 Commission’s	
comprehensive	 legislative	 package91	 towards	 addressing	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 and	
fostering	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 Commission	 adopted	 a	 ‘Proposal	 for	 a	
Directive	 on	 credit	 servicers,	 credit	 purchasers	 and	 the	 recovery	 of	 collateral’92	
(hereafter:	 the	proposed	Directive)	addressed	for	 further	 formal	act	 to	the	European	
Parliament	and	the	Council93.		
	
The	 proposed	 Directive	 on	 recovery	 of	 collateral	 is	 designed	 to	 enhance	 the	
management	 of	 NPLs	within	more	 efficient	 and	more	 predictable	 loan	 enforcement	
frameworks94	 for	 value	 recovery	 by	 secured	 creditors.	 It	 aspires	 to	 enhance	 secured	
                                                
91	Effectively	addressing	NPLs	and	preventing	the	build-up	of	high	stocks	of	NPLs	in	the	future	requires	a	
comprehensive	approach.	Even	though	this	responsibility	 is	primarily	reserved	for	Member	States,	 the	
interconnectedness	of	 the	EU’s	banking	system	 implies	 the	 interest	of	 the	European	Union	to	address	
current	stocks	of	NPLs	and	to	prevent	their	future	accumulation.	Especially	due	to	potential	contagion,	
spill-over	effects	from	Member	States	with	high	NPL	levels	may	be	devastating	for	the	economic	growth	
and	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	EU	area.	See:	Recital	 (1)	of	 the	proposed	Directive	on	potential	 spill-over	
effects	and	Recital	(3)	on	the	comprehensive	approach	followed	at	European	level.	
92	COM/2018/135	 final,	14.03.2018,	Procedure	reference	2018/0063	 (COD).	For	particular	Recitals	and	
Articles	of	the	proposed	Directive,	relevant	for	the	analysis	of	the	present	paper,	see:	Annex	I.		
93	The	Commission	has	called	for	negotiations	to	be	finalised	before	the	end	of	the	current	legislature.	
By	 the	 time	 of	 the	 submission	 of	 this	 paper	 (31.01.2019),	 the	 stage	 already	 reached	 in	 the	 ordinary	
legislative	 procedure	 (Article	 294	 TFEU)	 is	 that	 the	 responsible	 Committee’s	 decision	 is	 awaited	
(ECON/8/12530,	with	Rapporteurs	appointed	on	31.05.2018).	The	Committees	for	opinion,	i.e.	the	IMCO	
(Internal	Market	and	Consumer	Protection)	and	the	JURI	(Legal	Affairs)	decided	not	to	give	an	opinion.	
See:	European	Parliament/	Legislative	Observatory:		
https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2018/0063(
OLP)#tab-0	(Last	date	of	access:	31.01.2019).	
94	See:	‘Principles	for	Effective	Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Rights	Systems	(Revised),	101069,	World	
Bank,	 Jan	 &	 May	 2015,	 p.	 4:	 ‘The	 ability	 of	 financial	 institutions	 to	 adopt	 effective	 credit	 risk	
management	 practices	 to	 resolve	 or	 liquidate	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 depends	 on	 having	 reliable	 and	
predictable	 legal	 mechanisms	 that	 provide	 a	 means	 for	 more	 accurately	 pricing	 recovery	 and	
enforcement	costs.	Where	non-performing	assets	or	other	factors	jeopardize	the	viability	of	a	bank,	or	
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creditors’	 protection,	 by	 enabling	 them	 to	 recover	 value	 from	 collateral	 in	 a	 swifter	
manner	 through	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedures	 for	 collateral95.	 Thus,	 the	
provision	of	new	credit	flow	from	banks	to	the	economy96,	particularly	to	SMEs,	would	
be	facilitated,	in	consistency	with	the	CMU's	objective	of	facilitating	access	to	finance	
for	companies.		
1.	Legislative	rationale	
The	 need	 to	 effectively	 address	 the	 build-up	 of	 NPLs	 is	 imperative,	 since	 they	
deteriorate	bank	performance,	they	reduce	the	banks’	 liquidity	and	profitability,	they	
jeopardise	banks’	viability	and	financial	stability97.	In	addition,	NPLs	occupy	significant	
administrative	and	financial	resources,	limiting	the	bank's	capacity	to	supply	affordable	
credit,	 particularly	 to	 SMEs98,	 and	 they	 lock	 up	 capital	 to	 back	 unproductive	 assets,	
thus	weighing	down	on	monetary	policy	transmission.	It	is	also	essential	that	access	be	
provided	to	diversified	new	sources	of	 financing	 for	EU	businesses,	particularly	SMEs	
and	high-growth	 innovative	companies,	and	 to	enhanced	bank	 finance,	by	 improving	
banks’	 lending	 capacity	 and	 by	 enabling	 them	 to	 recover	 value	 from	 collateral	 in	
secured	loans99.	In	that	way,	as	mentioned	above,	the	proposed	Directive	is	embedded	
in	 the	 wider	 framework	 of	 strengthening	 Europe’s	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union	
(EMU)100,	 as	 it	 contributes	 to	 the	establishment	of	 a	 resilient,	 transparent	 and	more	
                                                                                                                                          
where	 economic	 conditions	 create	 systemic	 crises,	 creditor/debtor	 rights	 and	 insolvency	 systems	 are	
particularly	 important	 to	 enable	 a	 country	 and	 stakeholders	 to	 respond	 promptly	 [...]	 Unpredictable	
legal	 mechanisms	 for	 debt	 enforcement,	 recovery,	 and	 restructuring	 impede	 competition	 in	 credit	
delivery’.	
95	See:	Recital	(39)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
96	See:	‘Principles	for	Effective	Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Rights	Systems	(Revised),	101069,	World	
Bank,	 Jan	&	May	2015,	p.	5:	 ‘	These	rights	enable	parties	to	rely	on	contractual	agreements,	 fostering	
confidence	 that	 fuels	 investment,	 lending	 and	 commerce.	 Conversely,	 uncertainty	 about	 the	
enforceability	of	contractual	rights	 increases	the	cost	of	credit	to	compensate	for	the	increased	risk	of	
nonperformance	or,	in	severe	cases,	leads	to	credit	tightening’.	
97	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	1.	Also,	see	above	under	I.1.2.	
98	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	1	and	3.	Also,	see	above	under	I.1.2.	
99	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	1-2.	Also,	see	above	under	I.1.2.	
100	See	above	under	II.1,	II.1.1-	II.1.3.	
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integrated	 financial	 system	 with	 a	 well-functioning	 Banking	 and	 Capital	 Markets	
Union101.		
	
Particularly	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 swift	 collateral	 enforcement	
mechanisms	 to	 the	effective	management	and	 resolution	of	NPLs,	 it	has	been	noted	
that	‘legal	or	judicial	impediments	to	collateral	enforcement	influence	a	bank’s	ability	
to	commence	legal	proceedings	against	borrowers	or	to	receive	assets	 in	payment	of	
debt	 and	 will	 also	 affect	 collateral	 execution	 costs	 in	 loan	 loss	 provisioning	
estimations’102.	‘The	current	absence	of	a	contractual-based	out-of-court	enforcement	
mechanism	 to	 facilitate	 the	 swift	 repossession	 of	 securities’	 is	 considered	 to	 have	
possibly	 contributed	 to	 the	 current	 high	 stock	 of	 NPLs	 in	 banks'	 balance-sheets103.	
Enhanced,	modern	and	more	harmonised104	EU	measures	enabling	banks	to	effectively	
recover	 value	 from	 secured	 business	 loans,	 could	 minimise	 the	 cost,	 time	 and	
complexities	of	recovery	processes,	ultimately	preventing	the	future	build-up	of	NPLs	
and	increasing	cross-	border	corporate	lending.		
	
However,	 any	 initiative	 to	 the	 objective	 of	 protecting	 secured	 creditors	 from	
borrowers’	 default	 should	 maintain	 a	 fair	 balance	 between	 debtors'	 and	 creditors'	
interests105	 and	 not	 be	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	 current	 level	 of	 debtors'	 protection,	
                                                
101	See:	Recital	(2)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
102	See:	‘Draft	guidance	to	banks	on	Non-Performing	Loans’,	ECB,	September	2016,	p.	10.	
103	 Consultation	 Document:	 Development	 of	 Secondary	 Markets	 for	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 and	
Distressed	Assets	and	Protection	of	Secured	Creditors	from	Borrowers’	Default,	10.07.2017,	available	at:	
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-non-performing-loans-consultation-document_en.pdf	
[hereafter:	‘Consultation	Document’],	p.	3.	
104	 ‘Extrajudicial	 mechanisms	 are	 available	 only	 in	 some	 Member	 States.	 Drawing	 inspiration	 from	
national	 experiences,	 the	 rationale	 for	 a	 possible	 EU	 intervention	 to	 establish	 an	 “accelerated	 loan	
security”	would	be	to	ensure	that	this	possibility	is	available	in	all	Member	States.	This	could	prevent	the	
potential	emergence	of	systemic	vulnerabilities	in	the	banking	systems	of	Member	States,	in	particular	
within	the	euro-area’.	See:	Consultation	Document,	p.	10.	
105	For	creditor/debtor	rights	and	the	creditor-friendly	trend	in	this	balance,	see:	‘Principles	for	Effective	
Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Rights	Systems	(Revised),	101069,	World	Bank,	Jan	&	May	2015,	p.	12:	
‘A	modern	credit-based	economy	should	facilitate	broad	access	to	credit	at	affordable	rates	through	the	
widest	possible	range	of	credit	products	(secured	and	unsecured)	inspired	by	a	complete,	integrated	and	
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particularly	 natural	 persons,	 households	 in	 financial	 difficulties	 and	 consumers.	
Theoretically,	collateral-givers	would	benefit	from	an	easier	access	to	finance106,	if	they	
are	willing	 to	agree	upon	this	extrajudicial	mechanism,	while	banks	will	benefit	 from	
their	 enhanced	 power	 to	 recover	 and	 realise	 value	 from	 unpaid	 loans,	 safeguarding	
their	 priority	 right	 faster	 than	 in	 ordinary	 in-court	 enforcement	 and	 reducing	 their	
credit	 risk.	Nevertheless,	 in	 the	author’s	opinion,	 the	proposed	mechanism	seems	as	
an	 effort	 to	 enhance	 secured	 creditors’	 protection107,	 without	 even	 taking	 into	
consideration	 borrowers’	 rights	 (although	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 declares	 itself	
without	 prejudice	 to	 borrowers’	 rights108),	 and	 further	 empowering	 the	 already	
negotiation-wise	powerful	 parties:	 credit	 institutions.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 contractual	
term	on	the	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism	could	easily	turn	from	‘an	
opportunity	to	broader	access	to	credit’	to	‘a	prerequisite	for	any	access	to	credit’.	The	
transfer	 and	 minimisation	 of	 the	 contractually	 undertaken	 credit	 risk	 from	 banks	
indeed	could	be	a	fair	objective	to	pursue,	so	that	systemic	risk	of	banks’	 failure	and	
potential	 spill-over	 effects	 are	 diminished.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 undertaking	 of	 market	
and	 credit	 risk	 (particularly	 the	 risk	of	price	 fluctuations	and	debtors’	 default)	 lies	 in	
the	hard	core	of	the	provision	of	credit	and	is	accordingly	assessed	in	banks’	exposures	
and	prudential	capital	requirements.	Therefore,	it	seems	unfair	to	burden	prospective	
borrowers	with	another	requirement	for	bank	lending,	probably	already	stipulated	as	a	
clause	 in	 general	 contractual	 terms	 of	 the	 credit	 agreement,	 when	 the	 purported	
                                                                                                                                          
harmonized	commercial	law	system	designed	to	promote:	reliable	and	affordable	means	for	protecting	
credit	 and	 minimizing	 the	 risks	 of	 non-performance	 and	 default;	 [...]	 affordable,	 transparent	 and	
reasonably	 predictable	 mechanisms	 to	 enforce	 unsecured	 and	 secured	 credit	 claims	 by	 means	 of	
individual	action	 (e.g.,	enforcement	and	execution)	or	 through	collective	action	and	proceedings	 (e.g.,	
insolvency)	[italics	by	the	author].	
106	However,	drawing	arguments	from	our	experience	from	the	recent	recurrent	recessions,	it	could	be	
supported	that	the	ongoing	economic	problems	in	the	EU	are	not	caused	by	a	lack	of	lending,	but	by	a	
lack	of	demand,	which	could	be	boosted	by	increasing	public	investment	and	by	fostering	employment	
and	wage	growth.	
107	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	6	and	Recital	(39).	
108	See:	Recital	 (24)	of	 the	proposed	Directive:	 ‘To	avoid	a	reduction	 in	debtor	or	borrower	protection	
[...]’.	Also,	see:	Recital	(21),	Article	2	para.	5(a)	and	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	
p.	7.		
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objective	of	all	European	actions	is	the	shift	from	public	to	private	risk-sharing109.	By	its	
effects,	the	proposed	mechanism	seems	rather	to	allocate	the	risk	upon	the	public	(all	
the	prospective	borrowers	 in	this	case)	than	to	private	credit	actors.	Further	analysis	
will	follow	with	respect	to	the	balance	between	creditors’	and	debtors’	interests	in	this	
Chapter.	
	
2.	Objectives	pursued	through	the	proposed	Directive110	
The	objective	of	preventing	 the	 future	accumulation	of	NPLs	and	enhancing	 secured	
creditors’	protection	shall	be	achieved	in	two	ways	under	the	proposed	Directive.	One	
mechanism,	 on	 which	 the	 present	 legal	 analysis	 focuses,	 is	 the	 enhancement	 of	
efficient	 debt	 recovery	 procedures	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 distinct	 common	
accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	procedure111	(hereafter:	the	AECE).		
	
When	 enforcement	 procedures	 to	 foreclose	 collateral	 are	 inefficient	 or	 ineffective,	
banks	are	exposed	 to	a	higher	 risk	of	accumulation	of	NPLs112.	 So	 far,	banks	wish	 to	
recover	value	of	NPLs113	through	consensual	or	 legal	enforcement,	as	provided	for	 in	
national	 legislation,	 and	 to	 enforce	 collateral	 in	 secured	 loans,	 under	 national	 pre-
insolvency,	 insolvency	and	debt	 recovery	procedures.	However,	 judicial	 enforcement	
                                                
109	See:	Recital	(2)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
110	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	3.		
111	 See:	 Recital	 (40)	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 where	 it	 noted	 that	 domestic	 expedited	 and	 efficient	
extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedures	 for	 value	 recovery	 from	 collateral	 –if	 any-	 do	 not	 provide	
sufficient	 incentives	 for	 cross-border	 transactions	 and	 are	 not	 always	 adequately	 efficient.	 Thus,	 the	
objective	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 is	 to	make	 available	 a	 distinct	 common	mechanism	 for	 effective	
cross-border	value	recovery	procedures.		
112	See:	Consultation	Document,	p.	10.	
113	 See:	 Commission	 Staff	Working	Document:	 Impact	Assessment	 ‘Accelerated	Extrajudicial	 Collateral	
Enforcement”	(Part	2/2),	SWD/2018/76/final,	14.03.2018,	accompanying	the	document	“Proposal	for	a	
Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	credit	servicers,	credit	purchasers	and	the	
recovery	of	collateral”	(COM/2018/135/final)’,	p.	1:	‘The	microeconomic	benefits	of	the	use	of	collateral	
are	 impaired	 (ex-ante	 banks	 tend	 to	 lend	 less	 and/or	 at	 higher	 lending	 rates	 and	 ex-post	 banks	
accumulate	 on	 their	 books	 a	 large	 stock	 of	 bad	 loans	 for	 which	 recovery	 of	 value	 from	 collateral	 is	
difficult)’.	
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proceedings	may	be	time-consuming,	costly,	suboptimal	in	terms	of	recovery	rates	and	
with	 unpredictable	 outcomes114.	 During	 pending	 judicial	 proceedings,	 banks	 remain	
exposed	 to	 losses,	 legal	 uncertainty	 and	 reduced	 liquidity,	 with	 their	 human	 and	
financial	 resources	 tied	 up,	 thus	 unable	 to	 proceed	 to	 lending	 activities	 to	 viable	
customers.		
	
Hence,	 the	proposed	Directive	envisages	 a	more	efficient	 and	expedited	method	 for	
banks	and	other	authorised	entities	issuing	secured	loans	to	swiftly	recover	the	value	
from	secured	loans	in	the	event	of	business	borrower's	default,	out	of	court,	without	
being	 forced	 to	 wait	 for	 the	 result	 of	 judicial	 enforcement	 proceedings.	 This	 more	
efficient	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	procedure	would	be	available	
when	agreed	upon	in	advance	by	both	lender	and	borrower,	in	the	loan	agreement.	It	
will	 not	 be	 applicable	 for	 consumer	 credit	 and	 is	 designed	 in	 consistency	 with	
preventive	restructuring	(pre-insolvency)	or	 insolvency	proceedings.	Also,	 the	priority	
attached	 to	competing	security	 rights115	 in	 the	same	collateral	 is	not	affected	by	 the	
enforcement	 of	 one	 of	 those	 rights	 under	 the	 AECE	 mechanism.	 Since	 under	 the	
envisaged	 procedure	 the	 bank	 would	 have	 the	 right	 to	 acquire	 ownership	 of	 the	
encumbered	 assets	 or	 to	 initiate	 public	 auction	 and/or	 private	 sale	 to	 satisfy	 its	
secured	 claims	 through	 the	 proceeds	 of	 the	 sale,	 without	 judicial	 intervention,	 the	
predictability	and	the	timeframe	of	enforcement	are	enhanced,	 to	the	benefit	of	 the	
NPL	resolution	strategy.	
	
The	other	mechanism	envisaged	in	the	proposed	Directive	is	the	further	development	
of	 efficient	 secondary	 markets	 for	 NPLs,	 with	 the	 adequate	 human	 resources	 and	
expertise	 to	properly	manage	a	portfolio	of	distressed	 loans.	The	proposed	Directive	
removes	undue	impediments	to	credit	servicing	by	third	parties	and	to	the	transfer	of	
credit.	 Third	 party	 specialised	 credit	 servicers	 to	 whom	 the	 servicing	 of	 NPLs	 is	
outsourced,	 have	 to	 conform	 with	 the	 proposed	 common	 set	 of	 rules	 in	 order	 to	
operate	 within	 the	 Union.	 The	 proposed	 common	 standards	 aim	 at	 ensuring	 their	
                                                
114	See:	Recital	(41)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
115	See	Article	27	(Competing	security	rights)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
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proper	 conduct	 and	 supervision	across	 the	Union,	 at	 stimulating	 competition	among	
credit	servicers	and	at	harmonising	the	market	access.	The	facilitated	accessibility	and	
the	 reduced	 costs	 of	 credit	 servicing,	 further	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 entry	 for	 credit	
purchasers	to	whom	credit	agreements	are	sold.	
	
Overall,	 the	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 aspires	 to	 enhance	 the	
efficient	 management	 of	 NPLs116,	 as	 it	 could	 improve	 conditions	 for	 collateral	
enforcement117	and	for	outsourcing	NPLs	to	third	parties.	 Indeed,	the	AECE	 itself	 is	a	
swift	mechanism	for	value	recovery,	which	would	reduce	costs	for	resolving	NPLs	and	
improve	 recovery	 rates118.	 It	 is	 also	 mutually	 reinforcing	 with	 efficient	 secondary	
markets	 for	 NPLS,	 as	 shorter	 resolution	 and	 increased	 recovery	 rates	 increase	 the	
value	of	NPLs	and	the	bid	prices	in	possible	NPL	transactions119.	Moreover,	it	is	easier	
to	price	a	collateralised	NPL	than	an	unsecured	one	in	secondary	markets,	thus	credit	
purchasers	 will	 prefer	 NPLs	 with	 the	 AECE	 feature.	 This	 would	 give	 additional	
incentives	 for	 credit	 institutions	 to	 use	 this	 feature	 at	 the	 origination	 of	 new	 loans.	
Furthermore,	 the	 harmonisation	 and	 convergence	 in	 EU	 secured	 loan	 enforcement	
systems	would	make	credit	more	readily	available;	ultimately	the	attractiveness	of	the	
EU	 and	 the	 Member	 States	 as	 investment	 destinations	 for	 third-country	 investors	
                                                
116	See:	Recital	(6)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
117	 See:	 “Principles	 for	 Effective	 Insolvency	 and	 Creditor/Debtor	 Rights	 Systems	 (Revised)”,	 101069,	
World	Bank,	 Jan	&	May	2015,	p.	16,	A7	and	A8	as	 to	conditions	 for	effective	enforcement	of	 security	
rights	 over	 immovable	 and	 movable	 assets:	 ‘Enforcement	 systems	 should	 provide	 efficient,	 cost-
effective,	 transparent	 and	 reliable	 methods	 (including	 both	 judicial	 and	 non-judicial)	 for	 enforcing	 a	
security	 right.	 Enforcement	proceedings	 should	provide	 for	 recovery	of	 possession	of	 the	 encumbered	
asset,	the	possibility	of	proposing	the	acquisition	of	the	asset	by	the	secured	creditor	 in	total	or	partial	
satisfaction	 of	 the	 secured	 debt,	 and	 the	 prompt	 realisation	 of	 the	 rights	 obtained	 in	 secured	 assets,	
designed	to	enable	recovery	in	a	commercially	reasonable	manner.	The	proceeds	should	be	distributed	
according	to	the	priority	rules	of	the	applicable	substantive	law’	[italics	by	the	author].	
118	The	recovery	rate	is	the	percentage	of	the	distressed	loan’s	face	value,	which	can	be	recovered	by	a	
bank	or	a	NPL	investor.	
119	See:	Recital	(7)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
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could	be	 increased	and	 the	emergence	of	pan-European	NPL	 investors	 could	 further	
improve	market	liquidity120.		
3.	Legal	basis121	
The	establishment	and	proper	 functioning	of	 the	 internal	market	 is	 set	out	as	Union	
objective	under	Article	26	TFEU,	for	the	achievement	of	which	the	Union	is	competent	
to	adopt	adequate	measures.	More	specifically,	Article	114	TFEU	confers	the	European	
Parliament	and	the	Council	the	competence	to	adopt	measures	for	the	approximation	
of	 the	 provisions	 laid	 down	 by	 law,	 regulation	 or	 administrative	 action	 in	 Member	
States	 which	 have	 as	 their	 object	 the	 establishment	 and	 functioning	 of	 the	 internal	
market.		
	
By	 now,	 there	 have	 not	 been	 available	 expedited	 and	 effective	 procedures	 in	 all	
Member	States	for	out-of-court	loan	enforcement,	to	which	banks	could	resort	in	case	
of	 default	 of	 business	 borrowers	 who	 have	 granted	 collateral	 as	 security	 for	 their	
loans.	 Indeed,	 value	 recovery	 from	 collateral	 posed	 by	 a	 borrower	 in	 a	 different	
Member	State	is	presently	regulated	by	rules	different	from	the	rules	of	the	creditor's	
home	 Member	 State.	 Apart	 from	 the	 legal	 uncertainties	 in	 the	 applicable	 value	
recovery	regime,	ordinary	 in-court	 loan	enforcement	in	creditor’s	Member	State	may	
be	 inefficient,	 costly,	 time-consuming	 and	 certainly	 diverse	 within	 the	 EU.	 Low	
recovery	 rates	 from	 secured	 loans	 and	 burdensome	 costs	 of	 legal	 advice	 discourage	
creditors	 from	 cross-border	 credit	 supply	 or	 increase	 the	 cost	 of	 bank	 lending	 for	
companies,	 particularly	 SMEs.	 Thus,	 free	movement	of	 capital	 is	 hindered	 to	 a	 great	
extent,	with	direct	adverse	effect	on	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market.	
	
Addressing	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 single	 market	 into	 national	 markets	 with	
divergent	 funding	 opportunities	 for	 companies	 is	 pursued	 through	 the	 proposed	
efficient	 out-of-court	 collateral	 enforcement	 procedures.	 The	 proposed	 Directive	
makes	 available	 a	 distinct	 common	 expedited	 procedure	 for	 extrajudicial	 value	
recovery	 from	 secured	 loans	 in	 all	Member	 States	 in	 case	 of	 a	 business	 borrower’s	
                                                
120	See:	Recital	(7)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
121	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	pp.	7-11.	
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default.	 In	 that	way,	 it	 aspires	 to	 contribute	 to	better	management	of	NPLs	 through	
this	 effective	 debt	 recovery	 procedure,	 to	 encourage	 cross-border,	 readily	 available	
bank	 lending	 and	 to	 ameliorates	 the	 outcomes	 of	 enforcement	 proceeding	 in	 cross-
border	 transactions,	 enhancing	 legal	 and	 procedural	 certainty.	 The	 proposed	
convergence	 in	EU	secured	 loan	enforcement	systems	will	 contribute	 to	 the	efficient	
functioning	 of	 EU	 capital	markets,	 thus	 improving	 their	 attractiveness	 as	 investment	
destinations	 for	 third-country	 investors,	 and	 to	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	 single	
market,	in	accordance	with	the	Articles	26	and	114	TFEU.	
	
For	the	adoption	of	the	proposed	Directive,	the	Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure	(ex	co-
decision	procedure,	COD)	is	followed	under	Article	294	TFEU122,	after	consultation	with	
the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee123.	EU	action	for	completing	the	internal	
market	 falls	 under	 the	 shared	 competence124	 between	 the	 Union	 and	 the	Member	
States,	and	it	must	be	appraised	in	the	light	of	the	subsidiarity	principle	of	Article	5(3)	
                                                
122	Article	294	TFEU	 (ex	Article	251	TEC):	 ‘1.	Where	 reference	 is	made	 in	 the	Treaties	 to	 the	ordinary	
legislative	procedure	for	the	adoption	of	an	act,	the	following	procedure	shall	apply.	2.	The	Commission	
shall	submit	a	proposal	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council.	3.	The	European	Parliament	shall	
adopt	 its	 position	 at	 first	 reading	 and	 communicate	 it	 to	 the	 Council.	 4.	 If	 the	 Council	 approves	 the	
European	Parliament's	position,	the	act	concerned	shall	be	adopted	in	the	wording	which	corresponds	
to	the	position	of	the	European	Parliament	[...]’.	
123	See:	Opinion	of	 the	EESC,	mainly	points	1.15	and	4.3.1.	 In	a	plenary	session	 in	 July	2018,	 the	EESC	
adopted	 its	 opinion,	 welcoming	 the	 Commission’s	 package	 to	 tackle	 NPLs.	 As	 to	 the	 proposed	 AECE	
procedure,	 the	 EESC	 notes	 that,	 since	 the	 enforcement	 process	 is	 already	 efficient	 in	many	Member	
States,	focus	is	correctly	put	on	the	strengthening	of	judicial	procedures	across	the	whole	EU.	The	EESC	
expresses	its	doubts,	also	held	by	some	Member	States,	about	the	effectiveness	of	the	proposed	AECE	in	
significantly	accelerating	the	enforcement	process	in	Member	States	where	procedures	in	the	courts	are	
already	handled	in	a	short	period	of	time.	Finally,	the	EESC	recognises	that	out-of-court	procedures	may	
be	beneficial	for	creditors	and	agrees	upon	the	restrictions	on	the	applicability	of	the	proposed	AECE,	as	
the	 AECE	 is	 available	 only	 for	 loan	 agreements	 between	 creditors	 and	 business	 borrowers,	 with	 the	
specific	 exclusion	 of	 consumers	 engaged	 in	 non-professional	 activities,	 non-profit-making	 companies,	
financial	collateral	arrangements	and	immovable	residential	property	which	is	the	primary	residence	of	
a	business	borrower.	
124	Article	4	TFEU	para.	1.	and	2(a).	
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TEU125.	 In	this	case	of	shared	competence,	the	Union	shall	act	only	if	and	in	so	far	as	
the	objectives	of	the	Proposal	cannot	be	sufficiently	achieved	by	the	Member	States,	in	
the	framework	of	their	national	legal	systems,	but	can	rather,	by	reason	of	its	scale	or	
effects,	be	better	achieved	at	Union	level126.	Also,	the	content	and	form	of	EU	action	
should	not	exceed	what	 is	necessary	to	achieve	the	objectives	of	 the	Treaties,	under	
the	principle	of	proportionality	(Article	5(4)	TEU)127.	As	Directive128,	it	enables	Member	
States	to	choose	form	and	methods	required	to	deliver	the	pursued	objectives,	as	it	is	
binding	 only	 as	 to	 the	 pursued	 results.	 In	 that	 way,	 the	 proposed	 Directive129	 is	
                                                
125	Article	5	TEU,	para.	3.	
126	 See:	 Recital	 (1)	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive.	 Also,	 see:	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 proposed	
Directive,	pp.	9-	10	 (conclusions	on	 ‘Subsidiarity’	summarised	by	the	author):	High	stocks	of	NPLs,	 the	
deteriorated	 market	 perceptions	 of	 the	 European	 banking	 sector	 as	 a	 whole	 and	 the	 negative	
externalities	 incurred	have	indicated	the	failure	of	 individual	Member	States	to	effectively	address	the	
accumulation	 of	 NPLs,	 even	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 an	 EU/IMF	 economic	 adjustment	 programme,	
although	 they	 have	 recognised	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 problem.	 This	 failure	may	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
market	 fragmentation	 and	 legal	 diversity.	 Therefore,	 it	 has	 been	 evident	 that	 the	 pursued	 objectives	
cannot	 be	 achieved	 at	 all	 (or	 at	 least	 sufficiently)	 by	 individual	 Member	 States.	 Divergence	 and	
amplification	of	problems	require	for	EU-level	intervention	for	the	resolution	of	such	critical	issues	that	
affect	 banks'	 soundness,	 credit	 provision	 and	 the	 overall	 economic	 growth.	 Therefore,	 for	 reasons	 of	
enhancing	 the	economic	 growth	and	 financial	 stability	 and	 reducing	 financial	 fragmentation,	 all	 these	
objectives	can	be	better	achieved	at	Union	 level,	both	by	reasons	of	their	scale	and	effects,	and	given	
the	failure	of	Member	States	to	sufficiently	deliver	the	pursued	objectives.	
127	Article	5	TEU,	para.	4.	
128	Article	288	TFEU	(ex	Article	249	TEC):	 ‘A	directive	shall	be	binding,	as	 to	 the	result	 to	be	achieved,	
upon	each	Member	State	to	which	it	is	addressed,	but	shall	leave	to	the	national	authorities	the	choice	
of	form	and	methods.	[...]’.	
129	 See:	 Commission	 Staff	Working	Document:	 Impact	Assessment	 ‘Accelerated	Extrajudicial	 Collateral	
Enforcement”	(Part	2/2),	SWD/2018/76/final,	14.03.2018,	accompanying	the	document	“Proposal	for	a	
Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	credit	servicers,	credit	purchasers	and	the	
recovery	of	collateral”	(COM/2018/135/final)’,	p.	2	(‘Solutions’	summarised	by	the	author):	This	second	
impact	 assessment,	 dealing	 with	 the	 AECE,	 considered	 three	 policy	 options,	 on	 top	 of	 the	 baseline	
scenario	 of	 no	 EU	 action.	 The	 first	 option	 referred	 to	 non-regulatory	 action	 based	 on	 existing	
international	 harmonisation	 initiatives	 of	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 procedures,	 so	 the	
assessed	 tool	 was	 Commission’s	 Recommendation	 to	Member	 State	 to	 deploy	 such	 procedures.	 The	
second	option,	which	was	ultimately	preferred	upon	evaluation	and	 consideration	of	 its	 impacts,	was	
minimum	 harmonisation	 of	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 procedures,	 through	 a	 Directive.	 This	
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designed	 to	 deliver	 the	 pursued	 objectives	 and	 to	 provide	 a	 ‘level	 playing	 field’130,	
enabling	secured	creditors	to	agree	with	the	borrower	upon	an	extrajudicial	procedure	
for	value	recovery	from	the	provided	collateral,	while	enhancing	financial	stability	and	
funding	opportunities	for	companies,	particularly	SMEs.	At	the	same	time,	consistency	
with	‘civil,	commercial,	property,	insolvency	and	public	laws’	shall	be	ensured131,	since	
the	proposed	Directive	shall	be	without	prejudice	to	already	applicable	provisions132.		
	
4.	Overview	of	specific	provisions	of	the	proposed	Directive	
After	 the	 above	 brief	 analysis	 on	 the	 objectives	 pursued	 through	 the	 proposed	
extrajudicial	enforcement	procedure	and	its	significance,	an	overview	of	its	functioning	
is	of	outmost	interest.	
                                                                                                                                          
option	was	considered	to	achieve	policy	objectives	more	efficiently	and	more	proportionally,	as	it	results	
in	 coherence	 at	 EU	 level,	 while	 providing	 sufficient	 flexibility	 to	 Member	 States	 to	 choose	 the	 right	
transposition	 instruments	 so	 as	 not	 to	 prejudice	 their	 national	 private,	 property	 and	public	 laws.	 The	
third	option	investigated	the	merits	of	creating	a	new	EU	security	right	together	with	a	fully	harmonised	
extrajudicial	enforcement	procedure,	through	a	Regulation.	
130	 See:	 Recital	 (42)	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive:	 ‘Existing	 enforcement	 procedures	 within	 the	 Union	
sometimes	result	 in	a	 lack	of	 level-playing	field	 for	credit	 institutions	and	companies	across	the	Union	
with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 credit,	 particularly	 for	 SMEs	which	 depend	 on	 bank	 credit	more	 than	 larger	
companies.	 [...]	 This	 contributes	 to	a	 lack	of	 confidence	 in	 the	ability	 to	enforce	 collateral	 in	different	
Member	States	and	may	 lead	 to	higher	borrowing	 costs	 corresponding	 to	place	of	establishment	and	
irrespective	 of	 their	 real	 creditworthiness.	 Therefore,	 a	 common	 new	 procedure	 is	 required	 for	 the	
single	market,	the	Banking	Union	and	the	Capital	Markets	Union	and	it	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	credit	
institutions	 and	 undertakings	 which	 are	 authorised	 to	 issue	 credit	 by	 concluding	 secured	 credit	
agreements	 in	 all	Member	 States	 have	 the	 ability	 to	enforce	 those	 agreements	 through	 effective	 and	
expedited	extrajudicial	enforcement	procedures’	[italics	by	the	author].	
131	 See:	 Explanatory	Memorandum	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 p.	 5	 and	 10:	 ‘Given	 the	 inherent	 links	
between	 collateral	 enforcement	 and	 Member	 States'	 civil,	 property,	 commercial,	 pre-insolvency,	
insolvency	 and	 public	 laws,	 the	 envisaged	 rules	 on	 this	 distinct	 common	 extrajudicial	 collateral	
enforcement	mechanism	would	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	 be	 implemented	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 consistent	with	
those	Member	States'	laws’.	Also,	see:		Recital	(50)	and	Article	32	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
132	For	an	analysis	of	whether	and	to	what	extent	such	consistency	is	actually	achieved,	see	below	under	
III.4.	and	Chapter	IV.	
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4.1.	Scope	of	application	
As	 already	mentioned,	 a	 common	 framework	 is	 established	 for	 a	 ‘supplementary133	
common	 Accelerated	 Extrajudicial	 Collateral	 Enforcement	 (AECE)	 mechanism,	 in	
respect	 of	 secured	 credit	 agreements	 concluded	 between	 creditors	 and	 business	
borrowers	which	are	secured	by	collateral134.		
	
The	 scope	 of	 application135	 of	 the	 AECE	 covers	 only	 secured	 credit	 agreements136	
concluded	 between	 creditors137,	 primarily	 credit	 institutions,	 and	 business	
borrowers138	(i.e.	borrowers	granted	credit	for	the	purposes	of	their	trade,	business	or	
profession)	which	are	secured	by	any	movable	and	immovable	assets	(rights	in	rem139)	
owned	by	 the	business	borrower	and	posed	as	 collateral	 to	 the	creditor,	 in	order	 to	
secure	repayment	of	credit	claims140.		
	
                                                
133	 See:	 Recital	 (40)	 and	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 p.	 10:	 As	 collateral	
enforcement	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	 ‘Member	 States'	 civil,	 property,	 commercial,	 pre-insolvency,	
insolvency	 and	 public	 laws’,	 the	 proposed	 ‘distinct	 common	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	
mechanism’	shall	be	implemented	in	consistency	with	national	provisions	and	only	as	a	‘supplementary	
mechanism’,	not	 interfering	 ‘with	national	extrajudicial	enforcement	systems	for	the	type	of	collateral	
covered	in	the	Proposal’.		
134	Article	1	(Subject	matter),	point	(c).	
135	Article	2	(Scope).		
136	Article	 3,	 point	 (6):	 ‘	 “secured	 credit	 agreement”	means	 a	 credit	 agreement	 concluded	by	 a	 credit	
institution	or	another	undertaking	authorised	to	issue	credit,	which	is	secured	by	either	of	the	following	
collateral;	(a)	a	mortgage,	charge,	lien	or	other	comparable	security	right	commonly	used	in	a	Member	
State	 in	 relation	 to	 immovable	 assets;	 (b)	 a	 pledge,	 charge,	 lien	 or	 other	 comparable	 security	 right	
commonly	used	in	a	Member	State	in	relation	to	movable	assets’.	
137	Article	3,	point		(2).	
138	Article	3,	point	 (4):	 '	 ”business	borrower”	means	a	 legal	or	natural	person,	other	 than	a	consumer,	
who	has	concluded	a	credit	agreement	with	a	creditor’.	
139	Only	rights	in	rem	are	covered,	in	contrast	to	personal	rights	(rights	in	personam),	such	as	guarantee	
or	a	surety-ship.	
140	See:	Consultation	Document,	p.	14:	‘A	credit	economy	should	broadly	support	all	manner	of	modern	
forms	 of	 lending	 and	 credit	 transactions	 and	 structures,	with	 respect	 to	 utilising	movable	 assets	 as	 a	
means	of	providing	credit	protection	to	reduce	the	costs	of	credit’.		
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The	proposed	Directive	does	not	regulate	the	formalities	for	vesting	a	security	interest,	
such	 as	 the	 format	 for	 its	 creation	 (private	 or	 notarised	 document),	 its	 publicity	 or	
registration	 in	 public	 registries	 or	 any	 intervention	 of	 public	 authorities.	 All	 these	
elements	are	still	 regulated	within	national	property	 law	frameworks.	Neither	does	 it	
interfere	with	the	core	characteristics	of	security	interests,	such	as	its	accessory	nature	
or	 the	 parties’	 fiduciary	 relationship	 with	 special	 rights	 and	 obligations	 for	 each	
party141.	
	
The	 scope	 of	 application	 seems	 rather	 broad	 ratione	 personae,	 since	 the	 proposed	
mechanism	 could	 be	 made	 available	 to	 any	 secured	 professional	 creditor	 (credit	
institution,	credit	purchaser	or	any	legal	person	issuing	credit	in	the	course	of	its	trade),	
therefore	 the	protective	 rationale	of	 improving	banks’	 liquidity,	profitability,	 viability	
and	 financial	 stability	 is	missing.	Credit	 institutions,	operating	with	certain	prudential	
requirements	 and	 subject	 to	 supervision,	 are	 indeed	 vessels	 of	 monetary	 policy	
transmission	 and	 perform	 a	 systemic	 role,	 in	 contrast	 to	 ‘any	 legal	 person	 issuing	
credit’,	for	which	harmonisation	and	facilitation	of	debt	recovery	is	not	so	imperative.	
Nor	a	 deviation	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 treatment	 could	 be	 easily	 consolidated	 for	
such	 legal	 persons,	 as	 there	 are	 no	 grounds	 justifying	 their	 preferential	 treatment.	
Besides,	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 has	 as	 its	 declared	 objective	 to	 encourage	 bank	
lending	and	 to	establish	a	 resilient,	 transparent	and	more	 integrated	banking	 sector,	
therefore	 its	 scope	 of	 application	 should	 be	 restricted	 to	 banks	 and	 not	 cover	 other	
actors,	operating	outside	the	banking	system.	This	extension	of	the	scope	is	deliberate	
but	also	conscious,	since	the	proposed	mechanism	could	be	explicitly	applicable	only	
to	 ‘credit	 institutions’	 of	 Article	 3,	 point	 (1)	 and	 not	 ‘creditors’	 in	 general,	 thus	 it	 is	
subject	to	our	critique.		
	
                                                
141	Namely,	 the	 borrower	 can	 usually	 redeem	 the	 encumbered	 assets	 free	 of	 the	 security	 interest	 by	
paying	 off	 the	 loan,	 whereas	 the	 secured	 creditor	 has	 a	 duty	 of	 good	 care	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 assets	
provided	as	security.	For	core	characteristics	of	security	interests,	see:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Transactions	in	
Securities,	 in:	Goode,	R.,	Kronke,	H.	&	McKendrick,	E.,	Transnational	Commercial	Law:	Texts,	Cases	and	
Materials,	2nd	Ed.,	Oxford	University	Press,	2015,	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.47.	
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Furthermore,	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 is	 also	 broad	 ratione	materiae,	 since	 it	 could	
cover	 even	 loans	 with	 loan	 payments	 past	 due	 for	 less	 than	 90	 days.	 Although	 the	
Explanatory	 Memorandum	 and	 Recitals	 refer	 to	 NPLs,	 the	 term	 ‘Non-Performing	
Loans’	 is	nowhere	mentioned	 in	 the	 text	of	 the	Directive	 itself,	 so	 there	 is	 space	 for	
arbitrary	 interpretation	 and	 extension	 of	 its	 application	 to	 loans	 not	 categorised	 as	
NPLs.	 Neither	 the	 enforcement	 event	 is	 defined	 in	 the	 Directive,	 rather	 it	 is	 left	 to	
parties’	 discretion	 to	 agree	 upon	 its	 occurrence.	 Legal	 certainty	 and	 transactions	
security	 are	 greatly	 endangered	 in	 this	 way,	 although	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 could	
have	provided	 that	 the	enforcement	event	 shall	be	 conceived	as	an	event	 rendering	
the	 debt	 ‘overdue	 and	 chargeable’	 under	 national	 provisions.	 Of	 course,	 with	 a	
systematic	 interpretation,	 the	 scope	of	 application	 could	be	 limited	 to	NPLs,	but	 the	
objective	of	harmonisation,	convergence	and	legal	certainty	is	by	no	means	achieved.	
	
The	 AECE	 will	 not	 be	 available142	 in	 secured	 credit	 agreements	 concluded	 between	
creditors	and	 ‘consumer	borrowers	engaged	 in	non-professional	activities’143	or	 ‘non-
profit-making	companies’,	neither	in	credit	agreements	secured	by	‘financial	collateral	
arrangements’144	and	‘immovable	residential	property,	which	 is	the	primary	residence	
of	a	business	borrower’145.		
                                                
142	Article	2	(Scope)	para.	5.		
143	 Directive	 2008/48/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 23	 April	 2008	 on	 credit	
agreements	 for	 consumers	 and	 repealing	 Council	 Directive	 87/102/EEC,	 OJ	 L	 133,	 22.05.2008	
(‘Consumer	 Credit	Directive’),	 Article	 3:	 ‘(a)	 “consumer”	means	 a	 natural	 person	who,	 in	 transactions	
covered	 by	 this	 Directive,	 is	 acting	 for	 purposes	which	 are	 outside	 his	 trade,	 business	 or	 profession’.	
Also,	see:	Directive	2014/17/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	4	February	2014	on	
credit	 agreements	 for	 consumers	 relating	 to	 residential	 immovable	property	 and	amending	Directives	
2008/48/EC	and	2013/36/EU	and	Regulation	(EU)	No	1093/2010,	OJ	L	60,	28.02.2014	(‘Mortgage	Credit	
Directive’).	Also,	see:	Council	Directive	93/13/EEC	of	5	April	1993	on	unfair	terms	in	consumer	contracts,	
OJ	L	95,	21.04.1993.	For	consistency	with	safeguards	 for	consumers,	 see:	Recitals	 (21)	and	 (52)	of	 the	
proposed	 Directive.	 Moreover,	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 is	 without	 prejudice	 to	 pre-contractual	
obligations	 to	 inform	 the	 consumer	 about	 modifications	 to	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 the	 credit	
agreement	 (Article	 34),	 while	 particular	 effective	 and	 accessible	 procedures	 to	 deal	 with	 borrowers’	
complaints	have	to	be	established	(Article	35).	
144	 Directive	 2002/47/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 6	 June	 2002	 on	 financial	
collateral	 arrangements,	 OJ	 L168,	 27.06.2002	 (‘FCD’),	 Article	 2(1)(a):	 ‘(a)	 “financial	 collateral	
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Restricting	the	scope	of	application	to	corporate	loans	enhances	(or	at	least	preserves	
the	 same	 level	 of)	 the	 protection	 of	 consumers	 and	 households,	 in	 consistency	with	
safeguards	 for	 consumers	 and	 other	 Union	 policies146.	 Besides,	 creditors’	 rights	 are	
well	preserved,	since	business	borrowers	are	usually	able	to	pledge	more	valuable	and	
diverse	 movable	 and	 immovable	 assets	 as	 collateral	 and	 have	 an	 established	
operational	 structure,	 beneficial	 for	 cooperation	 with	 the	 creditor	 at	 the	 stage	 of	
enforcement.	 Moreover,	 the	 exclusion	 of	 consumers	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
principle	 of	 proportionality	 (Article	 5(4)	 TEU),	 as	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 aspires	 to	
effectively	strike	the	balance	between	creditor’s	and	business	borrower’s	interests.	
	
Regarding	this	restriction	on	the	scope	of	the	accelerated	debt	recovery	instrument	to	
loans	to	businesses	and	corporates,	it	is	surprising	that	the	EBF	has	supported147	that	
generally	 speaking,	 an	 accelerated	 collateral	 enforcement	 mechanism	 ‘should	 be	
considered	 for	all	 the	categories	of	credit’,	 in	order	 to	 facilitate	access	 to	 finance	 for	
consumers	 as	 well	 and	 to	 reduce	 loss	 for	 creditors.	 Thankfully,	 the	 EBF	 did	 not	
                                                                                                                                          
arrangement”	means	 a	 title	 transfer	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement	 or	 a	 security	 financial	 collateral	
arrangement	 whether	 or	 not	 these	 are	 covered	 by	 a	 master	 agreement	 or	 general	 terms	 and	
conditions’.	For	consistency	with	the	Financial	Collateral	Directive	(FCD),	see	below	under	IV.3.	
145	It	is	surprising	that	Article	28	of	the	Mortgage	Credit	Directive,	whose	primary	objective	is	consumer	
protection	and	which	is	applicable	to	consumers	and	home	owners,	provides	that	‘Member	States	shall	
not	 prevent	 the	 parties	 to	 a	 credit	 agreement	 from	 expressly	 agreeing	 that	 return	 or	 transfer	 to	 the	
creditor	of	the	security	or	proceeds	from	the	sale	of	the	security	 is	sufficient	to	repay	the	credit’.	The	
Directive	 takes	 for	 granted	 the	 possibility	 that,	 based	 on	 the	 parties’	 will,	 the	 credit	 agreement	 can	
provide	 the	 return	or	 the	 transfer	of	 the	 security	 to	 the	 creditor	or	 the	possibility	 for	 the	 creditor	 to	
proceed	to	the	sale,	without	any	preclusion	related	to	the	nature	of	the	collateral	or	to	the	category	of	
borrower	for	this	possibility,	but	it	considers	the	clause	an	added	value	for	both	parties.	
146	 See:	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 pp.	 4-5:	 The	 proposed	 Directive	 is	
consistent	with	Article	169	TFEU,	secondary	 legislation	and	Union	rules	on	consumer	protection	in	the	
area	of	financial	services.	Also,	see:	Recital	(43)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
147	See:	EBF	comments	on	the	EC	consultation	on	the	development	of	secondary	markets	for	NPLs	and	
protection	 of	 secured	 creditors,	 EBF_028384,	 19.10.2017	 [hereafter:	 EBF	 comments],	 pp.	 12-13	
(question	36).	
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recommend	such	extended	application	for	the	purposes	of	the	proposed	Directive148.	
The	EBF	also	held	that	‘accelerated	loan	securities	mechanisms	are	already	in	place	in	
Member	 States	 –	 on	 a	 contractual	 basis	 -	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 loans	 covered	 by	 the	
Mortgage	 Credit	 Directive’149.	 It	 is	 our	 opinion	 that,	 since	 the	 proposed	mechanism	
aims	at	enhancing	bank	credit	to	corporates	and	entrepreneurs,	its	applicability	should	
be	 restricted	 explicitly	 to	 these	 categories,	 at	 least	 at	 European	 level.	 Otherwise,	 its	
extension	 to	 other	 categories	 of	 borrowers	 could	 be	 used	 arbitrarily	 on	 behalf	 of	
creditors,	who	may	 insist	 on	 its	 contractual	 agreement	 as	 a	 prerequisite	 to	 provide	
credit	to	the	negotiation-wise	weaker	parties,	i.e.	consumers	and	home	owners150.	
	
The	 main	 residence	 of	 the	 business	 owner	 is	 also	 excluded	 from	 the	 scope	 of	
application,	 based	 on	 social	 and	 economic	 considerations	 of	 protecting	 sole	
entrepreneurs151,	as	it	enables	the	continuation	of	borrower’s	business	and	the	future	
enhancement	of	business	borrower’s	credibility.	Indeed,	the	specific	creditor	seems	to	
be	deprived	of	another	source	 from	which	 it	could	recover	value,	 i.e.	 the	borrower’s	
main	residence,	but	the	sole	entrepreneur	in	financial	difficulties	is	given	the	chance	to	
                                                
148	Ibid,	p.	12:	‘Nevertheless,	we	consider	that	this	Commission	proposal	should	be	limited	to	businesses	
and	 corporates.	 Indeed,	 the	proposal	 responds	 to	 the	overall	 objective	of	 the	Capital	Markets	Union,	
which	is	to	create	better	access	to	finance	for	businesses	and	corporates	in	the	EU’.	Also,	in	p.	13:	‘We	
think	that	accelerated	 loans	security	 instruments	should	be	considered	for	all	 the	categories	of	credit,	
but	we	believe	that	this	Commission	Proposal	should	be	limited	to	businesses	and	corporates	because	it	
is	in	the	context	of	the	CMU	[...]’.	
149	Ibid,	p.	13.		
150	 See:	 Consultation	 Document,	 p.	 12:	 ‘On	 social	 equity	 grounds,	 the	 case	 for	 a	 more	 harmonised	
European	 approach	 for	 secured	 loans	 seems	 potentially	 more	 difficult	 to	 make	 for	 households,	
especially	in	case	of	first-owned	houses	which	are	the	usual	family	domicile,	or	consumers	particularly	if	
primary	 family	 residences	 are	 at	 stake.	 These	 considerations	 are	 less	 present	 in	 the	 case	 of	 small	
businesses	 and	 corporates.	 It	 therefore	 seems	 appropriate	 to	 exclude	 some	 categories	 of	 collateral	
givers	(e.g.	natural	persons,	householders,	consumers,	non-	professional	borrowers)	and	the	scope	of	an	
accelerated	loan	security	should	be	limited	to	business	financial	transactions	 (i.e.	 loans	between	banks	
and	entrepreneurs	and	corporates,	excluding	consumers).	Even	for	business	borrowers,	the	execution	of	
such	 an	 instrument	 should	 be	 limited	 in	 respect	 of	 certain	 classes	 of	movable	 assets	 and	 real	 estate	
properties	(e.g.	the	main	residence	of	the	borrower	and	other	owner's	relatives)’	[italics	by	the	author].		
151	Ibid.	Also,	see:	Recital	(43)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
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continue	 the	 business,	 to	 restore	 its	 ability	 to	meet	 its	 obligations	 and	 repay	 other	
loans,	before	 they	become	non-performing.	 In	 that	way,	 the	proposed	Directive	 is	 in	
conformity	with	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality	 and	 shares	 common	objectives	with	
the	 Restructuring	 Proposal152,	 namely	 the	 prevention	 of	 the	 future	 accumulation	 of	
NPLs	and	increased	opportunities	for	honest	entrepreneurs	to	be	given	a	fresh	start	and	
avoid	 insolvency.	 It	 is	 also	 in	 consistency	 with	 national	 pre-insolvency	 proceedings,	
which	aim	at	the	continuation	of	business	borrower’s	business	and	for	this	reason	the	
main	residence	of	business	owner	is	protected.	
	
The	proposed	Directive	declares	itself	in	full	consistency	with	borrower	rights,	personal	
data	protection	rights153	and	national	civil	law	provisions	governing	the	assignment	of	
contracts154.	 The	 wording	 of	 the	 Explanatory	Memorandum	 here	 is	 very	 interesting	
and	possibly	problematic.155	The	 intention	was	probably	to	state	that	this	proposal	 is	
without	prejudice	 to	borrower	 rights,	but	one	could	conclude	 that	 the	proposal	does	
not	even	take	 into	consideration	borrower	rights	or	at	 least	that	 it	neglects	and	does	
not	try	to	be	in	consistency	with	such	rights.	
4.2.	Conditions	for	use	of	the	AECE	
Title	V	(Articles	23-33)	of	the	proposed	Directive	refers	exclusively	to	the	Accelerated	
Extrajudicial	 Collateral	 Enforcement	 (AECE)	 as	 a	 voluntary	 instrument156	 agreed	
between	the	secured	creditor	and	business	borrower,	which	the	secured	creditor	may	
exercise	only	once	the	cumulative	conditions	set	out	in	Article	23157	are	met.	
                                                
152	See	below	under	IV.2.2.	
153	See:	Article	36	(Personal	data	protection)	and	Recitals	(30)	and	(54)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
154	See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	7:	 ‘Borrower	rights	[...]	are	not	within	
the	scope	of	this	proposal’.	
155	 Consistency	 with	 borrower	 rights	 here	 refers	 to	 the	 framework	 of	 credit	 servicers’	 and	 credit	
purchasers’	 operation	 and	 not	 to	 traditionally	 recognised	 borrower	 rights	 during	 the	 enforcement	
procedure.	For	the	latter,	the	following	analysis	will	highlight	some	aspects	of	the	proposed	mechanism,	
possibly	detrimental	to	borrowers’	interests.	
156	See:	Recital	(44)	of	the	proposed	Directive	
157	See:	Article	23	(Conditions	for	the	voluntary	use	of	Accelerated	Extrajudicial	Collateral	Enforcement)	
in	Annex	I.	
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The	AECE	mechanism	at	first	reading	seems	sufficiently	formalistic158	and	protective	of	
borrower’s	 interests,	 since	 it	 requires	 its	 previous	 contractual	 conclusion	 in	 an	
agreement	in	writing	or	in	a	notarised	format	(if	so	provided	by	the	Member	State)	by	
the	 creditor	 and	 business	 borrower;	 prior	 provision	 of	 precise	 information	 to	 the	
business	 borrower	 about	 its	 application	 and	 consequences159;	 and	 prior	 notice	 in	
writing	of	 the	creditor's	 intention	to	realise	 the	assets	 through	this	AECE	mechanism	
along	with	other	information.	The	AECE	will	not	be	available,	if	the	business	borrower	
has	executed	full	payment160,	as	stipulated	in	the	creditor's	notification	and	within	the	
given	time	period.		
	
It	has	already	been	stated161	that,	whereas	the	proposed	mechanism	is	based	on	the	
contractual	freedom	of	the	parties,	at	the	moment	of	the	conclusion	of	the	respective	
term,	banks	are	the	negotiation-wise	powerful	parties	and	can	impose	on	prospective	
borrowers	-in	need	for	finance-	any	term	that	favours	their	interests.	However,	in	non-
                                                
158	Since	(mandatory)	enforcement/	execution	of	claims	results	in	drastic	intervention	to	constitutionally	
guaranteed	 borrower’s	 rights	 (property,	 personality),	 strict	 and	 typical	 procedural	 requirements	 are	
established.	Such	procedural	requirements	may	be	either	general	or	specific	 (enforceable	title,	certain	
and	cleared	claim,	legalisation	of	the	enforcing	creditor).	See:	Nikas,	N.	(2012),	Manual	of	Enforcement	
Law,	Sakkoulas	Publications,	2012,	p.	117	[translation	from	Greek	to	English	by	the	author].	Also,	see:	
Keijser,	T.	 (2017),	Financial	 collateral	arrangements	 in	 the	European	Union:	 current	 state	and	 the	way	
forward,	 Uniform	 Law	 Review,	 Vol.	 22	 (1),	 01.03.2017,	 p.	 284	 for	 the	 ‘traditional’	 enforcement	
procedures	and	 their	mandatory	 set	of	 requirements	 (prior	notice,	 involvement	of	a	 court	or	another	
independent	party),	strict	procedures	guaranteeing	maximum	proceeds	and	restitution	of	any	positive	
surplus).	Likewise,	see:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.47,	where	it	is	stated	that	disposal	of	
assets	 is	 only	 possible	 for	 the	 secured	 creditor	 only	 upon	 borrower’s	 default	 and	 in	 accordance	with	
strict	procedures,	which	guarantee	maximum	proceeds	(usually	requiring	for	the	involvement	of	a	court,	
a	notary	or	a	court	bailiff).		
159	See:	Recital	(44)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
160	 See:	 Article	 23	 para.	 1:	 ‘Member	 States	 have	 the	 discretion	 to	 envisage	 that,	 in	 cases	 where	 a	
business	borrower	has	paid	at	least	85%	of	the	amount	of	the	secured	credit	agreement,	the	period	for	
the	execution	of	 full	payment	before	the	use	of	the	AECE	mechanism	may	be	extended	by	at	 least	six	
months’.	The	last	discretion	is	in	accordance	with	the	proportionality	principle	of	Article	5(4)	TEU.	
161	See	above	under	III.1,	p.	32.	
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consumer	 credit	 agreements,	 such	 terms	 could	 not	 be	 declared	 null	 and	 void	 as	
abusive	general	terms	of	contract	under	European	legislation,	as	they	could	be	void	or	
voidable	in	consumer	loans162,	given	the	recently	restricted	European	definition	of	the	
term	 ‘consumer’163.	 	 Therefore,	 the	only	opportunity	of	 their	 annullation	 is	provided	
under	 national	 law164.	 Indeed,	 the	 contractual	 clause	 on	 the	 use	 of	 the	 AECE	
mechanism,	 excessively	 restricting	 business	 borrowers’	 contractual	 freedom165	 and	
disproportionately	 favourable	 to	 creditors,	 could	 easily	 turn	 from	 ‘an	opportunity	 to	
                                                
162	 It	 is	 to	our	surprise	that	 the	EBF	criticises	debtors’	 right	 to	oppose	or	 to	revoke	unfair	and	abusive	
terms	concluded	with	more	powerful	party,	the	bank	creditor.	See:	EBF	comments,	p.	15	(question	39):	
‘Moreover,	 in	 our	 view,	 in	 certain	 EU	 Member	 States,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 to	 efficient	
enforcement	of	collateral	are	the	current	privileges	granted	to	the	debtor,	as	the	weakest	party,	which	
tend	to	weaken	negotiations	for	its	future	possibility	of	opposition	or	revocation’.	
163	 Directive	 2008/48/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 23	 April	 2008	 on	 credit	
agreements	 for	 consumers	 and	 repealing	 Council	 Directive	 87/102/EEC,	 OJ	 L	 133,	 22.05.2008	
(‘Consumer	 Credit	Directive’),	 Article	 3:	 ‘(a)	 “consumer”	means	 a	 natural	 person	who,	 in	 transactions	
covered	by	this	Directive,	is	acting	for	purposes	which	are	outside	his	trade,	business	or	profession’.	
164	For	instance,	in	Greece,	the	clause	on	the	use	of	the	AECE	mechanism	could	be	void	pursuant	Article	
178	of	Civil	Code	(legal	acts	against	morality	are	void)	and	Article	179	of	Civil	Code	(a	 legal	act	 is	void	
especially,	when	it	excessively	restricts	a	person’s	freedom	or	when	the	one	party	takes	advantages	of	
the	 other	 party’s	 need,	 affliction	 or	 inexperience	 and	 avails	 himself	 or	 a	 third	 person	 with	 benefits	
apparently	disproportionate	to	his	offer).	Abusive	exercise	of	rights	is	also	controlled	under	Article	281	
of	Civil	Code	(prohibition	of	the	abusive	exercise	of	rights,	when	this	exercise	is	contrary	to	good	faith,	
commercial	customs	and	the	social	or	economic	objective	of	the	right).	
165	 It	has	even	been	proposed	that	‘banks	should	have	the	possibility	to	disregard	the	accelerated	loan	
security		clause	even	if	this	clause	was	agreed	with	the	borrower	in	the	credit	contract	and	to	decide	to	
activate	the	traditional	enforcement	procedures.	This	would	allow	banks	to	decide,	from	time	to	time,	
whether	 to	 use	 the	 accelerated	 loan	 security	 clause	 or	 the	 traditional	 enforcement	 procedures.	 The	
borrower	should	not	have	any	option	to	choose	which	of	the	possible	remedies	the	lender	will	use’,	see:	
EBF	comments,	p.	12	(question	35)	[italics	by	the	author].	Such	a	recommendation	reflects	the	tendency	
of	enhancing	the	already	more	powerful	position	of	banks,	to	the	detriment	of	borrowers’	interests	and	
legal	 certainty.	 Of	 course,	 creditors	 could	 initiate	 judicial	 enforcement	 proceedings,	 disregarding	 this	
supplementary	 enforcement	 procedure,	 if	 for	 some	 reason	 they	 consider	 it	 better	 to	 obtain	 a	 court	
decision	 as	 enforceable	 title.	 Besides,	 it	 is	 upon	 creditor’s	 discretion	 to	 decide	which	 of	 its	 claims	 to	
enforce	 and	 how,	 among	 the	 various	 legally	 provided	 procedures.	 However,	 initiation	 of	 traditional	
judicial	 proceedings	 after	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 extrajudicial	 mechanism	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	
abusive	behaviour	on	behalf	of	the	creditor.	
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broader	 access	 to	 credit’	 to	 ‘a	 prerequisite	 for	 any	 access	 to	 credit’,	 unilaterally	
imposed	and	not	voluntarily	agreed	upon.	
	
The	agreement	(or	clause	in	the	credit	agreement)	between	the	secured	creditor	and	
business	borrower	on	the	use	of	the	AECE	constitutes	a	directly	enforceable	title166,	in	
order	 to	 enable	 direct	 execution	 of	 the	 collateral	 through	 the	 AECE	 mechanism,	
without	the	need	to	obtain	an	enforceable	title	from	the	court.	In	that	way,	the	AECE	
will	 be	 indeed	 an	 expedited	 (without	 the	 delays	 but	 also	 without	 the	 adequate	
safeguards	of	judicial	intervention)	and	effective	(beneficial	for	banks	only)	instrument	
to	recover	value	from	collateral167.	However,	 this	provision	will	be	problematic	when	
transposed	 to	 national	 legislation,	 since	 in	 most	 Member	 States’	 jurisdictions	 only	
public	documents168,	 i.e.	court	decisions,	arbitral	awards	and	notarial	documents,	are	
recognised	as	directly	enforceable	titles169.	Therefore,	we	estimate	that	most	Member	
                                                
166	 Article	 23:	 ‘For	 the	 purposes	 of	 paragraph	 1,	 the	 agreement	 referred	 to	 in	 paragraph	 1(a)	 shall	
include	a	directly	enforceable	title’.		
167	See:	Recital	(46)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
168	 The	 enforceable	 title	 constitutes	 primary	 and	 unswerving	 requirement	 for	 the	 intervention	 to	 the	
personality	and	property	of	 the	debtor	 through	enforcement.	 Enforceable	 title	 is	 the	public	document,	
which	ensures	that	a	specific	claim	can	be	realised	through	the	enforcement	procedure.	The	content	and	
extent	 of	 the	 enforcement	 procedure	 and	 persons	 legitimised	 to	 initiate	 it	 are	 determined	 in	 the	
enforceable	 title.	 In	 that	way,	 the	 state	 intervention	 is	 delimited	 and	 the	 relation	 of	 enforceability	 is	
determined,	i.e.	the	debtor’s	public	law	obligation	and	the	respective	creditor’s	claim	vis-à-vis	the	state	
for	 enforcement.	 See:	 Nikas,	 N.	 (2012),	 p.	 124	 [translation	 from	 Greek	 to	 English	 and	 italics	 by	 the	
author].	
169	 See:	 Article	 904	 of	 the	 Greek	 Code	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 (grCCP):	 1.	 Enforcement	may	 possible	 only	
under	an	enforceable	 title.	 2.	 Enforceable	 titles	 are:	 a)	 final	 (of	 second	 instance)	decisions,	 as	well	 as	
decisions	of	every	Greek	court	declared	provisionally	enforceable;	b)	arbitral	awards;	c)	records	of	Greek	
courts	 containing	 a	 settlement	 or	 determination	 of	 judicial	 costs;	 d)	 notarial	 documents;	 e)	 payment	
orders,	issued	by	Greek	courts	and	performance	orders	for	the	return	of	the	use	of	leased	property;	f)	
foreign	 titles	 declared	 enforceable;	 g)	 orders	 and	 deed	 recognised	 by	 law	 as	 enforceable	 titles	
[translation	 from	 Greek	 to	 English	 by	 the	 author].	 Even	 the	 point	 (g)	 refers	 to	 public	 documents,	
although	 with	 this	 provision	 the	 principle	 of	 ‘numerus	 clausus’	 of	 enforceable	 titles	 is	 made	 more	
relative.	This	discretion	to	declare	various	orders	and	deed	as	enforceable	titles	is	reserved	only	for	the	
legislator	and	not	for	the	administrative	authorities	of	the	contracting	parties.	See:	Nikas,	N.	(2012),	p.	
239	[translation	from	Greek	to	English	by	the	author].	
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States	 will	 require	 the	 notarised	 format	 of	 such	 an	 agreement170,	 particularly	 with	
regard	 to	 immovable	 property	 pledged	 as	 collateral,	 for	 which	 national	 provisions	
usually	 dictate	 the	 notarised	 format	 for	 every	 transaction	 relating	 to	 immovable	
                                                
170	 From	a	 comparative	 law	perspective,	 in	Greece	 the	 legislative	 decree	 17.7/13.08.1923	on	 ‘specific	
provisions	for	publicly	listed	companies’	(adopted	almost	a	century	ago!)	recognised	as	enforceable	title	
the	document	(private	document	for	movable	collateral,	notarised	for	immovable)	containing	the	credit	
agreement	 -between	 a	 credit	 institution	 (and	 other	 publicly	 listed	 companies,	 under	 certain	
prerequisites)	and	a	business	borrower-	and	the	pledge	of	collateral	(movable	or	immovable	property).	
The	 objective	 of	 this	 legislative	 decree	 was	 the	 acceleration	 and	 simplification	 of	 the	 debt	 recovery	
procedure,	so	that	banks	could	satisfy	their	claims	more	easily.	This	accelerated	debt	recovery	is	–also	in	
Greece-	 available	 upon	 agreement,	 based	 on	 contractual	 freedom	 of	 the	 parties,	 and	 aims	 at	 the	
encouragement	of	banks	to	provide	credit	and	to	finance	productive	investments,	to	the	benefit	of	the	
whole	 economy	 of	 the	 state	 (bare	 in	mind,	 however,	 the	 destroyed	 economy	 of	 Greece	 at	 the	 time,	
after	consecutive	wars	and	heavy	migration	flows,	thus	the	respective	state	budget	policy	that	had	to	be	
followed).	 The	 main	 feature	 of	 the	 introduced	 procedure	 is	 exactly	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 executory	
judgment	 (as	enforceable	title).	Any	subsequent	declaration	of	debtor’s	 insolvency	(after	the	provision	
of	 collateral	 to	 the	 bank)	does	 not	 affect	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 security,	 even	 though	 created	 during	 the	
suspect	 period	 (which	 is	 a	 clear	 deviation	 from	 general	 provisions	 of	 the	 Bankruptcy	 Code).	 The	
enforcement	 event	 is	 stated	 as	 the	 time	 when	 the	 loan	 becomes	 ‘overdue	 and	 chargeable	 for	 any	
reason’,	 upon	 which	 the	 creditor	 is	 entitled	 to	 proceed	 to	 enforcement	 (Article	 53	 para.	 1).	 For	 the	
initiation	of	enforcement,	an	order	for	payment,	consisting	of	a	summary	of	the	credit	agreement	and	
description	of	 the	collateral,	 together	with	a	notification	on	the	outstanding	sum	of	 the	debt,	must	be	
notified	 to	 the	 debtor	 and	 any	 holder/occupant	 of	 the	 collateral	 and	 then	 registered	 to	 the	 public	
registry	(this	registration	counts	as	execution)	(Article	57).	After	the	registration,	the	creditor	orders	the	
notary	to	initiate	public	auction,	where	the	notary	has	the	role	of	the	auction	administrator	(Article	59).	
Only	limited	publicity	is	required	for	the	commencement	of	the	mandatory	execution	and	no	deadlines	
have	to	be	followed.	However,	if	the	order	for	payment	lacks	the	required	information,	the	enforcement	
may	be	 annullated,	 upon	proof	 of	 debtor’s	 procedural	 damage.	 This	 deviation	 from	 the	provisions	 of	
Code	of	Civil	Procedure	 is,	 in	the	author’s	opinion,	of	questionable	consistency	with	the	constitutional	
principle	of	equality,	as	credit	institutions	are	treated	favourably	in	comparison	with	other	creditors,	and	
the	 constitutional	 guarantees	 of	 the	 right	 to	 property,	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 which	 the	 Code	 of	 Civil	
Procedure	 has	 adopted	 certain	 safeguarding	 provisions.	 In	 any	 case,	 this	 extrajudicial	 collateral	
enforcement	 mechanism	 provided	 for	 banks	 is	 a	 national	 regime,	 where	 all	 aspects	 of	 legality	 and	
constitutionality	have	been	weighed,	in	accordance	with	the	national	legal	culture	and	the	objectives	to	
be	pursued	by	that	time.	Besides,	banks	still	prefer	to	obtain	a	court-ordered	enforceable	title,	either	in	
the	form	of	a	court	decision	or	a	payment	order,	issued	by	courts.	Therefore,	an	extension	to	European	
level	would	be	problematic	from	several	perspectives.	
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property	and	its	registration	of	rights	in	rem	in	public	registries171.	Besides,	such	formal	
requirements	of	a	court-issued	enforcement	title	aim	at	providing	 legal	certainty	and	
at	the	substantive172	–apart	from	the	procedural-	review	of	execution	procedure.	
	
The	business	borrower	should	be	precluded173	from	disposing	of	the	assets	pledged	as	
collateral,	as	of	receipt	of	the	creditor’s	written	notification,	and	should	be	subject	to	a	
general	duty	to	cooperate	and	to	furnish	all	relevant	information.	These	requirements	
are	 typical	 of	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship	 between	 the	 secured	 creditor	 and	 the	
borrower174.	For	business	borrower’s	protection175,	 it	 should	be	afforded	 ‘reasonable	
time	for	execution	of	payment,	averting	enforcement’176,	and	the	creditor	should	make	
reasonable	efforts	to	avoid	the	use	of	the	AECE	mechanism.	These	recommendations	
towards	 the	avoidance	of	 the	proposed	mechanism	probably	 stand	as	 recognition	of	
the	burdensome	and	unfair	(to	the	business	borrower)	character	of	the	procedure.	
	
The	 contractual	 nature	 of	 the	 AECE	 mechanism	 might	 ensure	 flexibility	 as	 to	 its	
structure,	 accordingly	 adapted	 to	 the	 different	 national	 legal	 frameworks	 and	 the	
specific	 needs	 of	 the	 banking	 system.	 Therefore,	 the	 architecture	 of	 the	 possible	
accelerated	loan	security	requires	careful	balancing	of	creditors’-	borrowers’	interests,	
within	the	framework	of	Member	States’	allowed	discretion,	to	minimise	any	possible	
                                                
171	 See:	 ‘Principles	 for	 Effective	 Insolvency	 and	 Creditor/Debtor	 Rights	 Systems	 (Revised)’,	 101069,	
World	 Bank,	 Jan	 &	May	 2015,	 p.	 13,	 A.4.	 Registry	 for	 Property	 and	 Security	 Rights	 over	 Immovable	
Assets:	 ‘There	 should	 be	 efficient,	 transparent,	 and	 cost-effective	 registration	 systems	with	 regard	 to	
property	rights	and	security	rights	in	the	grantor’s	immovable	assets’.	The	typically	required	registration	
of	 ‘mortgages,	 hypothecs	 and	 other	 charges	 or	 encumbrances	 over	 immovable	 assets’	 serves	 this	
objective	of	transparency	and	is	set	to	the	protection	of	third	parties.		
172	For	 instance,	the	certainty	and	clearance	of	the	claim	to	be	enforced,	as	we	mentioned	above	in	fn	
158.	
173	Article	23	para.	2.		
174	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.47.	
175	See:	Recital	(45)	of	the	proposed	Directive:	‘In	order	to	protect	business	borrowers,	it	is	appropriate	
to	 ensure	 that	 the	 necessary	 measures	 are	 in	 place	 to	 ensure	 that	 creditors	 afford	 borrowers	 a	
reasonable	period	of	time	for	execution	of	payment	to	avert	this	kind	of	enforcement’.			
176	Article	23	para.	3.	
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impact	on	national	private	 law	(property	 law,	pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	 law)	and	
public	law	(for	instance,	registration	system	when	several	and	different	security	rights	
are	created	over	 the	same	assets).	As	 to	 this	 last	point,	 the	proposed	Directive	does	
not	require	any	registration	of	the	agreement	or	of	the	notice	for	the	initiation	of	the	
enforcement,	thus	it	should	be	left	to	national	legislation	to	regulate	such	registration,	
especially	for	immovable	property.	
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4.3.	Collateral	enforcement177	under	proposed	Directive	
Member	States	must	ensure	the	realisation	of	collateral	under	the	AECE	mechanism178,	
by	putting	in	place	at	least	one	enforcement	procedure	to	be	used	for	the	purpose	of	
the	 AECE.	 The	 collateral	 should	 be	 enforceable	 pursuant	 to	 the	 AECE	 mechanism,	
through	public	auction179	or/and	private	sale180,	which	are	commonly	used	 to	 realise	
                                                
177	 The	 initial	 thought	was	 the	automatic	 ‘retention	 or	 transfer	 of	 the	 ownership’	 of	 the	 encumbered	
assets	pledged	as	collateral	to	the	creditor,	i.e.	the	creation	of	‘a	new	type	of	contractual	security	right’.	
See:	Consultation	Document,	pp.	11-12:	‘The	accelerated	loan	security	could	be	designed	as	a	new	type	
of	contractual	security	right	over	movable	and	immovable	assets	to	secure	a	loan	granted	by	a	bank	to	a	
business.	 The	 possible	 core	 feature	 of	 the	 EU	 accelerated	 loan	 security	 could	 be	 the	 "accelerating"	
clause:	once	certain	conditions	are	met,	the	effect	of	the	debtor’s	default	could	be	the	retention	or	the	
transfer	of	the	ownership	of	the	movable	or	 immovable	assets,	given	as	a	guarantee	by	the	debtor,	to	
the	bank.	Having	acquired	the	ownership	over	the	encumbered	assets,	the	bank	could	therefore	be	 in	
the	 position	 to	 foreclose	 the	 collateral	 (i.e.	 to	 execute	 directly	 the	 security	 right)	 via	 an	 out-of-court	
enforcement,	without	any	 judicial	 intervention:	 should	the	secured	claim	not	be	 fully	or	partially	paid,	
the	bank	might	have	the	right	to	directly	recover	value	from	the	collateral	either	by	selling	the	assets	(in	
a	private	sale	and	not	 in	a	 judicial	auction)	or	by	keeping	 them’	 [italics	by	 the	author].	The	automatic	
ownership	 transfer	 of	 the	 encumbered	 assets	 from	 debtors	 to	 banks,	 which	 is	 described	 in	 the	
Consultation	 Paper,	 is	 different	 from	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 a	 claim	 through	 an	 accelerated	 enforcement	
procedure	and	raises	even	more	questions	on	the	consistency	of	the	proposed	mechanism	with	national	
private	 and	 public	 laws.	 Namely,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 EU	 security	 right	would	 be	 too	 complex	 and	
would	 unacceptably	 interfere	 excessively	 with	 national	 property	 law,	 transfer	 of	 ownership,	 publicity	
requirements	 and	 insolvency.	 The	 designation	 of	 security	 rights	 should	 by	 default	 be	 reserved	 for	
individual	Member	States.	
Thankfully,	 this	 option	 was	 criticised	 and	 not	 followed	 (but	 for	 accounting	 reasons	 and	 not	 for	 the	
possible	 inconsistency	with	national	 legislation),	see:	EBF	comments,	p.	11	 (question	34):	 [retaining	or	
acquiring	ownership	of	 the	encumbered	assets]	 ‘could	mean	that	 the	bank	would	have	 to	consolidate	
newly	acquired	assets	on	their	balance	sheets	to	the	detriment	of	e.g.	capital	allocation	requirements.	A	
different	option	could	be	that	the	ownership	of	the	encumbered	asset	was	not	transferred,	but	rather	
that	the	asset	was	sold	either	 through	a	private	sale	or	an	auction	with	proceeds	going	directly	 to	the	
lender.	In	this	way,	the	lender		would	be	satisfied	while	keeping	the	assets	off	the	balance	sheet’.		
For	the	options	that	were	explored,	see	above	in	fn	129.		
178	See:	Article	24	(Enforcement)	in	Annex	I.	
179	The	public	auction	should	be	carried	out	only	when	the	conditions	of	Article	25	are	met	cumulatively.	
See:	Article	25	(Public	Auction)	in	Annex	I.	
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collateral	 in	general,	 for	each	type	of	security	 right	and	collateral,	given	the	multiple	
links	 of	 collateral	 enforcement	with	private	 and	public	 laws181.	Under	 some	national	
frameworks,	where	the	extrajudicial	enforcement	procedure	is	exercised	by	means	of	
appropriation	 of	 the	 assets,	 the	 right	 of	 the	 creditor	 to	 retain	 the	 asset	 shall	 be	
governed	by	the	applicable	national	law182.		
	
The	appointment	of	a	notary,	bailiff	or	other	public	official183	is	questionable	as	to	the	
extent	it	will	ensure	the	protection	of	borrower's	rights184,	since	the	appointed	person	
will	only	administer	the	enforcement	procedure	and	ensure	compliance	with	procedural	
requirements,	whereas	 any	 possible	 substantive	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 enforcement	 title	
(the	contractual	agreement	of	the	parties)	will	not	have	been	reviewed	by	a	court.		
                                                                                                                                          
180	The	private	sale	should	be	carried	out	only	when	the	conditions	of	Article	26	are	met	cumulatively.	
See:	Article	26	(Private	Sale)	in	Annex	I.	
181	 See	 Recital	 (47):	 ‘In	 Member	 States	 which	 have	 already	 established	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	
procedures,	 those	 procedures	 are	 interlinked	 with	 elements	 of	 national	 civil,	 commercial,	 property,	
insolvency	and	public	 laws,	and	the	type	of	enforcement	procedure	that	may	be	used	depends	on	the	
type	of	 the	asset	provided	as	 collateral,	with	procedures	 for	 immovable	assets	often	entailing	 stricter	
procedural	elements	and	minimum	judicial	oversight.	Therefore,	Member	States	should	have	flexibility	
in	deciding	upon	 the	 type	of	enforcement	procedure	which	 is	made	available	 to	secured	creditors	 for	
the	purpose	of	 this	accelerated	extrajudicial	 collateral	enforcement:	public	auction	or	private	sale,	or,	
under	some	national	frameworks,	the	appropriation	of	the	asset.	
182	 Article	 24	 para.	 3:	 ‘Where	 Member	 States	 establish	 the	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedure	 by	
means	 of	 appropriation,	 the	 right	 of	 the	 creditor	 to	 retain	 the	 asset	 in	 or	 towards	 satisfaction	 of	
business	borrower's	 liability	 shall	be	governed	by	 the	applicable	 laws	 in	each	Member	State.	Member	
States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 appropriation	 the	 positive	 difference	 to	 be	 paid	 out	 to	 the	
business	borrower	 shall	 be	 the	difference	between	 sum	outstanding	of	 the	 secured	 credit	 agreement	
and	the	valuation	of	the	asset’.	
183	Particularly	 in	the	case	of	 immovable	assets,	for	which	procedural	elements	are	usually	stricter	and	
there	is	at	least	minimum	judicial	oversight.	
184	 Strict	 procedures	 guaranteeing	 maximum	 proceeds	 are	 typical	 mandatory	 requirements	 of	
‘traditional’	enforcement	procedures.	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2017),	p.	284.	Also,	see:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	
p.	440,	para.	15.47,	where	it	is	stated	that	in	‘traditional’	enforcement	regimes,	disposal	of	assets	is	only	
possible	for	the	secured	creditor	only	upon	borrower’s	default	and	in	accordance	with	strict	procedures,	
which	 guarantee	maximum	proceeds	 (usually	 requiring	 for	 the	 involvement	 of	 a	 court,	 a	 notary	 or	 a	
court	bailiff).		
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Before	 the	 realisation	 of	 collateral,	 the	 creditor	 must	 organise	 a	 valuation	 of	 the	
assets185,	 in	order	 to	determine	 the	 reserve	price	 and	guide	price,	 in	 cases	of	public	
auction	and	private	sale	respectively.		Such	valuation	is	carried	out	upon	agreement	of	
the	parties	on	the	independent	valuer	to	be	appointed,	specifically	for	the	purposes	of	
the	 realisation	 of	 the	 collateral	 after	 the	 enforcement	 event,	 and	 should	 be	 fair,	
realistic	 and	 challengeable	 by	 the	 business	 borrower	 before	 courts186.	 Should	 no	
agreement	 be	 reached	 upon	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 valuer,	 the	 valuer	 shall	 be	
appointed	by	a	decision	of	a	judicial	court.	
	
It	 is	 not	 clarified	 whether	 the	 agreement	 on	 the	 valuer	 to	 be	 appointed	 should	 be	
concluded	before	or	upon	the	enforcement	event.	Such	pre-enforcement	agreement187	
could	as	abusive	as	the	agreement	on	the	voluntary	use	of	the	AECE	mechanism	itself,	
as	at	 that	 time	the	negotiation-wise	powerful	party	 is	 the	credit	provider.	We	rather	
tend	 to	 think	 that	 the	 agreement	 on	 the	 valuer	 should	 take	 place	 after	 the	
enforcement	 event,	 as	 the	 valuation	 itself,	 so	 that	 the	 borrower	 is	 given	 the	
opportunity	to	object	to	the	appointment	of	a	valuer	dependent	on	the	creditor,	who	
anyway	organises	the	valuation	and	thus	may	ensure	a	valuation	outcome	favourable	
to	it.	Besides,	the	judicial	appointment	of	the	valuer,	in	case	of	parties’	disagreement,	
will	take	place	also	post-enforcement.		
	
The	 valuation	 procedure	 would	 be	 more	 consistent	 with	 ‘traditional’	 enforcement	
procedures	 and	 would	 offer	 more	 safeguards	 of	 fairness	 and	 objectivity,	 should	 it	
require	 the	 involvement	 of	 an	 independent	 public	 administrator,	 such	 as	 a	 notary,	 a	
                                                
185	Article	24	para.	4.		
186	 Article	 28	 (Right	 to	 challenge	 the	 enforcement):	 ‘Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 the	 business	
borrower	 has	 the	 right	 to	 challenge	 the	 use	 of	 this	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	
mechanism	before	 a	national	 court	where	 [...]	 the	 valuation	of	 the	 assets	has	not	been	 conducted	 in	
accordance	with	the	national	provisions	transposing	Article	24(4)’.	
187	 It	 is	 a	 common	practice	 that	banks	 collaborate	with	 ‘independent	valuers’	 for	 the	valuation	of	 the	
initial	 price	 of	 the	 collateral,	 to	 the	 services	 of	 whom	 they	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 resort	 also	 for	 the	
valuation	of	the	collateral	for	the	purpose	of	its	realisation.	However,	the	independence	and	objectivity	
of	such	valuers	is	questionable.	
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court-bailiff	 or	 even	 courts,	 which	 would	 organise	 the	 valuation	 and	 appoint	 a	
genuinely	independent	valuer188.	Of	course,	this	would	be	contrary	to	the	extrajudicial	
character	of	the	enforcement,	but	only	partially,	since	the	enforcement	title	would	still	
be	 contractual-based	 and	without	 judicial	 intervention.	 Besides,	 the	 criterion	 of	 fair	
valuation	 in	 a	 commercially	 reasonable	 manner189	 can	 be	 invoked	 only	 post-
enforcement	and	will	be	unfavourable	to	borrowers	in	terms	of	proof,	since	they	must	
prove	the	facts	they	invoke	(as	a	typical	procedural	rule),	while	the	creditor	organises	
the	valuation	and	holds	 (or	may	 counterfeit)	 all	 the	 relevant	 information.	Therefore,	
despite	the	few	safeguards,	the	valuation	remains	under	creditor’s	control	and	several	
questions	of	partiality	may	be	raised.		
4.4.	Right	to	challenge	the	enforcement	
The	business	borrower	has	the	right	to	challenge	the	use	of	the	AECE	before	a	national	
court190,	where	the	sale	of	collateral	has	not	been	conducted	 in	accordance	with	the	
respective	 provisions	 about	 appropriation,	 public	 auction	 and	 private	 sale,	 or	where	
the	valuation	of	the	assets	has	not	been	properly	conducted.	The	right	to	challenge	the	
realisation	of	the	encumbered	assets	is	an	expression	of	the	fundamental	right	to	fair	
trial191,	thus	it	would	have	still	been	available	to	business	borrowers,	even	without	its	
explicit	 provision	 in	 the	 proposed	 Directive.	 Pre-enforcement	 challenge	 of	 the	
                                                
188	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.47,	where	it	is	stated	that	in	‘traditional’	enforcement	
regimes,	disposal	of	assets	is	in	accordance	with	strict	procedures,	which	guarantee	maximum	proceeds	
(usually	requiring	for	the	involvement	of	a	court,	a	notary	or	a	court	bailiff).	
189	Valuation	and	 realisation	of	assets	 should	be	carried	out	 in	a	commercial	manner	 (eg.	with	proper	
publicity	in	advance)	primarily	in	order	to	deliver	the	best	value	(and	to	protect	the	business	borrower	
for	 abusive	 behaviour	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 creditor).	 Besides,	 ‘creation	 of	 such	 a	 security	 by	 borrowers	
should	not	be	more	expensive	or	more	cumbersome	in	terms	of	publicity	and	registry	costs	than	other	
securities	/collaterals’.	See:	EBF	comments,	p.	11	(question	34).	
190	See:	Article	28	(Right	to	challenge	the	enforcement)	in	Annex	I.	
191	See:	Opinion	of	the	EESC	p.	43–49,	points	1.15	and	4.3.1:	‘The	EESC	highlights,	in	a	positive	sense,	the	
obligation	of	Member	States	 to	ensure	a	business	borrower’s	 right	 to	challenge	 the	use	of	 the	out-of-
court	enforcement	procedure	before	a	national	court,	in	accordance	with	the	fundamental	right	to	a	fair	
trial	 (Article	 47	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights	 of	 the	 European	Union),	 particularly	 in	 case	 of	
unfair	 or	 abusive	 contractual	 terms	or	when	national	 provisions	 on	 the	 sale	 or	 valuation	 of	 collateral	
have	been	violated’.	
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agreement	itself	on	the	use	of	the	AECE	mechanism	should	be	always	possible	under	
national	 legislation	 on	 grounds	 related	 to	 the	 enforceable	 title,	 such	 as	 unfair	 or	
abusive	 contractual	 terms192,	 whereas	 post-enforcement	 challenge	 envisaged	 in	 the	
proposed	Directive	mainly	 refers	 to	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 procedural	 requirements	 for	
the	realisation	of	assets	and	the	valuation	of	collateral	(valuer’s	independence,	fair	and	
realistic	 valuation)	 193.	 Again,	 the	 post-enforcement	 challenge	 of	 the	 enforcement	
procedure	 will	 be	 unfavourable	 to	 the	 borrower	 in	 terms	 of	 proof	 and	 probably	
financial	constraints,	as	the	creditor	organises	the	valuation	and	is	the	most	powerful	
party.	 Besides,	 particular	 measures	 ordered	 by	 national	 courts	 before	 which	 the	
borrower	 challenges	 the	 enforcement,	 such	 as	 suspension,	 opposition	 and	 other	
interim	measures,	may	vary	significantly	among	Member	States,	thus	there	will	still	be	
divergent	 levels	 of	 borrower	 rights	 protection	 and	 divergent	 timeframes	 for	 the	
conclusion	of	this	extrajudicial	enforcement	procedure.	
	
4.5.	Restitution	and	settlement	
The	creditor	will	be	 required	 to	pay	 the	business	borrower	any	positive	difference194	
between	the	sum	outstanding	of	the	loan	agreement	and	the	proceeds	of	the	sale	of	
the	 asset,	 in	 public	 auction	 or	 private	 sale195.	 Also,	 in	 case	 of	 appropriation196,	 the	
creditor	 should	 be	 required	 to	 pay	 the	 borrower	 similarly	 any	 positive	 difference	
between	 the	 sum	outstanding	of	 the	 secured	 credit	 agreement	 and	 the	 valuation	of	
the	 asset	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 appropriation.	 Restitution	 of	 any	 surplus	 was	
envisaged	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 secured	 creditor	 only	 recovers	 what	 it	 is	 due	 by	 the	
business	borrower	under	the	credit	agreement197.		
	
                                                
192	Only	in	this	way,	any	substantive	deficiencies	of	the	contractual	agreement	on	the	AECE	mechanism	
could	 be	 identified,	 since	 this	 agreement	 constitutes	 a	 directly	 enforceable	 title,	 without	 any	 judicial	
intervention,	and	its	validity	has	not	been	validated	by	a	court	prior	to	its	enforcement.		
193	Article	24	para.	5.		
194	See:	Article	29	(Restitution	of	the	exceeding	amount)	in	Annex	I.	
195	It	is	typical	also	in	‘traditional’	enforcement	procedures	that	any	possible	surplus	value	must	be	paid	
to	the	borrower.	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2017),	p.	284;	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.47.	
196	Article	24	para.	3.	
197	See	Recital	(48)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
  
57 
For	 business	 borrower’s	 protection198,	 where	 less	 than	 the	 sum	 outstanding	 of	 the	
secured	 credit	 agreement	 is	 recovered	 through	 the	 AECE199,	 Member	 States	 may	
provide	for	the	settlement	of	all	liabilities200,	pursuant	to	respective	parties’	agreement	
that	the	realisation	of	collateral	by	means	of	AECE	is	sufficient	to	repay	the	credit.	
	
4.6.	Transfer	of	secured	credit	agreement	to	third	parties	
Where	a	secured	credit	agreement,	providing	for	the	right	to	use	AECE,	is	transferred	
by	the	credit	institution	or	its	subsidiary	to	any	third	party201,	that	third	party	acquires	
the	right	to	use	this	AECE	in	case	of	the	business	borrower's	default,	under	the	same	
terms	and	conditions	as	the	secured	credit	institution202.	
                                                
198	See:	Consultation	Document,	p.	12:	‘If	an	accelerated	loan	security	were	set	up,	the	balance	between	
debtors	and	creditors'	interests	would	have	to	be	carefully	safeguarded.	This	implies	considering	possible	
advantages	of	such	instruments	for	debtors	-	notably	for	instance,	through	the	possibility	of	the	debtors'	
full	discharge	from	further	repayment	obligations,	when	the	recovered	value	from	the	sale	of	assets	 is	
lower	than	the	value	of	the	outstanding	loan’	[italics	by	the	author].	
199	See:	Article	30	(Settlement	of	the	outstanding	amount)	in	Annex	I.	
200	See	the	critique	expressed	 in:	EBF	comments,	p.	10	 (question	34):	 ‘The	debtors	 full	discharge	 from	
further	repayment	obligations,	when	the	recovered	value	from	the	sale	of	assets	is	lower	than	the	value	
of	 the	 outstanding	 loan,	 could	 encourage	 borrowers	 to	 act	 irresponsibly	 and	 increase	 speculative	
behaviour	among	borrowers,	especially	when	asset	values	decrease.	While	any	proceeds	from	a	sale	of	
pledged	assets	should	be	subtracted	from	the	outstanding	debts,	the	debtor	should	still	be	responsible	
for	remaining	payments.	Furthermore,	full	debt	discharge	may	result	in	being	counterproductive,	since	it	
does	 not	 promote	 a	 responsible	 entrepreneurship	model	 (moral	 hazard	which	may	 also	 drive	 up	 the	
price	of	credit,	to	compensate	for	this	risk).	With	regards	to	such	a	provision,	the	debtor	should	remain	
responsible	 for	 the	 outstanding	 payments’.	 We	 disagree	 with	 this	 critique,	 since	 decrease	 in	 assets	
values	 is	 part	 of	 the	 risks	 undertaken	 by	 the	 creditor,	 when	 providing	 credit.	 Besides,	 social	 and	
economic	considerations	of	business	borrower’s	protection	may	support	the	argumentation	in	favor	of	
the	settlement	of	all	liabilities.	
201	See:	Article	31	(Transfer	of	secured	credit	agreements	to	third	parties)	in	Annex	I.	
202	 See:	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 pp.	 4-5:	 The	 proposed	 Directive	 is	
consistent	 with	 Union	 rules	 on	 consumer	 protection	 in	 the	 area	 of	 financial	 services,	 as	 the	 existing	
consumer	 protection	 rules	 will	 continue	 to	 apply,	 irrespective	 of	 who	 subsequently	 purchases	 or	
services	the	credit,	irrespective	of	the	legal	regime	in	force	in	the	Member	State	of	the	credit	purchaser	
or	 the	credit	 servicer	and	 irrespective	of	any	assignment	of	 the	creditor's	 rights	 to	a	 third	party.	Also,	
See:	Recital	(49)	of	the	proposed	Directive.			
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	IV	 CONSISTENCY	 WITH	 OTHER	 DEBT	 RECOVERY	 FRAMEWORKS	 IN	
EUROPE	
The	 proposed	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedure	 introduces	 a	 new	 debt	 recovery	
framework	 in	 Europe,	 which	 deviates	 from	 core	 characteristics	 and	 ‘traditional’	
enforcement	 principles,	 as	 elaborated	 in	 the	 previous	 Chapter.	 Potentially,	 the	
proposed	 mechanism	 could	 be	 greatly	 disruptive	 to	 the	 traditional	 individual	 and	
collective	 enforcement	 procedures	 already	 in	 place.	 Therefore,	 it	will	 be	 established	
through	a	Directive,	so	that	consistency	with	the	national	legislation	could	be	possible,	
when	provisions	are	transposed	into	Member	States’	legal	orders203.	As	a	general	rule,	
the	proposed	Directive	shall	be	without	prejudice	to	already	applicable	provisions,	so	
that	 consistency	 with	 civil,	 commercial,	 property	 and	 insolvency	 laws	 could	 be	
ensured.	 Hence,	 in	 this	 Chapter,	 we	 analyse	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 declared	
consistency	with	the	already	existing	enforcement	regimes	may	be	achieved.	
1.	National	pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	proceedings	
The	 Proposal	 aspires	 to	 ensure	 full	 consistency	 and	 complementarity	 with	 pre-
insolvency	 and	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 which	 are	 initiated	 under	 Member	 States'	
national	laws	and	regulations	and	aim	at	value	recovery	from	any	collateral	pledged	to	
secure	 loans,	 in	case	of	business	borrower’s	default204.	Pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	
                                                
203 Whereas	some	of	 its	aspects	could	be	 regulated	upon	the	 transposition	of	 the	proposed	Directive	
into	national	legislations	and	whereas	some	safeguards	have	already	been	set,	ensuring	its	consistency	
with	national	provisions	(such	as	the	stay	of	 individual	enforcement	actions),	other	practical	problems	
remain	unaddressed.	For	instance,	if	‘banks	to	foreclose	their	collateral	by	means	of	a	privileged	out-of-
court	 tool,	 then	 the	 value	of	 the	debtor's	 residual	 assets	will	 be	de	 facto	 reduced’.	 See:	 Consultation	
Document,	p.	13.	Therefore,	the	Commission	has	underlined	the	need	of	a	very	careful	designation	of	its	
structure,	when	transposed	into	national	legislation,	so	that	it	will	be	‘coherent	and	consistent	with	the	
functioning	of	pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	frameworks’	(p.	13).	
204	 For	 the	 design	 of	 national	 pro-insolvency	 and	 insolvency	 systems,	 see:	 ‘Principles	 for	 Effective	
Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Rights	Systems	(Revised)’,	101069,	World	Bank,	Jan	&	May	2015,	p.	3	et	
seq.,	where	 it	 is	highlighted	that	transparency,	accountability,	efficiency	reliability	and	predictability	of	
national	 insolvency	 frameworks	 are	 promoted	 as	 fundamental	 to	 sound	 credit	 relationships	 and	
enhanced	 availability	 of	 credit.	 Unpredictable	 legal	mechanisms	 for	 debt	 enforcement,	 recovery,	 and	
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proceedings	 constitute	mechanisms	 to	 enforce	 unsecured	 and	 secured	 credit	 claims	
upon	 debtor’s	 default	 by	 means	 of	 collective	 action,	 under	 special	 regulations	 and	
principles	 suitable	 for	 the	 their	 collective	 character,	 as	 opposed	 to	 individual	
enforcement	and	execution205	(either	judicial	or	extrajudicial).		
	
Consistency	with	existing	national	 insolvency	proceedings	 shall	be	ensured	 thanks	 to	
the	principle	that	the	out-of-court	enforcement	of	collateral	would	be	possible	as	long	
as	a	stay	of	 individual	enforcement	actions206	 -in	accordance	with	applicable	national	
laws-	 is	 not	 applicable,	meaning	 that	 the	 proposed	 AECE	mechanism	would	 only	 be	
available	as	long	as	the	debtor	is	only	in	default	towards	the	bank	but	before	entering	
into	 restructuring	 or	 insolvency	 proceedings	 (before	 being	 judicially	 declared	 in	
financial	 distress)207.	 Consequently,	 where	 insolvency	 proceedings	 are	 initiated	 in	
                                                                                                                                          
restructuring	impede	competition	in	credit	delivery.	
205	Ibid,	p.	5	and	12:	‘The	legal	framework	for	secured	lending	should	address	the	fundamental	features	
and	elements	 for	 the	creation,	 recognition,	 and	enforcement	of	 security	 rights	 in	all	 types	of	 assets—
movable	 and	 immovable,	 tangible	 and	 intangible—including	 inventories,	 receivables,	 proceeds,	 and	
future	 property	 and,	 on	 a	 global	 basis,	 including	 both	 possessory	 and	 non-possessory	 rights	 [...].	 A	
modern,	 credit-based	 economy	 requires	 affordable,	 transparent	 and	 reasonably	 predictable	
mechanisms	 to	 enforce	 unsecured	 and	 secured	 credit	 claims	 by	 means	 of	 individual	 action	 (e.g.,	
enforcement	 and	 execution),	 i.e.	 by	 efficient	 mechanisms	 outside	 of	 insolvency,	 or	 through	 sound	
collective	 action	 and	 proceedings	 (e.g.,	 insolvency).	 These	 rights	 enable	 parties	 to	 rely	 on	 contractual	
agreements,	fostering	confidence	that	fuels	investment,	lending	and	commerce.	Conversely,	uncertainty	
about	the	enforceability	of	contractual	rights	increases	the	cost	of	credit	to	compensate	for	the	increased	
risk	of	nonperformance	or,	in	severe	cases,	leads	to	credit	tightening’	[italics	by	the	author]. 
206	For	the	rationale	behind	the	stay	of	individual	enforcement	actions	in	pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	
proceedings,	see:	Ibid,	p.	19:	‘A	stay	of	actions	by	secured	creditors	also	should	be	imposed	in	liquidation	
proceedings	to	enable	higher	recovery	of	assets	by	sale	of	the	entire	business	or	its	productive	units,	and	
in	reorganization	proceedings	where	the	collateral	is	needed	for	the	reorganization.	The	stay	should	be	
of	 limited,	 specified	 duration,	 strike	 a	 proper	 balance	 between	 creditor	 protection	 and	 insolvency	
proceeding	objectives,	and	provide	for	relief	from	the	stay	by	application	to	the	court	based	on	clearly	
established	 grounds	 when	 the	 insolvency	 proceeding	 objectives	 or	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 secured	
creditor’s	 interests	 in	 its	 collateral	 are	 not	 achieved.	 Exceptions	 to	 the	 general	 rule	 on	 a	 stay	 of	
enforcement	actions	should	be	limited	and	clearly	defined’	[italics	by	the	author].	
207	See	the	critique	expressed	on	this	restriction	of	the	applicability	of	the	AECE	 in	EBF	comments,	pp.	
14-15	 (question	 38):	 ‘This	 aspect	 would	 significantly	 weaken	 the	 value	 of	 the	 security	 and	 would	
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respect	 of	 a	 business	 borrower,	 the	 realisation	 of	 collateral	 pursuant	 to	 the	 AECE	
mechanism	 is	 subject	 to	a	 stay	of	 individual	enforcement	actions	 in	accordance	with	
applicable	 national	 laws	 208.	 Procedural	 requirements	 for	 the	 grant,	 continuation	 or	
renewal	and	termination	of	the	stay	are	left	to	national	legislation.	
	
Apart	from	the	stay	of	individual	actions,	other	aspects	of	property	and	insolvency	law	
are	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 principle	 of	
proportionality	(Article	5,	para.	4	TEU)209.	Formalities	for	vesting	a	security	interest210,	
such	as	the	format	for	its	creation	(private	or	notarised	document),	its	registration	or	
any	 intervention	 of	 public	 authorities,	 are	 reserved	 for	 national	 property	 law	
provisions.	 Similarly,	 the	 determination	 of	 assets	 forming	 part	 of	 the	 ‘estate’,	
conditions	for	set-off,	the	effects	of	the	insolvency	on	current	contracts	(performance,	
termination,	 acceleration),	 the	 ranking	 of	 claims211,	 the	 voidness,	 voidability	 and	
unenforceability	 of	 legal	 acts	 detrimental	 to	 the	 general	 body	 of	 creditors	 and	 actio	
                                                                                                                                          
discourage	banks	holding	such	security	 from	supporting	 restructuring	efforts	 for	a	debtor’s	potentially	
viable	 business.	 Furthermore,	 it	 would	 likely	 limit	 the	 viability,	 effectiveness	 and	 relevance	 of	 the	
accelerated	 loan	security	severely,	 since	such	collateral	 is	generally	most	 relevant	 in	 times	of	 financial	
distress	for	the	borrower.		If	the	full	effect	of	the	collateral	is	to	be	realised,	the	accelerated	loan	security	
should	 be	 enforceable	 even	 when	 a	 debtor	 enters	 into	 an	 insolvency	 or	 preventive	 restructuring	
proceeding.	Avoidance	actions	should	still	apply	to	this	type	of	collateral	in	order	to	safeguard	the	rights	
of	 other	 creditors.	However,	 it	 is	 rather	 unlikely	 that	 such	 an	 advantage	 for	 secured	 creditors	 can	 be	
integrated	 into	 the	national	 insolvency	 regimes	of	most	Member	States	without	disruptions’	 [italics	by	
the	author].		
We	only	 agree	with	 the	 last	 position,	 namely	 that	 the	proposed	 extrajudicial	mechanism	 is	 already	 a	
great	disruption	to	traditional	individual	and	collective	enforcement	procedures,	with	limited	safeguards	
of	 legitimacy,	 thus	 its	 inapplicability	during	a	 stay	of	 individual	enforcement	actions	within	 insolvency	
and	pre-insolvency	proceedings	partially	alleviates	its	disruptive	effects	and	is	wisely	envisaged.		
208	See:	Article	32	para.	2	 (Restructuring	and	 insolvency	proceedings)	and	Recital	 (50)	of	 the	proposed	
Directive	in	Annex	I.	
209	 See:	 Explanatory	Memorandum	of	 the	 proposed	Directive,	 p.	 3:	 ‘It	 is	 designed	 so	 as	 to	 not	 affect	
preventive	restructuring	or	insolvency	proceedings’	[italics	by	the	author].	
210	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.47.		
211	 Secured	 claims	may	 be	 subordinated	 to	 claims	 of	 preferential	 creditors,	 such	 as	 claims	 for	 unpaid	
wages	of	government	taxes,	according	to	the	applicable	national	law.	
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pauliana212,	 the	 retroactive	effect	of	 the	declaration	of	 insolvency	 for	 the	 fixation	of	
the	 insolvent	 estate,	 the	 validity	 of	 securities	 vested	 during	 the	 suspect	 period,	 the	
partial	satisfaction	of	secured	creditors	after	 the	 initiation	of	 insolvency	proceedings,	
the	 distribution	 of	 proceeds	 from	 the	 realisation	 of	 assets,	 the	 insolvency	
administrator’s	duties	and	powers	and	other	procedural	aspects	of	the	administration	
of	insolvency	are	still	governed	by	national	provisions213.	
	
Thus,	 it	 should	 be	 left	 to	 national	 law,	 whether	 secured	 creditors	 have	 preferential	
access	 to	 the	 collateral	 under	 the	 accelerated	 debt	 recovery	mechanism,	 even	 once	
insolvency	proceedings	are	open214.	The	priority	attached	to	competing	security	rights	
in	 the	same	collateral	 should	not	be	affected	by	 their	enforcement	under	 traditional	
national	procedures215.	The	proposed	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism	
is	 also	 designed	 in	 consistency	 with	 the	 already	 nationally	 established	 hierarchy	 of	
creditors	in	insolvency216.	
	
                                                
212	 See:	 Goode,	 R.	 (2015),	Harmonization	 and	 Co-operation	 in	 Cross-border	 Insolvency,	 in:	 Goode,	 R.,	
Kronke,	H.	&	McKendrick,	E.,	Transnational	Commercial	Law:	Texts,	Cases	and	Materials,	2nd	Ed.,	Oxford	
University	Press,	Ch.	17,	p.	512,	para	17.30,	about	the	fact	that	all	these	matters	traditionally	fall	within	
the	lex	concursus	national	framework.	
213	 See:	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 p.	 3:	 ’Restructuring	 and	 insolvency	
proceedings	prevail	over	the	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	procedure	set	out	with	this	
proposal’	[italics	by	the	author].  
214	See:	Recital	(50)	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
215	See:	Article	27	(Competing	security	rights)	in	Annex	I.	
216	 See:	 Explanatory	Memorandum	of	 the	 proposed	Directive,	 p.	 3:	 ‘It	 is	 designed	 so	 as	 to	 not	 affect	
preventive	 restructuring	 or	 insolvency	 proceedings	 and	 not	 to	 change	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 creditors	 in	
insolvency’.	Also,	see:	Consultation	Document,	p.	13.		
However,	 nowhere	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 is	 it	 explicitly	 stated	 that	 the	 hierarchy	 of	
creditors	claims	in	insolvency	will	not	(or	shall	not)	be	affected	by	the	proposed	mechanism.	
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2.	Harmonised	pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	proceedings	
2.1.	Consistency	with	the	Regulation	on	cross-border	insolvency	proceedings	
2.1.1.	The	Regulation	(EU)	2015/848	
Since	June	2017,	Regulation217	 (EU)	2015/848218	has	replaced	Council	Regulation	(EC)	
1346/2000219	 to	 enhance	 the	 already	 effective	 administration	 of	 cross-border	
insolvency	 proceedings.	 The	 need	 for	 greater	 convergence	 in	 insolvency	 law	 and	
restructuring	 proceedings	 across	 Member	 States	 has	 been	 systematically	
acknowledged220,	as	inefficient	and	divergent	insolvency	laws	make	it	harder	to	assess	
and	 manage	 credit	 risk.	 Upgrading	 insolvency	 regimes	 towards	 best	 practices,	 thus	
enhancing	 legal	 certainty	 and	 encouraging	 the	 timely	 restructuring	 of	 borrowers	 in	
financial	distress,	could	contribute	to	the	success	of	strategies	to	address	NPLs.		
	
Regulation	 2015/848	deals	with	 issues	 of	 jurisdiction,	 applicable	 law	 in	 restructuring	
and	 insolvency	 procedures	 already	 existing	 in	 Member	 States,	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	 of	 insolvency	 decisions	 throughout	 the	 EU,	 as	 well	 as	 coordination	 of	
cross-border	 insolvency	proceedings.	 It	 covers	many	 types	of	 insolvency	procedures,	
including	 preventive/pre-insolvency	 procedures	 for	 companies	 and	 certain	 personal	
insolvency	procedures,	provided	that	they	fulfill	certain	conditions.	
	
                                                
217	According	to	Article	288	TFEU,	this	Regulation	shall	have	general	application	and	direct	applicability,	
being	binding	in	its	entirety	in	all	Member	States.	There	is	no	need	for	its	implementation	by	domestic	
legislation;	in	fact,	its	domestication	by	its	transposition	into	national	legislation	is	not	permissible.	See:	
Goode,	R.	(2015),	p.	508,	para	17.25.	
218	 Regulation	 (EU)	 2015/848	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 20	 May	 2015	 on	
insolvency	proceedings	(recast),	OJ	L	141,	05.06.2015	(‘Cross-border	Insolvency	Regulation’).			
219	 Council	 Regulation	 (EC)	 No	 1346/2000	 of	 29	 May	 2000	 on	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 OJ	 L	 160,	
30.06.2000.	
220	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council,	the	European	Central	
Bank,	 the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	 the	Committee	of	 the	Regions	 ‘Towards	 the	
completion	of	the	Banking	Union’,	COM/2015/587/Final,	24.11.2015.	
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The	 Regulation	 applies	 to	 public	 collective	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 including	 interim	
proceedings221,	in	which	-for	the	purpose	of	rescue,	adjustment	of	debt,	reorganisation	
or	 liquidation-	a	debtor	 is	 totally	or	partially	divested	of	 its	assets	and	an	 insolvency	
practitioner	is	appointed,	or	the	assets	and	affairs	of	a	debtor	are	subject	to	control	or	
supervision	by	a	court,	or	a	 temporary	stay	of	 individual	enforcement	proceedings	 is	
granted	by	a	court	or	by	operation	of	law,	in	order	to	allow	for	negotiations	between	
the	debtor	and	 its	creditors222.	 Insolvency	proceedings	 include	the	proceedings	 listed	
in	Annex	A	of	the	Regulation223.	
	
2.1.2.	Stay	of	insolvency	proceedings	
The	Regulation	provides	in	several	cases	the	possibility	for	a	court	to	order	a	stay224	of	
insolvency	(opening	or	enforcement)	proceedings225,	without	prejudice	to	the	rights	in	
rem	of	creditors	or	third	parties.		
	
When	a	temporary	stay	of	individual	enforcement	proceedings	has	been	granted	in	the	
main	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 the	 court	 may	 temporarily	 stay226	 the	 opening	 of	
                                                
221	See:	Goode,	R.	(2015),	Ch.	17,	pp.	508-509,	para.	17.26.	
222	 See:	 Article	 1	 (Scope)	 of	 the	 Cross-Border	 Insolvency	 Regulation:	 [...]	 ‘Where	 the	 proceedings	
referred	 to	 in	 this	 paragraph	 may	 be	 commenced	 in	 situations	 where	 there	 is	 only	 a	 likelihood	 of	
insolvency,	 their	 purpose	 shall	 be	 to	 avoid	 the	 debtor's	 insolvency	 or	 the	 cessation	 of	 the	 debtor's	
business	activities’.	
223	 See:	 Article	 2,	 point	 (4)	 of	 the	 Cross-Border	 Insolvency	 Regulation,	which	 refers	 to	 Annex	 A.	 Such	
proceedings	 are	 primarily	winding-	 up	 proceedings,	 in	which	 the	 debtor’s	 assets	 are	 collected	 in	 and	
realised	 and	 subsequently	 the	 proceeds	 are	 distributed	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 applicable	 insolvency	
law;	 and	 restructuring	 or	 re-organisation	 proceedings	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 company	 as	 public	 collective	
proceedings.	See:	Goode,	R.	(2015),	Ch.	17,	p.	509,	para.	17.26.	
224	See:	Recital	(69)	of	the	Cross-Border	Insolvency	Regulation.	
225	 Under	 the	 Cross-Border	 Insolvency	 Regulation,	 insolvency	 proceedings	 may	 be	main	 proceedings	
(opened	 within	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 centre	 of	 debtor’s	 main	 interests	 with	 universal	 effects,	 i.e.	
extending	to	all	the	debtor’s	assets	worldwide-	Article	3	para.	1)	and	territorial	proceedings	(opened	in	
another	Member	State	where	the	debtor	has	an	establishment	and	limited	to	local	assets-	Article	3	para.	
2).	 Territorial	 proceedings	 may	 be	 secondary	 proceedings	 (opened	 after	 the	 opening	 of	 main	
proceedings)	and	 independent	proceedings	(opened	prior	to	main	proceedings).	See:	Goode,	R.	(2015),	
p.	509,	para.	17.27.	
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secondary	insolvency	proceedings,	to	preserve	the	efficiency	of	the	latter	and	to	allow	
for	negotiations	between	the	debtor	and	its	creditors	on	a	restructuring	plan.	A	total	
or	partial	stay	of	the	process	of	realisation	of	assets227	may	be	ordered	for	up	to	three	
months	 (with	 possibility	 of	 continuation	 or	 renewal)	 by	 the	 court	 that	 opened	 the	
secondary	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 upon	 request	 from	 the	 insolvency	 practitioner	 in	
the	 main	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 It	 is	 among	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 insolvency	
practitioner,	appointed	in	insolvency	proceedings	opened	in	respect	of	a	member	of	a	
group	of	companies,	to	request	a	stay	of	any	measure	related	to	the	realisation	of	the	
assets	 in	 the	 proceedings	 opened	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 other	 member	 of	 the	 same	
group,	under	certain	conditions228,	in	order	to	facilitate	the	effective	administration	of	
the	proceedings.		
2.1.3.	Consistency	with	the	proposed	extrajudicial	mechanism	
The	 law	 of	 the	 ‘State	 of	 the	 opening	 of	 proceedings’	 (lex	 concursus),	 i.e.	 national	
legislation,	 determines	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 insolvency	 proceedings	 on	 proceedings	
brought	 by	 individual	 creditors,	 the	 distribution	 of	 proceeds	 from	 the	 realisation	 of	
assets,	 the	 ranking	 of	 claims	 and	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 secured	 creditors	 after	 the	
initiation	 of	 insolvency229.	 Similarly,	 the	 insolvency	 practitioner	 may	 exercise	 all	 the	
                                                                                                                                          
226	See:	Recital	(45)	of	the	Cross-Border	Insolvency	Regulation:	‘Second,	this	Regulation	should	provide	
for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 court	 temporarily	 stays	 the	 opening	 of	 secondary	 insolvency	 proceedings,	
when	a	temporary	stay	of	individual	enforcement	proceedings	has	been	granted	in	the	main	insolvency	
proceedings,	in	order	to	preserve	the	efficiency	of	the	stay	granted	in	the	main	insolvency	proceedings.	
The	court	should	be	able	to	grant	the	temporary	stay	if	it	is	satisfied	that	suitable	measures	are	in	place	
to	protect	the	general	 interest	of	 local	creditors.	 In	such	a	case,	all	creditors	that	could	be	affected	by	
the	outcome	of	the	negotiations	on	a	restructuring	plan	should	be	informed	of	the	negotiations	and	be	
allowed	 to	 participate	 in	 them’.	 Also,	 see:	 Article	 38	 (Decision	 to	 open	 secondary	 insolvency	
proceedings)	of	the	Cross-Border	Insolvency	Regulation.	
227	See:	Article	46	(Stay	of	the	process	of	realisation	of	assets)	of	the	Cross-Border	Insolvency	Regulation.	
228	 See:	 Article	 60	 para.	 1(b)	 and	 2	 (Powers	 of	 the	 insolvency	 practitioner	 in	 proceedings	 concerning	
members	of	a	group	of	companies)	of	the	Cross-Border	Insolvency	Regulation.		
229	 See	Article	36	and	Article	7	 (Applicable	 law)	of	 the	Cross-Border	 Insolvency	Regulation:	 ‘1.	 Save	as	
otherwise	 provided	 in	 this	 Regulation,	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 insolvency	 proceedings	 and	 their	 effects	
shall	be	that	of	the	Member	State	within	the	territory	of	which	such	proceedings	are	opened	(the	“State	
of	the	opening	of	proceedings”).	2.	The	law	of	the	State	of	the	opening	of	proceedings	shall	determine	
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powers	conferred	on	it	by	lex	concursus	(Article	21	para.	3)	with	certain	limitations230.	
Therefore,	 the	proposed	AECE	mechanism	should	not	 interfere	with	 these	 issues,	on	
which	national	legislators	have	exclusive	regulatory	competence231.	
	
Most	 importantly,	 consistency	 of	 the	 AECE	mechanism	with	 cross-border	 insolvency	
proceedings	 is	 ensured	 thanks	 to	 the	 approach	 followed	 by	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	
that	the	out-of-court	enforcement	of	collateral	would	be	possible	as	long	as	a	stay	of	
individual	 enforcement	 proceedings,	 in	 accordance	 with	 applicable	 laws,	 is	 not	
applicable.	 Where	 cross-border	 insolvency	 proceedings	 are	 initiated	 pursuant	 to	
Regulation	2015/848,	the	realisation	of	collateral	pursuant	to	the	AECE	mechanism	is	
subject	to	a	stay	of	individual	enforcement	actions232.	This	principle	is	line	with	the	fact	
that	 in	 collective	 insolvency	 proceedings	 the	 debtor	 is	 divested	 of	 its	 assets	 and	 an	
insolvency	practitioner	is	appointed,	or	the	assets	and	affairs	of	a	debtor	are	subject	to	
court	 control	 or	 supervision,	 so	 the	 debtor	 (though	 willing	 to)	 could	 not	 satisfy	 its	
creditors	through	any	individual	enforcement	procedure.		
	
                                                                                                                                          
the	 conditions	 for	 the	 opening	 of	 those	 proceedings,	 their	 conduct	 and	 their	 closure.	 In	 particular,	 it	
shall	determine	the	following:	[...]	 (f)	the	effects	of	the	 insolvency	proceedings	on	proceedings	brought	
by	 individual	 creditors,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 pending	 lawsuits;	 [...]	 (i)	 the	 rules	 governing	 the	
distribution	of	proceeds	from	the	realisation	of	assets,	the	ranking	of	claims	and	the	rights	of	creditors	
who	have	obtained	partial	satisfaction	after	the	opening	of	insolvency	proceedings	by	virtue	of	a	right	in	
rem	or	through	a	set-off’	[italics	by	the	author].	
230	 See:	 Article	 21	 para.	 3	 (Powers	 of	 the	 insolvency	 practitioner)	 of	 the	 Cross-Border	 Insolvency	
Regulation:	 ‘In	 exercising	 its	 powers,	 the	 insolvency	 practitioner	 shall	 comply	 with	 the	 law	 of	 the	
Member	 State	 within	 the	 territory	 of	 which	 it	 intends	 to	 take	 action,	 in	 particular	 with	 regard	 to	
procedures	 for	 the	 realisation	 of	 assets.	 Those	 powers	 may	 not	 include	 coercive	 measures,	 unless	
ordered	by	a	court	of	that	Member	State,	or	the	right	to	rule	on	legal	proceedings	or	disputes’.	
231	 See:	 Explanatory	Memorandum	of	 the	 proposed	Directive,	 p.	 3:	 ‘It	 is	 designed	 so	 as	 to	 not	 affect	
preventive	 restructuring	 or	 insolvency	 proceedings	 [...].	 Restructuring	 and	 insolvency	 proceedings	
prevail	over	 the	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	procedure	set	out	with	this	proposal’’	
[italics	by	the	author].	
232	See:	Article	32	para.	2	of	the	proposed	Directive	in	Annex	I.	
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2.2.	Consistency	with	the	Restructuring	Proposal	
2.2.1.	The	Restructuring	Proposal233	
In	November	2016,	 the	Commission	proposed	a	Directive	on	preventive	 restructuring	
frameworks,	second	chance	for	entrepreneurs	and	measures	to	increase	the	efficiency	
of	restructuring,	insolvency	and	discharge	procedures	(the	‘Restructuring	Proposal’)234.	
The	 Restructuring	 Proposal	 requires	 Member	 States	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	 national	
preventive	 restructuring	 procedures	 comply	 with	 certain	 minimum	 principles	 of	
effectiveness.		
	
Measures	 proposed	 in	 the	 Restructuring	 Proposal	 aim	 at	 facilitating	 the	 effective	
restructuring	 and	 insolvency	 proceedings	 and	 at	 establishing	 harmonised	 preventive	
restructuring	 procedures235,	 so	 that	 viable	 companies	 and	 entrepreneurs	 in	 financial	
                                                
233	 Proposal	 for	 a	 Directive	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 preventive	 restructuring	
frameworks,	 second	 chance	 and	measures	 to	 increase	 the	 efficiency	 of	 restructuring,	 insolvency	 and	
discharge	 procedures	 and	 amending	 Directive	 2012/30/EU,	 COM/2016/0723	 final,	 22.11.2016	
(‘Restructuring	Proposal’).	
234	 From	 a	 comparative	 law	 perspective,	 in	 Greece	 there	 has	 been	 established	 an	 ‘Extrajudicial	
Mechanism	for	Settlement	of	Business	Debts	 (Law	4469/2017,	published	on	the	Government	Gazette,	
FEK	 A’	 62/03.05.2017,	 as	 amended	 by	 the	 Law	 4587/2018,	 published	 on	 the	Government	 Gazette	 A’	
218/24.12.2018).	This	mechanism	allows	the	business	debtor	 (a	company	or	sole	entrepreneur)	 to	 re-
negotiate	 and	 restructure	 (adjust)	 its	 debts	 in	 money	 towards	 its	 creditors	 (which	 form	 a	 group	 of	
creditors),	 with	 the	 objective	 to	 extrajudicially	 settle	 its	 obligations,	 while	 ensuring	 the	 viability	 and	
continuation	 of	 its	 business.	 This	 mechanism	 is	 more	 an	 extrajudicial	 dispute	 resolution	 procedure	
(facilitated	 by	 an	 ad	 hoc	 appointed	 coordinator),	 aiming	 at	 the	 effective	 debt	 restructuring	 with	 a	
mutually	accepted	settlement;	it	is	not	a	strict	‘re-structuring’	or	‘re-organisation’	proceeding,	since	the	
business	borrower	 should	not	be	on	 the	verge	of	 insolvency	but,	on	 the	 contrary,	 its	business	 should	
have	 profitable	 balance	 sheets	 and	 the	 borrower	 should	 present	 a	 business	 plan	 for	 the	 viable	
continuation	 of	 its	 business,	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 its	 creditors	 to	 enter	 into	 negotiations	 with	
confidence.	For	this	reason,	any	record	of	settlement	has	to	be	validated	by	the	court	to	be	rendered	an	
enforceable	title	(Article	12).	However,	also	in	this	case,	all	individual	and	collective	enforcement	actions	
–including	 interim	measures-	 ex	 lege	 freeze	 for	 90	 days,	 commencing	 from	 the	 date	 when	 creditors	
were	invited	to	participate	in	negotiations	with	their	business	debtor	(Article	90).	
235	 See:	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 Restructuring	 Proposal,	 pp.	 18-19	 and	 Recital	 (12):	 By	
establishing	harmonised	preventive	restructuring	proceedings,	barriers	to	cross-border	 investment	will	
be	lifted	and	capital	market	development	in	the	EU	will	be	fostered.	
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difficulties	could	have	a	second	chance	and	avoid	insolvency	and	destruction	of	going	
concern	 value236.	 For	 natural	 persons,	 including	 sole	 entrepreneurs,	 the	 proposal	
provides	for	a	second	chance	through	‘debt	discharge’,	in	order	to	enable	them	a	fresh	
start	and	 incentivise	entrepreneurship.	 In	 that	way,	 it	 aims	at	effectively	 striking	 the	
balance	 between	 creditor’s	 interest	 for	 satisfaction	 of	 its	 credit	 claims	 (by	 inspiring	
confidence	 that	 entrepreneurs	 will	 meet	 their	 payment	 obligations)	 and	 business	
borrower’s	 interest	 for	 a	 second	 chance	 to	 viably	 continue	 its	 business	 and	 avoid	
insolvency.		
	
2.2.2.	Consistency	with	the	proposed	extrajudicial	mechanism	
The	initiative	on	the	AECE	declares	itself	 in	full	consistency	and	complementarity	with	
the	 Restructuring	 Proposal.	 The	 Restructuring	 Proposal,	 among	 other	 objectives,	
aspires	 to	contribute	 to	 the	prevention	of	 future	accumulation	of	NPLs	and	 to	 tackle	
their	 existing	 high	 stocks237.	 By	 improving	 the	 possibility	 for	 entrepreneurs	 and	
companies	 in	 financial	 difficulty	 to	 adopt	 a	 successful	 restructuring	 plan,	 more	
                                                
236	 See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	 the	Restructuring	Proposal,	 ‘Objective	of	 the	proposal’,	pp.	5-6:	
‘The	aim	 is	 for	all	Member	States	 to	have	 in	place	key	principles	on	effective	preventive	 restructuring	
and	second	chance	frameworks,	and	measures	to	make	all	types	of	insolvency	procedures	more	efficient	
by	reducing	their	length	and	associated	costs	and	improving	their	quality	[...].	Along	with	key	principles,	
more	targeted	rules	are	necessary	to	make	restructuring	frameworks	more	efficient.	Rules	on	company	
managers'	duty	of	care	when	nearing	insolvency	also	play	an	important	role	in	developing	a	culture	of	
business	 rescue	 instead	of	 liquidation,	 as	 they	encourage	early	 restructuring,	 prevent	misconduct	 and	
avoidable	losses	for	creditors.	Equally	important	are	rules	on	early	warning	tools.	[...]	Individuals	should	
not	be	deterred	from	entrepreneurial	activity	or	denied	the	opportunity	of	a	second	chance.	Above	all,	
the	proposal	aims	to	enhance	the	rescue	culture	in	the	EU.	The	rules	on	business	restructuring	and	rights	
of	 shareholders	 will	 predominantly	 contribute	 to	 "prevention",	 the	 rules	 on	 avoidance,	 insolvency	
practitioners	 and	 judicial	 or	 administrative	 authorities	 to	 “value	 recovery”	 and	 the	 rules	 on	 second	
chance	to	“debt	discharge”	’	[italics	by	the	author].	
237	 See:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	 the	Restructuring	Proposal,	 ‘Objective	of	 the	proposal’,	pp.	5-6:	
‘More	specifically,	such	frameworks	aim	to	[...]	prevent	the	build-up	of	Non-Performing	Loans,	facilitate	
cross-border	restructurings,	and	reduce	costs	and	increase	opportunities	for	honest	entrepreneurs	to	be	
given	a	fresh	start’	[italics	by	the	author].	
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companies	 indeed	 could	 be	 able	 to	 avoid	 insolvency	 and	 turn	 their	 Non-Performing	
Loans	into	performing238.		
	
Most	 importantly,	 the	 proposed	 AECE	 aims	 at	 establishing	 effective	 out-of-court	
enforcement	 procedures	 for	 collateral,	 without	 prejudice	 to	 the	 Restructuring	
Proposal239,	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	proportionality	(Article	5(4)	TEU).	That	
means	that,	where	a	preventive	restructuring	proceeding	is	initiated	in	respect	of	the	
business	borrower,	the	realisation	of	the	collateral	under	the	AECE	shall	be	subject	to	a	
stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions.	 Out-of-court	 collateral	 enforcement	 shall	 be	
available	as	 long	as	a	 stay	of	 individual	 enforcement	actions,	 in	accordance	with	 the	
Restructuring	Proposal,	is	not	applicable.		
	
Indeed,	under	the	Restructuring	Proposal,	creditors	-including	secured	and	preferential	
creditors	 of	 a	 company	 or	 entrepreneur	 under	 restructuring	 proceedings-	 may	 be	
subject	 to	 a	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions240.	 The	 stay	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	
                                                
238	See:	Communication	to	complete	the	Capital	Markets	Union,	p.4.	
239	See:	Article	32	para.	1	 (Restructuring	and	 insolvency	proceedings)	and	Recital	 (50)	of	 the	proposed	
Directive	in	Annex	I.	Also,	see:	Explanatory	Memorandum	of	the	proposed	Directive,	p.	3:	‘It	is	designed	
so	as	to	not	affect	preventive	restructuring	or	insolvency	proceedings	[...].	Restructuring	and	insolvency	
proceedings	prevail	over	the	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	procedure	set	out	with	this	
proposal’	[italics	by	the	author]. 
240	 See:	 Article	 6	 (Stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions)	 of	 the	 Restructuring	 Proposal:	 ‘1.	 Member	
States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 debtors	 who	 are	 negotiating	 a	 restructuring	 plan	 with	 their	 creditors	 may	
benefit	 from	a	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions	 if	 and	 to	 the	 extent	 such	 a	 stay	 is	 necessary	 to	
support	the	negotiations	of	a	restructuring	plan.	2.	Member	States	shall	ensure	that	a	stay	of	individual	
enforcement	 actions	 may	 be	 ordered	 in	 respect	 of	 all	 types	 of	 creditors,	 including	 secured	 and	
preferential	creditors.	The	stay	may	be	general,	covering	all	creditors,	or	 limited,	covering	one	or	more	
individual	 creditors,	 in	 accordance	 with	 national	 law.	 3.	 Paragraph	 2	 shall	 not	 apply	 to	 workers'	
outstanding	claims	[...].	4.	Member	States	shall	 limit	the	duration	of	the	stay	of	individual	enforcement	
actions	to	a	maximum	period	of	no	more	than	four	months.	5.	Member	States	may	nevertheless	enable	
judicial	or	administrative	authorities	to	extend	the	initial	duration	of	the	stay	of	individual	enforcement	
actions	 or	 to	 grant	 a	 new	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions,	 upon	 request	 of	 the	 debtor	 or	 of	
creditors.	 [...].	7.	The	total	duration	of	 the	stay	of	 individual	enforcement	actions,	 including	extensions	
and	renewals,	shall	not	exceed	twelve	months’	[italics	by	the	author].	
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temporary	 suspension	 of	 the	 creditor’s	 right	 to	 enforce	 a	 claim	 against	 a	 debtor241,	
ordered	 by	 a	 judicial	 or	 administrative	 authority242.	 Debtors	 who	 are	 negotiating	 a	
restructuring	plan	with	their	creditors	may	benefit	from	such	a	stay	of	limited	duration	
(which	 can	 be	 extended	 or	 renewed	 under	 certain	 conditions,	 without	 exceeding	
twelve	months	 in	 total243)	 to	 the	 extent	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 support	 negotiations	 of	 a	
restructuring	plan244.		
	
                                                
241	 See:	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 Restructuring	 Proposal	 (Consequences	 of	 the	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	
actions):	‘1.	Where	the	obligation	of	the	debtor	to	file	for	insolvency	under	national	law	arises	during	the	
period	of	the	stay	of	individual	enforcement	actions,	that	obligation	shall	be	suspended	for	the	duration	
of	the	stay.	2.	A	general	stay	covering	all	creditors	shall	prevent	the	opening	of	insolvency	procedures	at	
the	request	of	one	or	more	creditors	 [...].	4.	Member	States	shall	ensure	 that,	during	 the	stay	period,	
creditors	 to	which	 the	 stay	 applies	may	 not	withhold	 performance	 or	 terminate,	 accelerate	 or	 in	 any	
other	way	modify	executory	contracts	to	the	detriment	of	the	debtor	for	debts	that	came	into	existence	
prior	to	the	stay.	Member	States	may	limit	the	application	of	this	provision	to	essential	contracts,	which	
are	necessary	for	the	continuation	of	the	day-to-day	operation	of	the	business.	5.	Member	States	shall	
ensure	that	creditors	may	not	withhold	performance	or	terminate,	accelerate	or	in	any	other	way	modify	
executory	contracts	to	the	detriment	of	the	debtor	by	virtue	of	a	contractual	clause	providing	for	such	
measures,	solely	by	reason	of	the	debtor's	entry	into	restructuring	negotiations,	a	requested	for	a	stay	of	
individual	enforcement	actions,	 the	ordering	of	 the	stay	as	 such	or	any	similar	event	connected	 to	 the	
stay	[...].	7.	Member	States	shall	not	require	debtors	to	file	for	 insolvency	procedures	if	the	stay	period	
expires	without	 an	 agreement	 on	 a	 restructuring	 plan	 being	 reached,	 unless	 the	 other	 conditions	 for	
filing	laid	down	by	national	law	are	fulfilled’	[italics	by	the	author].	
242	See:	Article	2	para.	(4)	of	the	Restructuring	Proposal.	
243	 See:	Recital	 (19)	of	 the	Restructuring	Proposal:	 ‘A	debtor	 should	be	able	 to	 request	 the	 judicial	 or	
administrative	 authority	 for	 a	 temporary	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions	 which	 should	 also	
suspend	 the	 obligation	 to	 file	 for	 opening	of	 insolvency	 procedures	where	 such	actions	may	adversely	
affect	negotiations	and	hamper	 the	prospects	of	a	 restructuring	of	 the	debtor's	business.	 [...]	Member	
States	 should	 ensure	 that	 any	 request	 to	 extend	 the	 initial	 duration	 of	 the	 stay	 is	 made	 within	 a	
reasonable	deadline	so	as	to	allow	the	judiciary	or	administrative	authorities	to	deliver	a	decision	within	
due	time.	[...]	 In	the	interest	of	 legal	certainty,	the	total	period	of	the	stay	should	be	limited	to	twelve	
months’	[italics	by	the	author].	
244	 See:	Recital	 (18)	of	 the	Restructuring	Proposal:	 ‘The	debtor	 should	also	not	be	under	obligation	or	
under	threat	of	opening	of	other	types	of	insolvency	procedures,	in	particular	liquidation	procedures,	for	
the	period	of	the	stay,	so	it	can	continue	operating	its	business’	[italics	by	the	author].	
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In	 all	 these	 cases	 of	 a	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions	 pursuant	 to	 the	
Restructuring	Proposal,	the	proposed	extrajudicial	enforcement	procedure	will	not	be	
available,	 in	 order	 to	 enable	 the	 debtor	 to	 effectively	 negotiate	 a	 restructuring	 plan	
with	 creditors	 and	 avoid	 insolvency.	 Rescue	 and	 early	 prevention	 provisions	 of	 the	
Restructuring	 Proposal	 are	 rules	 of	 avoidance	 of	 insolvency	 procedures,	 hence	 'debt	
discharge'	takes	the	precedent	over	'value	recovery',	which	will	be	applicable	only	after	
the	finalisation	of	the	stay	period	of	the	Restructuring	Proposal,	either	as	in-court	or	as	
out-of-court	collateral	enforcement	procedure.	
	
3.	Enforcement	under	the	Financial	Collateral	Directive		
3.1.	The	Financial	Collateral	Directive245.	
The	 Financial	 Collateral	 Directive	 (FCD)	 introduced	 a	 European	 regime	 for	 the	 cross-
border	 provision	 and	 enforcement	 of	 collateral	 in	 repurchase	 and	 securities	 lending	
agreements246,	in	which	the	financial	collateral247	takes	the	form248	of	cash249,	financial	
instruments250,	namely	securities,	or	credit	claims251.		
                                                
245	 Directive	 2002/47/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 6	 June	 2002	 on	 financial	
collateral	 arrangements,	 OJ	 L168,	 27.06.2002	 (‘Financial	 Collateral	 Directive’).	 The	 Financial	 Collateral	
Directive	 was	 amended	 in	 2009	 together	 with	 the	 Settlement	 Finality	 Directive.	 See:	 Directive	
2009/44/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	6	May	2009	amending	Directive	98/26/EC	
on	 settlement	 finality	 in	 payment	 and	 securities	 settlement	 systems	 and	 Directive	 2002/47/EC	 on	
financial	collateral	arrangements	as	regards	 linked	systems	and	credit	claims,	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	
OJ	 L	 146,	 10.06.2009.	 The	 analysis	will	 refer	 to	 the	 amended	 FCD,	 taking	 into	 consideration	 any	 new	
elements	introduced	in	2009.		
246	 See:	 	 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 ‘Financial	 services:	 building	 a	 framework	 for	 action’,	
COM/98/625/Final,	 28.10.1998,	which	 highlighted	 the	proper	 regulation	 of	 cross-border	 collateralised	
transactions	and	the	mutual	compatibility	of	relevant	provisions	as	one	of	the	factors	contributing	to	the	
establishment	of	an	integrated	European	market	for	financial	services.	
247	The	financial	collateral,	from	an	economic	point	of	view,	is	characterised	by	its	function	of	recovery	
and	of	 tradeability,	which	enhances	 liquidity.	 In	 the	FCD,	 the	 financial	collateral	 is	 transferred	 in	 repo,	
securities	lending	and	derivatives	transactions,	which	both	have	the	recovery	and	tradeability	function.	
For	the	two	functions	of	 financial	collateral	and	the	suggested	 interpretation	of	 the	scope	of	 the	FCD,	
see:	Keijser,	T.	 (2006),	Financial	Collateral	Arrangements:	The	European	Collateral	Directive	considered	
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The	 FCD	 aimed	 at	 facilitating	 the	 development	 of	 a	 liquid	 cross-border	 cash	 and	
securities	 market	 in	 the	 EU252,	 in	 complementarity	 with	 the	 Settlement	 Finality	
Directive253	on	the	finality	of	payments	of	book-entry	cash	and	securities	in	designated	
settlement	systems.	Both	Directives	aim	ultimately	at	enhancing	the	optimal	function	
of	 the	 financial	market	 in	 the	European	Union254.	The	creation	of	a	minimum	regime	
relating	 to	 the	 financial	 collateral	was	 considered	 not	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 achieved	 by	
individual	Member	States,	therefore,	by	reason	of	the	scale	and	effects,	it	was	deemed	
to	 be	 better	 achieved	 at	 Community	 level,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 principles	 of	
subsidiarity	and	proportionality255.	
                                                                                                                                          
from	 a	 Property	 and	 Insolvency	 Law	 Perspective,	 Law	 of	 Business	 and	 Finance	 Series,	 Vol.	 9,	 Kluwer,	
2006,	p.	16	et	seq.	and	65	et	seq.	
248	See	Article	1	para.	4	(a)	of	the	FCD.	
249	 See:	 Recital	 (18)	 of	 the	 FCD:	 ‘It	 should	 be	 possible	 to	 provide	 cash	 as	 collateral	 under	 both	 title	
transfer	and	secured	structures	respectively	protected	by	the	recognition	of	netting	or	by	the	pledge	of	
cash	 collateral.	 Cash	 refers	 only	 to	money	which	 is	 represented	 by	 a	 credit	 to	 an	 account,	 or	 similar	
claims	on	repayment	of	money	(such	as	money	market	deposits),	 thus	explicitly	excluding	banknotes’.	
Also,	see:	Article	2	para.	1(d)	of	the	FCD	for	the	definition	of	cash.	
250	See:	Article	2	para.	1(e)	of	the	FCD	for	the	definition	of	financial	instruments.	
251	See:	Article	2	para.	1(o)	of	the	FCD	for	the	definition	of	credit	claims.	
252	 For	 the	 objective	 of	 boosting	 liquidity	 through	 the	 upsurged	 financial	 collateral	 transactions,	 see:	
Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	439,	para.	15.44.	
253	Directive	 98/26/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 19	May	 1998	 on	 settlement	
finality	 in	 payment	 and	 securities	 settlement	 systems,	 OJ	 L	 166,	 11.06.1998	 (‘Settlement	 Finality	
Directive’).	The	Settlement	finality	Directive	was	also	amended	in	2009.	See	above	in	fn	245.	
254	 See:	Recital	 (19)	 of	 the	 FCD:	 ‘This	Directive	provides	 for	 a	 right	of	 use	 in	 case	of	 security	 financial	
collateral	arrangements,	which	 increases	liquidity	 in	the	financial	market	stemming	from	such	reuse	of	
‘pledged’	 securities.	 This	 reuse	 however	 should	 be	 without	 prejudice	 to	 national	 legislation	 about	
separation	of	assets	and	unfair	treatment	of	creditors’	[italics	by	the	author]. 	
255	See:	Recital	(22)	of	the	FCD.	
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3.2.	Enforcement	of	collateral	under	the	Financial	Collateral	Directive	and	comparison	
with	the	proposed	extrajudicial	mechanism	
The	FCD	relates	to	'financial	collateral	arrangements'256,	i.e.	title	transfer	or	security257	
financial	 collateral	 arrangements,	 under	 which	 a	 collateral-provider	 transfers	 full	
ownership/	 full	 entitlement	 or	 provides	 a	 security	 interest	 to	 a	 collateral-taker	
respectively	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 securing	 the	 performance	 (or	 covering	 an	 exposure	
held	due	to	the	assumption)	of	a	financial	obligation.		
3.2.1.	Enforcement	event	and	commencement	of	the	enforcement	
The	enforcement	of	financial	collateral	arrangements	under	the	FCD	is	available	upon	
the	 occurrence	 of	 an	 enforcement	 event258,	 as	 agreed	 between	 the	 parties,	 which	
entitles	the	collateral-taker	to	realise	or	appropriate	the	financial	collateral	or	a	close-
out	netting	provision	comes	into	effect.	This	provision	of	the	contractual	agreement	on	
the	 enforcement	 event	 resembles	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 AECE	mechanism,	 as	 in	 both	
cases	collateral	enforcement	is	available	to	the	creditor	on	a	voluntary	basis,	 i.e.	only	
upon	specific	prior	agreement	between	the	parties,	either	the	collateral-provider	and	
                                                
256	See:	Article	2	para.	1	of	the	FCD:	‘(a)	“financial	collateral	arrangement”	means	a	title	transfer	financial	
collateral	arrangement	or	a	security	financial	collateral	arrangement	whether	or	not	these	are	covered	
by	 a	 master	 agreement	 or	 general	 terms	 and	 conditions;	 (b)	 “title	 transfer	 financial	 collateral	
arrangement”	 means	 an	 arrangement,	 including	 repurchase	 agreements,	 under	 which	 a	 collateral	
provider	transfers	full	ownership	of,	or	full	entitlement	to,	financial	collateral	to	a	collateral	taker	for	the	
purpose	 of	 securing	 or	 otherwise	 covering	 the	 performance	 of	 relevant	 financial	 obligations;	 (c)	
“security	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement”	 means	 an	 arrangement	 under	 which	 a	 collateral	 provider	
provides	financial	collateral	by	way	of	security	to	or	in	favour	of	a	collateral	taker,	and	where	the	full	or	
qualified	ownership	of,	or	full	entitlement	to,	the	financial	collateral	remains	with	the	collateral	provider	
when	the	security	right	is	established’.	
257	 In	security	collateral	arrangements,	a	security	 interest	–other	 than	 full	ownership-	 is	provided	from	
the	 collateral-provider	 to	 the	 collateral-taker	 to	 secure	 the	 performance	 of	 financial	 obligation.	 See:	
Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.46	[italics	by	the	author].	
258	See:	Article	2	para.	1(l)	of	the	FCD:	‘	“enforcement	event”	means	an	event	of	default	or	any	similar	
event	 as	 agreed	 between	 the	 parties	 on	 the	 occurrence	 of	 which,	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 a	 financial	
collateral	arrangement	or	by	operation	of	 law,	 the	collateral	 taker	 is	entitled	to	realise	or	appropriate	
financial	collateral	or	a	close-out	netting	provision	comes	into	effect’.	
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the	 collateral-taker	 or	 the	 secured	 creditor	 and	 the	 business	 borrower259.	 However,	
the	FCD	provides	greater	 legal	 certainty,	as	 it	 sets	at	 least	an	 indicative	definition	of	
the	enforcement	event.	
	
3.2.2.	Ways	of	enforcement260.		
Within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 FCD,	 the	 collateral-taker	 can	 realise	 any	 financial	
collateral	provided	under	terms	of	the	security	financial	collateral	arrangement	in	the	
following	ways:	for	financial	instruments,	the	collateral-taker	is	entitled	to	proceed	to	
sale	or	to	appropriation	by	setting	off	their	value	against	or	by	applying	their	value	in	
discharge	of	the	relevant	financial	obligations;	for	cash	collateral,	the	collateral-taker	is	
entitled	to	set	off	the	amount	against	or	apply	it	in	discharge	of	the	relevant	financial	
obligations;	 for	 credit	 claims,	 the	 collateral-taker	 is	 entitled	 to	proceed	 to	 sale	 or	 to	
appropriation	by	setting	off	their	value	against	or	by	applying	their	value	in	discharge	
of	 the	 relevant	 financial	 obligations.	 Appropriation	 of	 the	 financial	 instruments	 or	
credit	claims	is	possible	only	if	contractually	agreed	upon	by	the	parties	in	the	security	
financial	collateral	arrangement,	along	with	their	valuation261.		
	
Apart	 from	 sale	 and	 appropriation,	 another	 (liberalised	 and	 non-formalistic)	 way	 of	
prematurely	 ending	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 collateral-provider	 and	 the	
collateral-taker	 is	 the	effect	of	a	close-out	netting	contractual	arrangement262,	which	
                                                
259	Indeed,	as	elaborated	above	under	III.4.2,	according	to	Article	23	of	the	proposed	Directive,	the	AECE	
mechanism	must	have	been	contractually	agreed	upon	in	writing	by	the	creditor	and	business	borrower	
in	advance,	with	specification	of	 the	enforcement	event	and	the	period	of	 time	 in	which	 the	business	
borrower	may	execute	payment,	following	that	event,	in	order	to	avert	the	execution	under	the	AECE.	In	
addition,	 prior	 the	 conclusion	 of	 this	 agreement,	 the	 business	 borrower	 must	 have	 been	 clearly	
informed	about	the	application	and	consequences	of	the	AECE.	
260		See:	Article	4	para.	1	of	the	FCD	(Enforcement	of	financial	collateral	arrangements).	
261	See:	Article	4	para.	2	of	the	FCD	(Enforcement	of	financial	collateral	arrangements).	
262	See:	Article	2	para.	1(n)	of	 the	FCD:	 ‘	“close-out	netting	provision”	means	a	provision	of	a	 financial	
collateral	arrangement,	or	of	an	arrangement	of	which	a	financial	collateral	arrangement	forms	part,	or,	
in	the	absence	of	any	such	provision,	any	statutory	rule	by	which,	on	the	occurrence	of	an	enforcement	
event,	whether	through	the	operation	of	netting	or	set-off	or	otherwise:	(i)	the	obligations	of	the	parties	
are	 accelerated	 so	 as	 to	 be	 immediately	 due	 and	 expressed	 as	 an	 obligation	 to	 pay	 an	 amount	
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results	 in	 a	 final	 net	 amount	 payable	 by	 one	 party,	 with	 respect	 to	 each	 financial	
collateral263.	Close-out	netting	 is	 ‘the	early	termination	of	transactions	or	obligations’	
upon	 the	 occurrence	 of	 an	 enforcement	 event,	 where	 the	 valuation	 in	 a	 single	
‘termination	 currency’	 (so	 that	 all	 valued	 transactions	 be	 made	 commensurable)	
results	in	‘the	netting	for	the	determination	of	the	final	net	obligation	of	one	party	to	
pay	the	termination	amount	to	the	other	party’264.	
	
3.2.3.	Abolition	of	formal	requirements	
The	 FCD	 abolishes	 formal	 requirements265	 for	 the	 creation,	 validity,	 perfection,	
enforceability	or	admissibility	 in	evidence	of	a	financial	collateral	arrangement	or	the	
                                                                                                                                          
representing	their	estimated	current	value,	or	are	terminated	and	replaced	by	an	obligation	to	pay	such	
an	amount;	and/or	(ii)	an	account	is	taken	of	what	is	due	from	each	party	to	the	other	in	respect	of	such	
obligations,	and	a	net	sum	equal	to	the	balance	of	the	account	is	payable	by	the	party	from	whom	the	
larger	amount	is	due	to	the	other	party’	[italics	by	the	author].	Also,	see:	Article	2	para.	1(l),	5	para.	5,	6	
para.2	and	7	of	the	FCD.	
263	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	445,	para.	15.69.	
264	 The	 further	analysis	of	 the	 close-out	netting	provisions	goes	beyond	 thee	purposes	of	 the	present	
paper.	For	a	more	elaborate	discussion,	see:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	446-449,	para.	15.70-15.78.	In	
para.	15.170,	Keijser	makes	reference	to	the	constituent	elements	of	close-out	netting,	as	described	by:	
Peeters	 M.	 (2014),	 On	 Close-out	 Netting,	 in:	 Keijser,	 T.	 (ed.),	 Transnational	 Securities	 Law,	 Oxford	
University	 Press,	 2014,	 Ch.	 3.	 Keijser,	 T.	 (2015)	 in	 Ch.	 15,	 p.	 446,	 para	 15.72	mentions	 the	 objectives	
pursued	 through	 the	 liberal	 enforceability	 of	 close-out	 netting	 provisions,	 namely	 the	 limitation	 of	
counter-party	risk	to	a	net	exposure	of	one	party	(instead	of	the	gross	exposures	of	each	party)	and	the	
mitigation	of	systemic	risk	(prevention	of	contagion	of	one	party’s	default	to	other	market	participants,	
not	 yet	 insolvent).	 However,	 Keijser,	 T.	 (2015),	 Ch.	 15,	 p.	 447-449,	 para.	 15.77-	 15.78	 also	mentions	
Peeters’	arguments	on	the	contribution	of	 the	broad	scope	and	unconstrained	enforceability	of	close-
out	netting	provisions	to	the	increase	of	systemic	risk	(in	terms	of	increased	liquidity	‘subsidised’	by	the	
parties,	increased	risks	of	runs	and	fire	sales,	and	regulatory	arbitrage	increasing	systemic	risks)	or	other	
undesirable	 outcomes	 (as	 to	 some	 firm-specific	 and	 illiquid	 assets,	 which	 should	 not	 be	 realised	
unrestrictedly;	 and	 reduction	 in	market	discipline).	 For	 further	analysis	on	 the	 systemic	vulnerabilities	
and	systemic	fragility,	also	see:	Mokal,	R.	(2016),	Liquidity,	Systemic	Risk,	and	the	Bankruptcy	Treatment	
of	 Financial	 Contracts,	 10	 Brooklyn	 Journal	 of	 Corporate,	 Financial	 and	 Commercial	 Law,	 07.01.2016	
(rev.),	available	at:	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694285.	
265	See:	Recital	(10)	of	the	FCD:	‘For	the	same	reasons,	the	creation,	validity,	perfection,	enforceability	or	
admissibility	 in	 evidence	 of	 a	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement,	 or	 the	 provision	 of	 financial	 collateral	
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provision	of	 financial	 collateral266,	 but	only	after	 the	provision	 (dispossession)	of	 the	
financial	collateral	and	on	condition	that	this	provision	can	be	evidenced	in	writing	or	
in	 a	 durable	 medium	 and	 the	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement	 can	 be	 evidenced	 in	
writing	 or	 any	 legally	 equivalent	manner267.	 This	 temporally	 limited	 and	 conditional	
abolition	of	requirements	for	performance	of	legal	acts	aims	at	striking	a	fair	balance	
between	 market	 efficiency	 and	 protection	 of	 the	 contracting	 and	 third	 parties268,	
particularly	against	the	risk	of	fraud	and	from	this	perspective	is	appraised.	
                                                                                                                                          
under	 a	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement,	 should	 not	 be	made	 dependent	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 any	
formal	 act	 such	 as	 the	 execution	 of	 any	 document	 in	 a	 specific	 form	 or	 in	 a	 particular	 manner,	 the	
making	of	any	filing	with	an	official	or	public	body	or	registration	in	a	public	register,	advertisement	in	a	
newspaper	or	journal,	in	an	official	register	or	publication	or	in	any	other	matter,	notification	to	a	public	
officer	or	 the	provision	of	evidence	 in	a	particular	 form	as	 to	 the	date	of	execution	of	a	document	or	
instrument,	the	amount	of	the	relevant	financial	obligations	or	any	other	matter	[...].	For	the	purpose	of	
this	Directive,	acts	required	under	the	law	of	a	Member	State	as	conditions	for	transferring	or	creating	a	
security	interest	on	financial	instruments,	other	than	book	entry	securities,	such	as	endorsement	 in	the	
case	of	instruments	to	order,	or	recording	on	the	issuer's	register	in	the	case	of	registered	instruments,	
should	not	be	considered	as	formal	acts’	[italics	by	the	author].	
266	See:	Article	3	para.	1	 (Formal	Requirements)	of	 the	FCD:	 ‘Member	States	shall	not	require	that	 the	
creation,	 validity,	 perfection,	 enforceability	 or	 admissibility	 in	 evidence	 of	 a	 financial	 collateral	
arrangement	 or	 the	 provision	 of	 financial	 collateral	 under	 a	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement	 be	
dependent	on	the	performance	of	any	formal	act.	Without	prejudice	to	Article	1(5),	when	credit	claims	
are	 provided	 as	 financial	 collateral,	 Member	 States	 shall	 not	 require	 that	 the	 creation,	 validity,	
perfection,	priority,	enforceability	or	admissibility	in	evidence	of	such	financial	collateral	be	dependent	
on	 the	performance	of	any	 formal	act	such	as	 the	 registration	or	 the	notification	of	 the	debtor	of	 the	
credit	claim	provided	as	collateral.	However,	Member	States	may	require	the	performance	of	a	formal	
act,	such	as	registration	or	notification,	for	purposes	of	perfection,	priority,	enforceability	or	admissibility	
in	evidence	against	the	debtor	or	third	parties	[...]’	[italics	by	the	author].	
267	 See:	 Article	 3	 para.	 2	 (Formal	 Requirements)	 of	 the	 FCD:	 ‘Paragraph	 1	 is	without	 prejudice	 to	 the	
application	of	this	Directive	to	financial	collateral	only	once	it	has	been	provided	and	if	that	provision	can	
be	evidenced	in	writing	and	where	the	financial	collateral	arrangement	can	be	evidenced	in	writing	or	in	
a	legally	equivalent	manner’	[italics	by	the	author].	Also,	see:	Articles	1	para.	5	(application	of	the	FCD	
once	the	financial	collateral	has	been	provided),	2	para.	2	(meaning	of	the	term	‘provision	of	collateral’)	
and	2	para.	3	(meaning	of	the	term	‘in	writing’)	and	Recital	(11)	of	the	FCD.	Also,	see:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	
Ch.	15,	p.	440,	para.	15.48-	15.49.	
268	 See:	 Recital	 (10)	 of	 the	 FCD:	 ‘[...]	 This	Directive	must	 however	 provide	a	 balance	 between	market	
efficiency	and	the	safety	of	the	parties	to	the	arrangement	and	third	parties,	thereby	avoiding	inter	alia	
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At	 this	 point,	 the	 FCD	 differs	 from	 the	 proposed	 mechanism:	 whereas	 the	 FCD	
abolishes	 formal	 requirements	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 financial	 collateral	 and	 the	
enforceability	 of	 the	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement	 (only	 after	 dispossession	 and	
under	 certain	 conditions),	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 is	 totally	 silent	 on	 this	 issue	 and	
reserves	 the	 maintenance	 or	 abolition	 of	 formal	 requirements	 for	 the	 national	
legislator.	 This	 differentiation	 is	 logical,	 since	 the	 FCD	 harmonises	 the	 whole	
framework	of	 financial	collateral	arrangements,	while	the	proposed	Directive	focuses	
only	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 common	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 mechanism,	 not	
interfering	 with	 national	 provisions	 on	 issues	 other	 than	 the	 enforceability	 of	 the	
relevant	agreement	and	the	enforcement	procedure	itself.	
	
3.2.4.	Formalities	for	the	enforcement		
The	realisation	of	the	financial	collateral	and	the	effect	of	a	close-out	netting	provision	
is	subject	only	to	the	contractual	terms	agreed	in	the	financial	collateral	arrangement,	
as	 the	 FCD	 provides	 for	 rapid,	 non-formalistic	 enforcement269	 in	 a	 liberal	 regime,	
deviating	 from	 (actually,	 disapplying270)	 the	 ‘traditional’	 formalistic	 enforcement	
                                                                                                                                          
the	risk	of	fraud.	This	balance	should	be	achieved	through	the	scope	of	this	Directive	covering	only	those	
financial	collateral	arrangements	which	provide	for	some	form	of	dispossession,	i.e.	the	provision	of	the	
financial	collateral,	and	where	the	provision	of	the	financial	collateral	can	be	evidenced	in	writing	or	in	a	
durable	medium,	ensuring	thereby	the	traceability	of	that	collateral	[...]’	[italics	by	the	author].		
269	 See:	 Recital	 (17)	 of	 the	 FCD.	 Also,	 see:	 Keijser,	 T.	 (2016),	 A	 Need	 for	 a	 Change:	 The	 Undesirable	
Consequences	of	the	Settlement	Finality	Directive	and	the	Collateral	Directive	in	the	Field	of	Property	and	
Insolvency	 Law,	 in	 Particular	 for	 Small-	 and	 Medium-Sized	 Enterprises,	 Zeitschrift	 für	 Europäisches	
Privatrecht,	Vol.	13	(2),	27.10.2016,	p.	316.	
270	See:	Keijser,	T.	 (2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	442,	para.	15.54.	Also,	see:	Gullifer,	L.	 (2012),	What	should	we	do	
about	Financial	Collateral?,	Current	Legal	Problems,	Vol.	65	 (1),	01.01.2012	 January	2012,	pp.	409-10,	
where	the	special	character	of	financial	collateral	is	highlighted	and	its	potential	to	reduce	systemic	risk	
on	the	financial	markets.	However,	it	is	noted	that,	when	it	is	used	to	cover	for	an	exposure,	it	should	be	
treated	 as	 any	 other	 collateral	 and	 default	 rules	 on	 registration,	 enforcement	 and	 insolvency	 should	
apply.	 Disapplication	 should	 be	 justified	 and	 be	 possible	 ad	 hoc	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 collateral	
arrangements,	only	when	the	cost	of	applying	such	rules	outweighs	the	value	of	the	rules.		
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procedures271,	 for	 reasons	 of	 financial	 stability,	 liquidity	 and	 limitation	 of	 possible	
contagion	effects	of	a	party’s	default272.		Indeed,	enforcement	under	the	FCD	does	not	
require	any	prior	notice	of	collateral-taker’s	 intention	to	enforce	collateral	or	operate	
the	close-out	netting	provision;	approval	of	the	terms	by	court,	public	officer	or	other	
person;	the	elapse	of	any	additional	time	period;	or	the	realisation	by	public	auction	or	
any	other	prescribed	manner273.		
	
At	 this	point,	 the	FCD	differs	 from	the	proposed	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement,	
which	requires	for	prior	notice	of	creditor’s	intention	to	enforce	collateral;	the	elapse	
of	reasonable	time,	in	which	the	business	borrower	may	execute	full	payment	to	avert	
execution;	the	realisation	of	collateral	by	means	of	public	auction	and/or	private	sale;	
and	the	valuation	of	the	assets	to	be	realised	by	an	independent	valuer274.	Should	the	
realisation	 of	 collateral	 take	 place	 with	 disregard	 to	 these	 formalistic	 procedural	
                                                
271	 Strict	 ‘traditional’	 enforcement	 procedures	 protect	 the	 security	 provider,	 by	preventing	 abuse	 and	
optimising	 proceeds	 at	 the	 time	 of	 enforcement,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship	 between	 the	
collateral	 provider	 and	 collateral	 taker.	 However,	 the	 FCD	 follows	 a	 liberal	 enforcement	 approach,	
without	 any	 formal	 requirements	 for	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 pledged	 financial	 collateral.	 For	 the	
differences	between	traditional	and	liberal	approach,	see:	Keijser,	T.	(2006),	p.	279	et	seq.	
272	Indeed,	rapid	and	direct	enforcement	under	the	FCD	promotes	liquidity	of	the	financial	markets	and	
limits	 contagion	 effects	 on	 the	 counterparties	 of	 a	 defaulting	 market	 participant,	 thus	 reducing	 the	
systemic	 risk.	 See:	Keijser,	T.	 (2006),	p.	284,	with	arguments	 that	 could	be	presented	 in	 favour	of	 the	
liberal	 approach	 followed	 by	 the	 FCD.	 Namely,	 since	 financial	 collateral	 arrangements	 are	 usually	
concluded	 between	professional	market	 participants	 of	 equal	 power	 position,	a	 reasonable	 valuation	
mechanism	may	be	agreed	upon,	thus	there	is	no	need	for	protection	of	the	weaker	party.	Besides,	the	
enforcement	 may	 be	 conducted	 in	 a	 commercially	 reasonable	 manner	 in	 accordance	 with	 national	
legislator’s	 discretion.	 However,	 Keijser	 is	 skeptical	 towards	 this	 deviation	 from	 the	 traditional	
formalistic	enforcement,	 in	the	case	of	SMEs,	which	are	 less	powerful	 than	major	 financial	 institutions	
and	not	 ‘professionals’	 in	 financial	 collateral	 arrangements	with	 the	necessary	expertise	 to	assess	 the	
commercial	reasonableness	(if	the	standard	is	imposed	and	only	post-enforcement).	For	these	reasons,	
he	proposes	 the	non-application	of	 the	 FCD	 to	 SMEs,	under	Article	 1	para.	 3.	 The	 same	 concerns	 are	
expressed	in:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	442,	para.	15.55.	Also,	see:	Gullifer,	L.	(2012),	pp.	409-10,	who	
supports	only	ad	hoc	disapplication	of	formalities,	when	justified	by	good	countervailing	policy	reasons.	
273	See:	Article	4	para.	4	of	the	FCD	(Enforcement	of	financial	collateral	arrangements)	of	the	FCD.	
274	See:	Articles	23	para.	1,	24	para.	2,	25	and	26	of	the	proposed	Directive.	
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requirements,	the	business	owner	is	entitled	to	challenge	the	enforcement	a	posteriori,	
in	accordance	with	the	Article	28	of	the	proposed	Directive.		
	
The	 differentiation	 is	 logical,	 since	 financial	 collateral	 arrangements	 are	 usually	
concluded	between	market	participants	of	equal	negotiating	power,	without	the	need	
of	protective	formalities,	and	the	(optional)	standard	of	commercial	reasonableness	for	
the	valuation	of	the	financial	collateral275,	wherever	imposed,	may	give	grounds	for	an	
ex	post	challenge	of	the	enforcement.	On	the	other	side,	the	extrajudicial	enforcement	
mechanism	 will	 be	 available	 for	 secured	 credit	 agreements	 between	 market	
participants	of	by	default	extremely	unbalanced	power	position,	 therefore	protection	
of	the	weaker	party,	 i.e.	the	business	borrower,	against	creditor’s	potentially	abusive	
behavior	should	be	ensured	through	such	formal	requirements,	as	in	other	‘traditional’	
enforcement	 procedures.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 business	 borrower’s	 rights	 are	 in	
essence	safeguarded	(at	least	pre-enforcement)	has	been	analysed	already	in	Chapter	
III	and	is	intensely	questioned.		
3.2.5.	Restitution	of	the	surplus		
The	 issue	of	 the	 collateral-provider's	 right	 to	 surplus	 value	upon	enforcement	 is	 not	
dealt	with	 in	 the	 FCD,	 rather	 than	 it	 continues	 to	be	determined	under	 the	national	
applicable	 law276.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 realisation	 of	 collateral	 under	 the	
AECE	 mechanism,	 the	 creditor	 shall	 be	 required	 to	 pay	 the	 business	 borrower	 any	
positive	surplus277,	as	in	‘traditional’	enforcement	procedures.	The	proposed	Directive	
hereby	explicitly	protects	the	business	borrower,	by	ensuring	that	the	secured	creditor	
only	 recovers	what	 it	 is	 due	 under	 the	 credit	 agreement	 and	 restitutes	 any	 positive	
difference,	in	consistency	with	the	typical	characteristics	of	their	fiduciary	relationship.	
	
                                                
275	See:	Article	4	para.	6	of	the	FCD:	‘This	Article	and	Articles	5,	6	and	7	shall	be	without	prejudice	to	any	
requirements	under	national	law	to	the	effect	that	the	realisation	or	valuation	of	financial	collateral	and	
the	 calculation	 of	 the	 relevant	 financial	 obligations	must	 be	 conducted	 in	 a	 commercially	 reasonable	
manner’.	
276	Keijser,	T.	(2006),	p.	276.	
277	See:	Article	29	of	the	proposed	Directive	in	Annex	I.	
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3.3.	Relationship	with	pre-insolvency	and	insolvency	proceedings	
The	 enforcement	 of	 a	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement278	 and	 a	 close-out	 netting	
provision279	should	take	effect,	notwithstanding	the	commencement	or	continuation	of	
insolvency	or	pre-insolvency	proceedings	for	the	collateral-provider	or	collateral-taker.	
In	 other	words,	 the	 enforcement	 under	 the	 FCD	 is	 not	 hindered	 by	 a	 freeze	 period,	
since	a	stay	of	individual	actions	exercising	any	security	right	would	hinder	liquidity	of	
financial	markets,	thus	posing	a	systemic	risk,	taken	into	consideration	that	usually	the	
major	 market	 participants	 entering	 into	 financial	 collateral	 arrangements	 may	
influence	the	liquidity	of	financial	markets280.		
	
The	 FCD	 also	 envisages	 the	 disapplication	 of	 certain	 insolvency	 provisions281,	 namely	
the	automatic	retroactive	effect	of	the	declaration	of	insolvency	to	the	start	of	the	day	
this	 declaration	 (’timing	 claw	 back’	 or	 	 ‘zero	 hour’	 rules)282.	 The	 validity	 and	
enforceability	 of	 ‘margin	 maintenance’	 (top-up	 arrangements)	 and	 ‘substitution	
                                                
278	See:	Article	4	para.	5	of	the	FCD:	‘Member	States	shall	ensure	that	a	financial	collateral	arrangement	
can	 take	 effect	 in	 accordance	with	 its	 terms	 notwithstanding	 the	 commencement	 or	 continuation	 of	
winding-up	 proceedings	 or	 reorganisation	measures	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 collateral	 provider	 or	 collateral	
taker	the	realisation’.	
279	 According	 to	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 FCD,	 a	 close-out	 netting	 provision	 should	 be	 able	 to	 take	 effect	 in	
accordance	 with	 its	 terms,	 notwithstanding	 the	 commencement	 or	 continuation	 of	 winding-up	
proceedings	or	 reorganisation	measures	and/or	notwithstanding	any	purported	assignment,	 judicial	or	
other	attachment	or	other	disposition	of	or	 in	respect	of	such	rights,	without	any	requirements	for	 its	
activation.	
280	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2006),	p.	329;	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	443,	para.	15.58.	
281	See:	Article	8	of	 the	FCD	(Certain	 insolvency	provisions	disapplied):	 ‘1.	Member	States	shall	ensure	
that	 a	 financial	 collateral	 arrangement,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 financial	 collateral	 under	 such	
arrangement,	may	 not	 be	 declared	 invalid	 or	 void	 or	 be	 reversed	 on	 the	 sole	 basis	 that	 the	 financial	
collateral	arrangement	has	come	into	existence,	or	the	financial	collateral	has	been	provided:	(a)	on	the	
day	 of	 the	 commencement	 of	 winding-up	 proceedings	 or	 reorganisation	 measures,	 but	 prior	 to	 the	
order	 or	 decree	making	 that	 commencement;	 or	 (b)	 in	 a	 prescribed	 period	 prior	 to,	 and	 defined	 by	
reference	to,	the	commencement	of	such	proceedings	or	measures	or	by	reference	to	the	making	of	any	
order	or	decree	or	the	taking	of	any	other	action	or	occurrence	of	any	other	event	in	the	course	of	such	
proceedings	or	measures’.	
282	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	443,	para.	15.59.	
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arrangements’283,	 remains	 also	 unaffected284	 from	 the	 retroactive	 effect	 of	 the	
declaration	 of	 insolvency285.	 The	 FCD	 even	 provides	 for	 the	 enforceability	 of	 the	
financial	 collateral	 arrangement	 on	 the	 day	 of,	 but	 after	 the	 commencement	 of	
insolvency	and	pre-insolvency	proceedings,	should	 the	collateral-taker	have	not	been	
aware	of	this	commencement286.		
	
                                                
283	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	443,	para.	15.60.	
284	See:	Recital	(16)	of	the	FCD:	‘[...]	The	intention	is	merely	that	the	provision	of	top-up	or	substitution	
financial	collateral	cannot	be	questioned	on	the	sole	basis	that	the	relevant	financial	obligations	existed	
before	 that	 financial	 collateral	 was	 provided,	 or	 that	 the	 financial	 collateral	 was	 provided	 during	 a	
prescribed	period.	However,	this	does	not	prejudice	the	possibility	of	questioning	under	national	law	the	
financial	collateral	arrangement	and	the	provision	of	financial	collateral	as	part	of	the	 initial	provision,	
top-up	or	substitution	of	financial	collateral,	for	example	where	this	has	been	intentionally	done	to	the	
detriment	of	the	other	creditors	(this	covers	inter	alia	actions	based	on	fraud	or	similar	avoidance	rules	
which	may	apply	in	a	prescribed	period)’	[italics	by	the	author].	
285	See:	Article	8	para.	3	of	the	FCD:	‘Where	a	financial	collateral	arrangement	contains:	(a)	an	obligation	
to	provide	financial	collateral	or	additional	financial	collateral	in	order	to	take	account	of	changes	in	the	
value	of	 the	 financial	collateral	or	 in	 the	amount	of	 the	relevant	 financial	obligations,	or	 (b)	a	 right	 to	
withdraw	 financial	 collateral	 on	 providing,	 by	 way	 of	 substitution	 or	 exchange,	 financial	 collateral	 of	
substantially	 the	 same	 value,	 Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 the	 provision	 of	 financial	 collateral,	
additional	financial	collateral	or	substitute	or	replacement	financial	collateral	under	such	an	obligation	
or	 right	 shall	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 invalid	 or	 reversed	 or	 declared	 void	 on	 the	 sole	 basis	 that:	 (i)	 such	
provision	 was	made	 on	 the	 day	 of	 the	 commencement	 of	 winding-up	 proceedings	 or	 reorganisation	
measures,	but	prior	to	the	order	or	decree	making	that	commencement	or	in	a	prescribed	period	prior	
to,	 and	 defined	 by	 reference	 to,	 the	 commencement	 of	 winding-up	 proceedings	 or	 reorganisation	
measures	 or	 by	 reference	 to	 the	making	 of	 any	 order	 or	 decree	 or	 the	 taking	 of	 any	 other	 action	 or	
occurrence	of	any	other	event	 in	the	course	of	such	proceedings	or	measures;	and/or	(ii)	 the	relevant	
financial	obligations	were	incurred	prior	to	the	date	of	the	provision	of	the	financial	collateral,	additional	
financial	collateral	or	substitute	or	replacement	financial	collateral’.	
286	 See:	 Article	 8	 para.	 2	 of	 the	 FCD:	 ‘Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 where	 a	 financial	 collateral	
arrangement	or	a	relevant	financial	obligation	has	come	into	existence,	or	financial	collateral	has	been	
provided	 on	 the	 day	 of,	 but	 after	 the	moment	 of	 the	 commencement	 of,	winding-up	 proceedings	 or	
reorganisation	 measures,	 it	 shall	 be	 legally	 enforceable	 and	 binding	 on	 third	 parties	 if	 the	 collateral	
taker	 can	 prove	 that	 he	was	 not	 aware,	 nor	 should	 have	 been	 aware,	 of	 the	 commencement	 of	 such	
proceedings	or	measures’	[italics	by	the	author].	
  
81 
The	 far-reaching	 reform	 the	 FCD	 has	 brought	 about	 to	 the	 insolvency	 law287,	 in	
correlation	 with	 its	 broad	 scope	 of	 application	 has	 been	 criticised	 in	 academic	
literature288.	Apart	from	the	disapplication	of	the	aforementioned	insolvency	rules,	the	
FCD	 leaves	 unaffected	 the	 general	 national	 provisions	 on	 protection	 of	 the	 general	
body	 of	 creditors	 from	 fraud289.	 As	 general	 remark,	 the	 FCD	 deviates	 from	 national	
provisions	on	insolvency	and	pre-insolvency	proceedings	to	a	great	extent,	disrupting	
general	 protective	 principles.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 proposed	 extrajudicial	 mechanism	 is	
designed	 without	 prejudice	 to	 national	 insolvency	 law,	 as	 the	 proposed	 Directive	
reserves	 almost	 all	 issues	 for	 the	 national	 legislator	 and	 is	 in	 consistency	 with	 the	
general	rule	of	the	stay	of	individual	enforcement	actions,	for	which	case	the	proposed	
mechanism	will	be	inapplicable.	
	
3.4.	Consistency	of	the	Financial	Collateral	Directive	with	the	proposed	Directive	
The	 proposed	 Directive	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 FCD,	 with	 the	 meaning	 that	 their	
application	 is	 mutually	 exclusive:	 value	 recovery	 under	 the	 AECE	 is	 available	 if	
contractually	 agreed	 upon	 only	 in	 secured	 credit	 agreements	 concluded	 between	
                                                
287	See:	Keijser,	T.	(2016),	p.	311.	
288	 See:	Keijser,	 T.	 (2006),	pp.	 324-325,	where	 the	 critique	also	 refers	 to	 the	 contradiction	of	 the	FCD	
with	 the	pari	passu	 rule	 (which	aims	at	protecting	 the	 interests	of	 the	 joint	 creditors	of	 the	 insolvent	
estate	against	the	single	interest	of	an	individual	creditor),	since	the	FCD	favours	the	counterparty	of	the	
insolvent	party,	to	the	detriment	of	all	other	creditors.	Indeed,	under	the	FCD	the	interests	of	the	joint	
creditors	sometimes	concede	to	the	interest	of	a	single	creditor,	thus	entailing	the	risk	of	serious	abuse,	
as	the	insolvent	collateral	provider	may	arbitrarily	make	effective	payments	to	individual	creditors	of	his	
choice	even	after	the	declaration	of	insolvency,	who	are	protected	if	they	have	acted	in	good	faith.	Also,	
see:	Keijser,	T.	(2017),	p.	286;	Keijser,	T.	(2016),	pp.	318-321	and	p.	324	(proposed	amendments	to	the	
FCD	 and	 the	 SFD,	 namely	 provisions	 for	 the	 non-enforceability	 of	 legal	 acts	 after	 the	 declaration	 of	
insolvency,	retroactive	force	of	the	declaration	of	insolvency	and	applicability	of	the	moratorium).	Also,	
see:	 Gullifer,	 L.	 (2012),	 pp.	 409-10,	 on	 restrictions	 that	 should	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 disapplication	 of	
registration,	enforcement	and	insolvency	rules.	
289	See:	Article	8	para.	4:	 ‘Without	prejudice	to	paragraphs	1,	2	and	3,	this	Directive	 leaves	unaffected	
the	 general	 rules	 of	 national	 insolvency	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 voidance	 of	 transactions	 entered	 into	
during	the	prescribed	period	referred	to	 in	paragraph	1(b)	and	 in	paragraph	3(i)’.	Also,	see:	Keijser,	T.	
(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	443,	para.	15.62.	
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creditors	 and	 business	 borrowers,	 with	 the	 explicit	 exclusion	 of	 credit	 agreements	
secured	by	financial	collateral	arrangements290.	Thus,	the	proposed	Directive	governs	
the	out-of-court	 enforcement	of	 types	 of	 collateral	 (immovable	 and	movable	 assets)	
other	than	the	financial	collateral,	falling	within	the	scope	of	the	FCD.	
                                                
290	See:	Article	2	para.	5	of	the	proposed	Directive	in	Annex	I.	
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Concluding	Remarks	
The	 present	 paper	 has	 examined	 various	 legal	 aspects	 of	 the	 proposed	 common	
accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 mechanism,	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
institutional	 documents	 of	 its	 inspiration,	 the	 objectives	 it	 pursues,	 its	 designed	
structure	 and	 its	 consistency	 with	 other	 -national	 or	 harmonised-	 collateral	
enforcement	procedures.	
	
As	 concluding	 remark,	 it	 could	 be	 stated	 that	 the	 proposed	mechanism	has	 a	 broad	
scope	 and	 is	 greatly	 disruptive	 to	 ‘traditional’	 individual	 or	 collective	 enforcement	
procedures	 and	 national	 property	 laws,	 overturning	 the	 fair	 balance	 between	
creditor’s	and	debtor’s	 rights.	Ad	hoc	deviation	from	default	 formalities	and	rules	on	
enforcement	should	be	justified	by	well-founded	countervailing	policy	reasons,	namely	
when	 the	 cost	 of	 applying	 such	 rules	 outweighs	 the	 value	 of	 the	 rules,	 in	 this	 case	
when	the	burdens	of	obtaining	a	judicially	issued	enforceable	title	on	behalf	of	secured	
creditors	outweighs	(in	terms	of	costs,	 time	and	complexities)	 the	need	for	sufficient	
protection	 of	 borrower	 rights291.	 We	 have	 great	 difficulty	 to	 believe	 that	 court	
intervention	 is	 so	burdensome	 to	credit	 institutions,	with	an	elaborate	 technical	and	
financial	 infrastructure,	 that	 it	 justifies	 the	 sacrifice	 of	 borrower	 rights	 and	 legal	
certainty.		
	
In	 fact,	 although	 the	 proposed	mechanism	was	 conceived	 as	 an	 initiative	 to	 ensure	
creditor’s	protection	without	prejudice	 to	 the	business	borrower’s	 rights,	by	effect	 it	
does	 not	 even	 take	 into	 consideration	 borrower	 interests	 on	 various	 occasions.	
Furthermore,	 the	 ‘accelerated’	 element	 seems	 to	 endanger	 every	 notion	 of	 legal	
certainty	and	the	European	acquis	on	the	right	to	property	and	fair	trial,	as	the	space	
left	to	judicial	review	of	and	court	intervention	to	the	enforcement	procedure	is	very	
narrow	and	only	a	posteriori.	Besides,	its	expedited	commencement	–without	judicial	
intervention-	could	accelerate	business	borrowers’	default,	with	devastating	systemic	
                                                
291	Argument	inspired	from	the	argumentation	on	the	disapplication	of	default	registration,	enforcement	
and	insolvency	rules	in	the	case	of	financial	collateral	in:	Gullifer,	L.	(2012),	pp.	409-10.	
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effects	 on	 entrepreneurship,	 which	 the	 proposed	 Directive	 supposedly	 aims	 to	
enhance292.		
	
The	 (potentially	 very	 broad)	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 the	 proposed	 Directive,	 the	
contractual	 nature	 of	 the	 mechanism	 and	 the	 direct	 enforceability	 of	 the	 parties’	
agreement,	the	commencement	of	the	enforcement	and	the	valuation	procedure	have	
been	subject	to	our	critique,	since	arbitrary,	abusive	and	unfair	behaviour	on	behalf	of	
the	creditor	will	be	possible,	without	sufficient	safeguards	for	the	business	borrower.	
	
It	could	be	said	symbolically	that	the	extrajudicial	enforcement	mechanism	may	have	
been	conceived	as	‘deus	ex	machina’	to	‘save’	the	performance	of	distressed	loans,	but	
ultimately	 it	 has	 been	 designed	 as	 a	 ‘Trojan	 horse’,	 with	 which	 credit	 institutions	
pursue	 to	 ‘conquer’	 business	 borrowers’	 property,	 covertly	 and	without	 appropriate	
safeguards,	so	as	to	have	their	profits	maximised	again.	
	
Maybe	 the	 solution	 for	 the	 effective	 resolution	 of	 high	 stocks	 of	 NPLs	 and	 the	
prevention	 of	 their	 future	 accumulation	 lies	 in	 a	 more	 delicate	 and	 balanced	
harmonisation	 of	 debt	 recovery	 through	 the	 enhancement	 of	 the	 already	 existing	
enforcement	procedures	in	terms	of	time,	costs,	recovery	rates,	and	complexities	and	
not	the	introduction	of	a	radically	new	extrajudicial	mechanism	at	European	level.	Of	
course,	 individual	Member	 States	 could	 provide	 for	 out-of-court	 procedures,	 to	 the	
extent	 that	 this	 is	 compatible	 with	 their	 legal	 culture,	 social	 considerations	 and	
economic	objectives293.	
	
	
                                                
292	Argument	inspired	from	the	argumentation	on	the	risks	that	the	enforcement	under	the	FCD	entails,	
in:	Keijser,	T.	(2015),	Ch.	15,	p.	445,	para.	15.67.	
293	 For	 the	 design	 of	 national	 pro-insolvency	 and	 insolvency	 systems,	 see:	 ‘Principles	 for	 Effective	
Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Rights	Systems	(Revised)’,	101069,	World	Bank,	Jan	&	May	2015,	p.	3	et	
seq.,	 where	 it	 is	 highlighted	 that	 national	 insolvency	 frameworks	 depend	 on	 structural,	 institutional,	
social,	 and	 human	 fundamental	 values	 and	 national	 legal	 tradition.	 Therefore,	 their	 effectiveness	 is	
assessed	based	on	the	resolution	of	national	problems	and	needs,	within	the	country’s	broader	cultural,	
economic,	legal,	and	social	context.	
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Annex	I.	The	proposed	Directive295	
Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	credit	servicers,	credit	
purchasers	 and	 the	 recovery	 of	 collateral,	 Text	 with	 EEA	 relevance,	 COM/2018/135/Final,	
14.03.2018,	Procedure	2018/0063	(COD)	
THE	EUROPEAN	PARLIAMENT	AND	THE	COUNCIL	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION,		
Having	regard	to	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union,	and	in	particular	Article	
53	and	Article	114	thereof,		
Having	regard	to	the	proposal	from	the	European	Commission,	
After	transmission	of	the	draft	legislative	act	to	the	national	parliaments,	
Having	regard	to	the	opinion	of	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee,		
Acting	in	accordance	with	the	ordinary	legislative	procedure,		
Whereas:		
(1)		The	establishment	of	a	comprehensive	strategy	to	address	the	issue	of	non-performing	loans	
(NPLs)	is	a	priority	for	the	Union.	While	addressing	NPLs	is	primarily	the	responsibility	of	credit	
institutions	and	Member	States,	there	is	also	a	clear	Union	dimension	to	reduce	current	stocks	
of	 NPLs,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 prevent	 any	 excessive	 build-	 up	 of	 NPLs	 in	 the	 future.	 Given	 the	
interconnectedness	 of	 the	 banking	 and	 financial	 systems	 across	 the	 Union	 where	 credit	
institutions	operate	in	multiple	jurisdictions	and	Member	States,	there	is	significant	potential	for	
spill-over	 effects	 between	Member	 States	 and	 the	Union	 at	 large,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	
growth	and	financial	stability.			
(2)	An	 integrated	 financial	 system	will	 enhance	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 Economic	 and	Monetary	
Union	to	adverse	shocks	by	facilitating	private	cross-border	risk-sharing,	while	at	the	same	time	
reducing	the	need	for	public	risk-sharing.	In	order	to	achieve	these	objectives,	the	Union	should	
complete	 the	 Banking	Union	 and	 further	 develop	 a	 Capital	Markets	Union	 (CMU).	 Addressing	
high	stocks	of	NPLs	and	their	possible	future	accumulation	is	essential	to	completing	the	Banking	
Union	 as	 it	 is	 essential	 for	 ensuring	 competition	 in	 the	 banking	 sector,	 preserving	 financial	
stability	and	encouraging	lending	so	as	to	create	jobs	and	growth	within	the	Union.			
(3)	In	July	2017	the	Council	in	its	"Action	Plan	to	Tackle	Non-Performing	Loans	in	Europe"
	
called	
                                                
295	There	have	been	included	only	the	Recitals	and	Articles	relevant	for	the	analysis	of	the	present	paper.	
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upon	various	 institutions	 to	 take	appropriate	measures	 to	 further	address	 the	high	number	of	
NPLs	in	the	Union.	The	Action	Plan	sets	out	a	comprehensive	approach	that	focuses	on	a	mix	of	
complementary	 policy	 actions	 in	 four	 areas:	 (i)	 bank	 supervision	 and	 regulation	 (ii)	 reform	 of	
restructuring,	 insolvency	and	debt	recovery	frameworks,	(iii)	developing	secondary	markets	for	
distressed	assets,	and	(iv)	fostering	restructuring	of	the	banking	system.	Actions	 in	these	areas	
are	 to	 be	 taken	 at	 national	 level	 and	 at	 Union	 level	 where	 appropriate.	 The	 Commission	
announced	a	 similar	 intention	 in	 its	 "Communication	on	completing	 the	Banking	Union"	of	11	
October	2017,	which	called	for	a	comprehensive	package	on	tackling	NPLs	within	the	Union.		
(4)	 This	Directive,	 together	with	other	measures	which	 the	Commission	 is	 putting	 forward,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 action	 taken	 by	 the	 ECB	 in	 the	 context	 of	 banking	 supervision	 under	 the	 Single	
Supervisory	 Mechanism	 (SSM)	 and	 by	 the	 European	 Banking	 Authority	 will	 create	 the	
appropriate	environment	 for	credit	 institutions	 to	deal	with	NPLs	on	their	balance	sheets,	and	
will	reduce	the	risk	of	future	NPL	accumulation.			
(6)	This	Directive	should	enable	credit	institutions	to	better	deal	with	loans	once	these	become	
non-performing	 by	 improving	 conditions	 to	 either	 enforce	 the	 collateral	 used	 to	 secure	 the	
credit	 or	 to	 sell	 the	 credit	 to	 third	 parties.	 The	 introduction	 of	 accelerated	 collateral	
enforcement	as	a	swift	mechanism	for	the	recovery	of	collateral	value	would	reduce	the	costs	
for	resolving	NPLs	and	would	hence	support	both	credit	 institutions	and	purchasers	of	NPLs	 in	
recovering	value.	Moreover,	when	credit	institutions	face	a	large	build-up	of	NPLs	and	lack	the	
staff	or	expertise	to	properly	service	them,	one	viable	solution	would	be	to	either	outsource	the	
servicing	of	these	loans	to	a	specialised	credit	servicer	or	to	transfer	the	credit	agreement	to	a	
credit	purchaser	that	has	the	necessary	risk	appetite	and	expertise	to	manage	it.			
(7)	The	two	solutions	for	credit	 institutions	to	deal	with	NPLs	provided	for	by	this	Directive	are	
mutually	 reinforcing.	 The	 shorter	 time	 for	 enforcement	 and	 the	 increased	 recovery	 rates,	 as	
expected	with	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	increases	the	value	of	an	NPL.	In	
turn,	this	would	raise	bid	prices	in	NPL	transactions.	A	further	effect	is	that	selling	NPLs	will	be	
less	 complicated	 if	 the	 loan	 is	 collateralised.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	price	determination	 is	
simpler	 for	 a	 collateralised	 NPL	 than	 an	 unsecured	 one	 in	 a	 secondary	 market	 transaction	
because	 	the	 value	 of	 the	 collateral	 sets	 a	minimum	 value	 of	 a	 NPL.	With	 a	more	 liquid	 and	
better	functioning	secondary	market	for	NPLs	where	investors	would	show	greater	interest	for	
NPLs	 incorporating	 the	accelerated	enforcement	 feature,	 there	would	be	additional	 incentives	
for	credit	institutions	to	use	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	at	the	time	of	issue	
of	 the	 new	 loans.	 Moreover,	 the	 harmonisation	 achieved	 by	 this	 Directive	 would	 foster	
development	of	pan-Union	NPL	investors,	thus	further	improving	market	liquidity.		
(21)	In	 addition,	 this	 Directive	 does	 not	 reduce	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 Union	 consumer	
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protection	rules	and	to	the	extent	credit	purchasers	qualify	as	creditors	under	the	provisions	of	
Directive	 2014/17/EU	 and	 Directive	 2008/48/EC,	 they	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 specific	
obligations	 set	 by	 Article	 35	 of	 the	 Directive	 2014/17/EU	 or	 Article	 20	 of	 the	 Directive	
2008/48/EC,	respectively.			
(30)	 An	 important	 prerequisite	 for	 the	 taking	 up	 of	 the	 role	 by	 credit	 purchasers	 and	 credit	
servicers	 should	 be	 that	 they	 can	 access	 all	 relevant	 information	 and	 Member	 State	 should	
ensure	that	this	is	possible,	while	at	the	same	time	observing	Union	and	national	data	protection	
rules.	
(39)	In	 the	 Council's	 "Action	 Plan	 to	 Tackle	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 in	 Europe",	 a	 legislative	
initiative	 was	 put	 forward	 to	 enhance	 the	 protection	 of	 secured	 creditors	 by	 providing	 them	
with	 more	 efficient	 methods	 of	 value	 recovery	 from	 secured	 credit	 through	 an	 accelerated	
extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	procedure.			
(40)	 Expedited	 and	 efficient	 out-of-court	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 which	 enable	 secured	
creditors	to	recover	value	from	collateral	in	case	of	borrower's	default	are	not	available	in	some	
Member	States,	which	means	 that	 in	 those	Member	States	 secured	creditors	are	only	able	 to	
enforce	 collateral	 in	 court,	 which	 can	 be	 lengthy	 and	 costly.	Where	 available,	 the	 scope	 and	
efficiency	of	the	extrajudicial	enforcement	procedures	vary	from	one	Member	State	to	another.	
For	 that	 reason	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 establish	 a	 distinct	 common	 mechanism	 available	 in	 all	
Member	 States.	 That	mechanism	 should	 not,	 however,	 replace	 existing	 national	 enforcement	
measures	including	those	that	do	not	require	the	involvement	of	courts.		
(41)	 The	 inefficiency	 of	 some	 Member	 States'	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedures	 is	 an	
important	 factor	 for	 low	 recovery	 rates	 where	 business	 borrowers	 default	 on	 secured	 credit	
agreements.	 The	 length	 of	 some	 existing	 procedures	 entails	 additional	 costs	 for	 secured	
creditors	and	loss	of	value	of	the	assets	provided	as	collateral.	In	the	Member	States	which	have	
not	 established	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedures	 for	 various	 types	 of	 collateral,	 secured	
creditors	face	often	lengthy	judicial	enforcement	processes.			
(42)	Existing	 enforcement	 procedures	 within	 the	 Union	 sometimes	 result	 in	 a	 lack	 of	 level-	
playing	 field	 for	 credit	 institutions	 and	 companies	 across	 the	 Union	 with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	
credit,	particularly	for	SMEs	which	depend	on	bank	credit	more	than	larger	companies.	Uneven	
recovery	 rates	 across	Member	 States	 lead	 to	 differences	 in	 the	 availability	 of	 bank	 credit	 for	
SMEs	 because	 the	 credit	 institutions'	 lending	 capacity	 decreases	 as	NPLs	 accumulate	 on	 their	
balance	 sheets,	 due	 to	 prudential	 requirements	 and	 internal	 resources	 which	 need	 to	 be	
dedicated	to	dealing	with	NPLs.	This	contributes	to	a	lack	of	confidence	in	the	ability	to	enforce	
collateral	in	different	Member	States	and	may	lead	to	higher	borrowing	costs	corresponding	to	
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place	of	establishment	and	irrespective	of	their	real	creditworthiness.	Therefore,	a	common	new	
procedure	 is	required	for	the	single	market,	 the	Banking	Union	and	the	Capital	Markets	Union	
and	 it	 is	necessary	 to	ensure	that	credit	 institutions	and	undertakings	which	are	authorised	to	
issue	 credit	by	 concluding	 secured	 credit	 agreements	 in	 all	Member	 States	have	 the	ability	 to	
enforce	 those	 agreements	 through	 effective	 and	 expedited	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	
procedures.			
(43)	 In	 order	 to	 protect	 consumers,	 credit	 agreements	 provided	 to	 consumers	 should	 be	
excluded	from	the	scope	of	the	accelerated	extrajudicial	enforcement	mechanism	provided	for	
in	 this	 Directive.	 Equally,	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 sole	 entrepreneurs,	 this	 mechanism	 should	 not	
apply	 to	 credit	 agreements	 secured	by	 collateral	 in	 the	 form	of	 real	 estate	which	 is	 the	main	
residence	of	the	sole	entrepreneur.			
(44)	Since	 this	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 mechanism	 is	 a	 voluntary	
instrument	 which	 is	 subject	 to	 agreement	 between	 the	 secured	 creditor	 and	 the	 business	
borrower,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	 the	 borrower	 be	 informed	 about	 the	 consequences	 and	 of	 the	
conditions	under	which	this	accelerated	procedure	may	be	used	by	the	creditor.	Therefore	the	
conditions	 should	 be	 established	 in	 a	 written	 agreement,	 or	 in	 a	 notarised	 format	 where	
national	law	so	provides,	between	the	creditor	and	the	borrower.			
(45)	In	 order	 to	 protect	 business	 borrowers,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 necessary	
measures	are	in	place	to	ensure	that	creditors	afford	borrowers	a	reasonable	period	of	time	for	
execution	of	payment	to	avert	this	kind	of	enforcement.			
(46)	In	order	 to	ensure	 that	 this	accelerated	extrajudicial	 collateral	enforcement	mechanism	 is	
an	expedited	and	effective	instrument	to	recover	value	from	collateral,	the	agreement	by	which	
the	 secured	 creditor	 and	 the	 business	 borrower	 agree	 upon	 it	 should	 comprise	 a	 directly	
enforceable	 title,	 which	 is	 a	 clause	 in	 the	 agreement	 that	 enables	 direct	 execution	 of	 the	
collateral	through	AECE	without	the	need	to	obtain	an	enforceable	title	from	the	court.			
(47)	 In	Member	 States	 which	 have	 already	 established	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedures,	
those	 procedures	 are	 interlinked	 with	 elements	 of	 national	 civil,	 commercial,	 property,	
insolvency	and	public	laws,	and	the	type	of	enforcement	procedure	that	may	be	used	depends	
on	 the	 type	 of	 the	 asset	 provided	 as	 collateral,	 with	 procedures	 for	 immovable	 assets	 often	
entailing	stricter	procedural	elements	and	minimum	judicial	oversight.	Therefore	Member	States	
should	 have	 flexibility	 in	 deciding	 upon	 the	 type	 of	 enforcement	 procedure	 which	 is	 made	
available	 to	 secured	 creditors	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	
enforcement:	 public	 auction	 or	 private	 sale,	 or,	 under	 some	 national	 frameworks,	 the	
appropriation	of	the	asset.		
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(48)	In	order	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 secured	 creditor	only	 recovers	what	 it	 is	 due	by	 the	business	
borrower	under	the	credit	agreement,	Member	States	should	ensure	that	the	secured	creditor	is	
obliged	to	pay	the	business	borrower	any	positive	difference	between	the	sum	outstanding	of	
the	secured	credit	agreement	and	the	proceeds	of	the	sale	of	the	asset	(following	public	auction	
or	private	sale)	or,	in	the	case	of	appropriation	between	the	sum	outstanding	and	the	valuation	
of	 the	 asset	 performed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 appropriation.	 It	 is	 appropriate	 that	 where	
Member	States	provide	for	the	realisation	of	collateral	by	means	of	appropriation,	the	positive	
difference	 to	 be	 paid	 out	 to	 the	 borrower	 should	 be	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 sum	
outstanding	of	the	secured	credit	agreement	and	the	valuation	of	the	asset.	Where	less	than	the	
sum	 outstanding	 of	 the	 secured	 credit	 agreement	 is	 recovered	 through	 this	 accelerated	
enforcement,	Member	States	should	not	prevent	the	parties	to	a	secured	credit	agreement	from	
expressly	agreeing	that	the	realisation	of	collateral	by	means	of	AECE	is	sufficient	to	repay	the	
credit.			
(49)	Member	 States	 should	ensure	 that	where	a	 secured	 credit	 agreement	which	provides	 for	
the	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	set	out	in	this	Directive	is	transferred	by	the	
creditor	 to	 a	 third	 party,	 that	 third	 party	 would	 acquire	 the	 right	 to	 avail	 himself	 of	 the	
accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 under	 the	 same	 terms	 and	 conditions	 as	 the	
secured	creditor.			
(50)	In	 order	 to	 ensure	 consistency	 with	 pre-insolvency	 and	 insolvency	 rules,	 Member	 States	
should	ensure	that	where	a	preventive	restructuring	proceeding,	as	provided	for	in	the	Proposal	
for	a	Directive	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	on	preventive	restructuring	and	
second	chance,	is	 initiated	in	respect	of	the	business	borrower,	the	realisation	of	the	collateral	
pursuant	 to	an	AECE	 is	 subject	 to	a	 stay	of	 individual	enforcement	actions	 in	accordance	with	
applicable	 national	 laws	 transposing	 that	Directive.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 any	 insolvency	 proceedings	
which	are	initiated	in	respect	of	the	business	borrower,	the	realisation	of	the	collateral	pursuant	
to	an	AECE	should	also	be	subject	to	a	stay	of	individual	enforcement	actions	in	accordance	with	
applicable	 national	 laws.	 It	 should	 be	 left	 to	 national	 law	 whether	 secured	 creditors	 have	
preferential	 access	 to	 the	 collateral	 under	 this	 accelerated	 mechanism	 even	 once	 insolvency	
proceedings	are	open.			
(51)	Given	 the	 limited	 availability	 of	 data	 on	 the	 number	 of	 extrajudicial	 procedures	 used	 by	
credit	 institutions	 to	 recover	 value	 from	 collateral	 in	 case	 of	 borrower's	 default,	 national	
competent	 authorities	 which	 supervise	 credit	 institutions	 should	 be	 required	 to	 collect	
information	on	the	number	of	secured	credit	agreements	which	are	enforced	through	AECE	and	
the	 timeframes	 for	 such	 enforcement.	 In	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	
effectiveness	of	 the	exercise	of	AECE	within	 the	Union,	Member	States	 should	provide	annual	
statistical	 data	 on	 these	 matters	 to	 the	 Commission	starting	 from	one	year	after	 the	
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date	of	application	of	this	Directive.		
(52)	 Without	 prejudice	 to	 pre-contractual	 obligations	 under	 Directive	 2014/17EU,	 Directive	
2008/48/EC	 and	 Directive	 93/13/EEC,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 a	 high	 level	 of	 consumer	
protection,	the	consumer	should	be	presented,	in	due	time	and	prior	to	any	modifications	to	the	
terms	and	conditions	of	the	credit	agreement,	with	a	clear	and	comprehensive	list	of	any	such	
changes,	the	timescale	for	their	 implementation	and	the	necessary	details	as	well	as	the	name	
and	address	of	the	national	authority	where	he	or	she	may	lodge	a	complaint.			
	(54)	Both	 the	 provisions	 of	 Regulation	 (EU)	 2016/679	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	
Council
	
and	Regulation	(EC)	No	45/2001	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council
	
apply	to	
the	processing	of	personal	data	for	the	purposes	of	this	Directive.	In	particular,	where	personal	
data	is	processed	for	the	purposes	of	this	Directive,	the	precise	purpose	should	be	specified,	the	
relevant	legal	basis	referred	to,	the	relevant	security	requirements	laid	down	in	Regulation	(EU)	
2016/679	complied	with,	and	the	principles	of	necessity,	proportionality,	purpose	limitation	and	
proportionate	 data	 retention	 period	 respected.	 Also,	 personal	 data	 protection	 by	 design	 and	
data	protection	by	default	 should	be	embedded	 in	all	data	processing	 systems	developed	and	
used	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 Directive.	 Equally,	 administrative	 cooperation	 and	 mutual	
assistance	between	the	competent	authorities	of	the	Member	States	should	be	compatible	with	
the	 rules	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 personal	 data	 laid	 down	 in	 Regulation	 (EU)	 2016/679	 of	 the	
European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council,	and	in	accordance	with	national	data	protection	rules	
implementing	Union	legislation.					
(56)	In	accordance	with	the	Joint	Political	Declaration	of	28	September	2011	of	Member	States	
and	 the	 Commission	 on	 explanatory	 documents,	 Member	 States	 have	 undertaken	 to	
accompany,	in	justified	cases,	the	notification	of	their	transposition	measures	with	one	or	more	
documents	 explaining	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 components	 of	 a	 directive	 and	 the	
corresponding	 parts	 of	 national	 transposition	 instruments.	 With	 regard	 to	 this	 Directive,	 the	
legislator	considers	the	transmission	of	such	documents	to	be	justified,		
HAVE	ADOPTED	THIS	DIRECTIVE:		
Title	I.	Subject	matter,	scope	and	definitions	
Article	1.	Subject	matter	
This	Directive	lays	down	a	common	framework	and	requirements	for:		
(a)	credit	 servicers	acting	on	behalf	of	a	credit	 institution	or	a	credit	purchaser	 in	 respect	of	a	
credit	agreement	issued	by	a	credit	institution	or	by	its	subsidiaries;			
(b)	credit	purchasers	of	a	credit	agreement	issued	by	a	credit	institution	or	by	its	subsidiaries;			
(c)	a	 supplementary	 common	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	
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mechanism	in	respect	of	secured	credit	agreements	concluded	between	creditors	and	business	
borrowers	which	are	secured	by	collateral.			
Article	2.	Scope			
2.	Articles	 3,	 23	 to	33	and	39	 to	43	of	 this	Directive	 shall	 apply	 to	 secured	 credit	 agreements	
concluded	between	 creditors	 and	business	 borrowers	which	 are	 secured	by	 any	movable	 and	
immovable	assets	owned	by	the	business	borrower	and	which	have	been	posed	as	collateral	to	a	
creditor	in	order	to	secure	repayment	of	claims	arising	from	the	secured	credit	agreement.			
3.	 This	 Directive	 does	 not	 affect	 the	 protection	 granted	 to	 consumers,	 pursuant	 to	 Directive	
2014/17/EU,	 Directive	 2008/48/EC,	 Council	 Directive	 93/13/EEC	 and	 the	 national	 provisions	
transposing	them,	with	regard	to	credit	agreements	falling	within	its	scope.			
5.	Articles	3,	23	to	33	and	34	to	43	of	this	Directive	shall	not	apply	to:		
(a)	secured	credit	agreements	concluded	between	creditors	and	borrowers	who	are		consumers	
as	defined	in	point	(a)	of	Article	3	of	Directive	2008/48/EC;			
(b)	 secured	 credit	 agreements	 concluded	between	 creditors	 and	business	borrowers	 	who	are	
non-profit	making	companies;			
(c)	secured	credit	agreements	concluded	between	creditors	and	business	borrowers		which	are	
secured	by	the	following	categories	of	collateral:	(i)		financial	collateral	arrangements	as	defined	
in	 Article	 2(1)(a)	 of	 	Directive	 2002/47/EC;	 	(ii)	 	immovable	 residential	 property	 which	 is	 the	
primary	residence	of	a	business	borrower.			
Article	3.	Definitions			
For	the	purpose	of	this	Directive,	the	following	definitions	shall	apply:		
	(1)	'credit	 institution'	 means	 a	 credit	 institution	 as	 defined	 in	 point	 (1)	 of	 Article	 4(1)	 of	
Regulation	(EU)	No	575/2013;			
(2)	'creditor'	means	a	credit	institution	or	any	legal	person	who	has	issued	a	credit	in	the	course	
of	his	trade,	business	or	profession,	or	a	credit	purchaser;			
(3)	'borrower'	means	 a	 legal	 or	 natural	 person	who	 has	 concluded	 a	 credit	 agreement	with	 a	
creditor;			
(4)	'business	 borrower'	 means	 a	 legal	 or	 natural	 person,	 other	 than	 a	 consumer,	 who	 has	
concluded	a	credit	agreement	with	a	creditor;			
(5)	'credit	agreement'	means	an	agreement	as	originally	issued,	modified	or	replaced,	whereby	a	
creditor	grants	or	promises	to	grant	a	credit	in	the	form	of	a	deferred	payment,	a	loan	or	other	
similar	financial	accommodation;			
(6)	'secured	 credit	 agreement'	means	 a	 credit	 agreement	 concluded	 by	 a	 credit	 institution	 or	
another	undertaking	authorised	 to	 issue	credit,	 which	 is	 secured	 by	 either	 of	 the	 following	
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collateral;	 (a)	 	a	mortgage,	charge,	 lien	or	other	comparable	security	right	commonly	used	in	a	
Member	State	 in	relation	to	 immovable	assets;	 (b)	 	a	pledge,	charge,	 lien	or	other	comparable	
security	right	commonly	used	in	a	Member	State	in	relation	to	movable	assets;			
		
TITLE	V.	Accelerated	Extrajudicial	Collateral	Enforcement			
Article	23.	Conditions	for	the	voluntary	use	of	Accelerated	Extrajudicial	Collateral	Enforcement		
1.	 Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 this	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	
mechanism	may	be	exercised	by	a	creditor	where	all	of	the	following	conditions	are	fulfilled:		
(a)	the	mechanism	has	 been	 agreed	 in	writing,	 or	 in	 a	 notarised	 format	 if	 so	 provided	 by	 the	
Member	 State,	 by	 the	 creditor	 and	 business	 borrower	 and	 that	 agreement	 specifies	 the	
enforcement	 event	 and	 the	 period	 of	 time	 in	 which	 the	 business	 borrower	 may	 execute	
payment	 following	 that	 event	 in	 order	 to	 avert	 the	 execution	 of	 this	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	
collateral	enforcement;			
(b)	the	business	borrower	has	been	clearly	informed	about	the	application	and	consequences	of	
this	 accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	 prior	 to	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 agreement	
referred	to	in	point	(a);			
(c)		within	4	weeks	of	the	enforcement	event,	or	such	later	point	in	time	where	so	negotiated	by	
the	 creditor	 and	 the	 business	 borrower,	 the	 creditor	 has	 notified	 the	 business	 borrower,	 in	
writing,	of	all	of	the	following:		
(i)	 the	creditor's	 intention	 to	 realise	 the	assets	 through	 this	accelerated	extrajudicial	 collateral	
enforcement	mechanism	to	satisfy	the	contractual	obligations	of	the	secured	credit	agreement;			
(ii)	the	type	of	enforcement	measure	to	be	applied	as	referred	to	in	Articles	25	and	26;			
(iii)	the	time	period	for	the	execution	of	payment	before	the	use	of	the	accelerated	extrajudicial	
collateral	enforcement	mechanism	referred	to	in	point	(a);			
(iv)	the	 default	 amount	 of	 the	 secured	 credit	 agreement	 due	 pursuant	 to	 the	 contractual	
obligations	of	the	secured	credit	agreement;			
(d)	the	 business	 borrower	 has	 not	 executed	 the	 full	 payment	 as	 stipulated	 in	 the	 creditor's	
notification	referred	to	in	point	(c).			
For	 the	purposes	 of	 paragraph	1,	 the	 agreement	 referred	 to	 in	 paragraph	1(a)	 shall	 include	 a	
directly	enforceable	title.		
For	the	purposes	of	paragraph	1(a),	Member	States	may	establish	that	in	cases	where	a	business	
borrower	 has	 paid	 at	 least	 85%	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 secured	 credit	 agreement,	 the	 period	
referred	to	therein	may	be	extended	by	at	least	six	months.		
2.	Member	States	shall	ensure	that	the	business	 borrower	is	not	permitted	to	dispose	of	the	
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assets	pledged	as	collateral	as	of	receipt	of	the	notification	referred	to	in	paragraph	1(c)	and	is	
subject	 to	 a	 general	 duty	 to	 cooperate	 and	 to	 furnish	 all	 relevant	 information	 where	 this	
accelerated	 extrajudicial	 collateral	 enforcement	mechanism	 is	 exercisable	 in	 accordance	 with	
paragraph	1.			
3.	 Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 the	 creditor	 affords	 the	 business	 borrower	 a	 reasonable	
period	of	time	for	execution	of	payment	and	makes	reasonable	efforts	to	avoid	the	use	of	this	
accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism.			
	
Article	24.	Enforcement			
1.	 Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 collateral	 may	 be	 realised	 pursuant	 to	 this	 accelerated	
extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism.			
2.	Member	States	 shall	 provide	 for	 at	 least	one	or	both	of	 the	 following	means	 to	 realise	 the	
collateral	as	referred	to	in	paragraph	1	for	each	type	of	security	right	and	collateral:	(a)	 	public	
auction;		(b)		private	sale.			
3.	 For	 each	of	 these	means,	Member	 States	may	provide	 that	 a	notary,	 bailiff	 or	other	public	
official	is	appointed	where	appropriate	to	ensure	an	efficient	and	expedited	distribution	of	sale	
proceeds	and	transfer	of	the	collateral	to	an	acquirer,	or	safeguard	the	borrower's	rights.			
4.	 Where	 Member	 States	 establish	 the	 extrajudicial	 enforcement	 procedure	 by	 means	 of	
appropriation,	the	right	of	the	creditor	to	retain	the	asset	in	or	towards	satisfaction	of	business	
borrower's	 liability	 shall	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 applicable	 laws	 in	 each	Member	 State.	Member	
States	shall	ensure	that	in	the	case	of	appropriation	the	positive	difference	to	be	paid	out	to	the	
business	 borrower	 shall	 be	 the	 difference	 between	 sum	 outstanding	 of	 the	 secured	 credit	
agreement	and	the	valuation	of	the	asset.			
5.	 For	 the	purposes	of	 the	 realisation	 referred	 to	 in	paragraph	2,	Member	States	 shall	 ensure	
that	the	creditor	organises	a	valuation	of	the	assets,	in	order	to	determine	the	reserve	price	in	
cases	of	public	auction	and	private	sale,	and	that	the	following	conditions	are	met:		
(a)	the	creditor	and	the	business	borrower	agree	on	the	valuer	to	be	appointed;			
(b)	the	valuation	is	conducted	by	an	independent	valuer;			
(c)	the	valuation	is	fair	and	realistic;			
(d)	the	 valuation	 is	 conducted	 specifically	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 collateral	
after	the	enforcement	event;			
(e)	the	business	borrower	has	the	right	to	challenge	the	valuation	before	a	court	in	accordance	
with	Article	29.			
6.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 point	 (a),	 where	 the	 parties	cannot	agree	upon	the	appointment	
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of	a	valuer	for	the	purposes	of	realising	the	collateral	referred	to	in	paragraph	2,	a	valuer	shall	
be	 appointed	 by	 a	 decision	 of	 a	 judicial	 court,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 national	 law	 of	 the	
Member	State	in	which	the	business	borrower	is	established	or	is	domiciled.		
	
Article	25.	Public	auction	
1. Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 the	 realisation	 of	 collateral	 by	means	 of	 public	 auction	 is	
conducted	in	accordance	with	the	following	elements:		
(a)	the	creditor	has	publicly	communicated	the	time	and	place	of	the	public	auction	at	least	10	
days	prior	to	that	auction;			
(b)	the	creditor	has	made	reasonable	efforts	to	attract	the	highest	number	of	potential	buyers;			
(c)	the	 creditor	 has	 notified	 the	 business	 borrower,	 and	 any	 third	 party	with	 an	 interest	 in	 or	
right	to	the	asset,	of	the	public	auction,	including	its	time	and	place,	at	least	10	days	prior	to	that	
auction;			
(d)	a	valuation	of	the	asset	has	been	conducted	prior	to	the	public	auction;			
(e)	the	reserve	price	of	the	asset	is	at	least	equal	to	the	valuation	amount	determined	prior	to	
the	public	auction;			
(f)	 the	asset	may	be	sold	at	a	 reduction	of	no	more	 than	20%	of	 the	valuation	amount	where	
both	 of	 the	 following	 apply:	 	 (i)	 	no	 buyer	 has	 made	 an	 offer	 in	 line	 with	 the	 requirements	
referred	 to	 in	 points	 (e)	 and	 (f)	 at	 the	 public	 auction;	 	(ii)	 	there	 is	 a	 threat	 of	 imminent	
deterioration	of	the	asset.			
2. Where	 the	 asset	 has	 not	 been	 sold	 by	 public	 auction,	Member	 States	may	 provide	 for	 the	
realisation	of	the	collateral	by	private	sale.			
3. Where	a	Member	State	provides	for	a	second	public	auction,	points	(a)	to	(e)	of	paragraph	1	
shall	apply	but	the	asset	may	be	sold	at	a	further	reduction,	as	determined	by	Member	States.		
	
Article	26.	Private	sale			
1.	 Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 the	 realisation	 of	 collateral	 by	 means	 of	 private	 sale	 is	
conducted	in	accordance	with	the	following	elements:		
(a)	 the	 creditor	has	made	 reasonable	 efforts,	 including	 adequate	public	 advertising,	 to	 attract	
potential	buyers;		
	(b)	the	creditor	has	notified	the	business	borrower,	and	any	relevant	third	party	with	an	interest	
in	or	right	to	the	asset,	of	its	intention	to	sell	the	asset	at	least	10	days	prior	to	offering	the	asset	
for	sale;			
(c)	a	valuation	of	the	asset	has	been	conducted	 prior	 to	 the	 private	 sale,	 and	 or	 a	 public	
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auction	in	accordance	with	point	(c)	of	Article	25(1);			
(d)	 the	 guide	 price	 of	 the	 asset	 is	 at	 least	 equal	 to	 the	 amount	 established	 in	 the	 valuation	
referred	to	in	point	(c),	at	the	time	of	offering	the	asset	for	private	sale;			
(e)	 the	 asset	 may	 be	 sold	 at	 a	 reduction	 of	 no	 more	 than	 20%	 of	 value	 where	 both	 of	 the	
following	 apply:	 (i)	 	no	 buyer	 has	made	 an	 offer	 in	 line	with	 the	 requirements	 referred	 to	 in	
points	(d)	and	(e)	within	30	days;		(ii)		there	is	a	threat	of	imminent	deterioration	of	the	asset.			
2. Where	the	asset	has	not	been	sold	by	private	sale	within	30	days	of	offering	the	asset	for	sale,	
Member	States	shall	ensure	that	the	creditor	publicly	advertises	the	sale	for	an	additional	period	
of	at	least	30	days	before	concluding	any	sale.			
3. Where	 a	Member	 State	 provides	 for	 a	 second	 attempt	 at	 private	 sale,	 points	 (a)	 to	 (d)	 of	
paragraph	 1	 shall	 apply	 but	 the	 asset	 may	 be	 sold	 at	 a	 further	 reduction,	 as	 determined	 by	
Member	States.			
Article	27.	Competing	security	rights			
Member	States	shall	provide	that	the	priority	attached	to	competing	security	rights	in	the	same	
collateral	 is	 not	 affected	by	 the	 enforcement	of	 one	of	 those	 rights	 by	means	of	 the	national	
provisions	transposing	this	Directive.		
	
Article	28.	Right	to	challenge	the	enforcement	
Member	States	shall	ensure	that	the	business	borrower	has	the	right	to	challenge	the	use	of	this	
accelerated	extrajudicial	 collateral	enforcement	mechanism	before	a	national	court	where	 the	
sale	of	the	assets	provided	as	collateral	has	not	been	conducted	in	accordance	with	the	national	
provisions	 transposing	 Articles	 24(3),	 25	 and	 26,	 or	 the	 valuation	 of	 the	 assets	 has	 not	 been	
conducted	in	accordance	with	the	national	provisions	transposing	Article	24(4).		
	
Article	29.	Restitution	of	the	exceeding	amount	
Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 the	 creditor	 is	 required	 to	 pay	 the	 business	 borrower	 any	
positive	 difference	 between	 the	 sum	 outstanding	 of	 the	 secured	 credit	 agreement	 and	 the	
proceeds	of	the	sale	of	the	asset.		
	
Article	30.	Settlement	of	the	outstanding	amount	
Without	prejudice	to	articles	19	to	23	of	the	Directive	(EU)	20XX/XX	of	the	European	Parliament	
and	 of	 the	 Council,	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 amount	 realised	 after	 the	 use	 of	 this	 accelerated	
extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism	is	an	amount	lower	than	the	sum	outstanding	of	
the	 secured	 credit	 agreement,	 Member	 States	 may	 provide	 for	 the	 settlement	 of	 all	
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liabilities	under	that	agreement,	in	accordance	with	applicable	national	laws.		
	
Article	31.	Transfer	of	secured	credit	agreements	to	third	parties	
Member	States	shall	ensure	that	where	a	secured	credit	agreement	which	provides	for	the	right	
to	use	accelerated	extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	is	transferred	by	the	credit	institution	or	
its	 subsidiary	 to	any	 third	party,	 that	 third	party	shall	acquire	 the	right	 to	use	 this	accelerated	
extrajudicial	collateral	enforcement	mechanism	in	case	of	the	business	borrower's	default	under	
the	same	terms	and	conditions	as	the	credit	institution.		
	
Article	32.	Restructuring	and	insolvency	proceedings	
1. This	 Directive	 shall	 be	 without	 prejudice	 to	 the	 Directive	 (EU)	 20XX/XX	 of	 the	 European	
Parliament	and	of	the	Council.			
2. Member	States	shall	ensure	that	where	 insolvency	proceedings	are	 initiated	 in	respect	of	a	
business	 borrower,	 the	 realisation	 of	 collateral	 pursuant	 to	 national	 laws	 transposing	 this	
Directive	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 stay	 of	 individual	 enforcement	 actions	 in	 accordance	with	 applicable	
national	laws.			
Article	33.	Data	collection			
1. Member	States	and,	in	the	case	of	credit	institutions	competent	authorities	which	supervise	
credit	institutions,	shall,	on	an	annual	basis,	collect	information	from	creditors	on	the	number	of	
secured	credit	agreements	which	are	enforced	 through	 this	accelerated	extrajudicial	 collateral	
enforcement	and	the	timeframes	for	such	enforcement.			
2. Member	States	and,	in	the	case	of	credit	institutions,	competent	authorities	which	supervise	
credit	institutions,	shall,	on	an	annual	basis,	collect	the	following	information	from	creditors:			
	
	(a)	 	the	number	of	 proceedings	 pursuant	 to	 the	national	 provisions	 transposing	 this	Directive	
initiated,	pending	and	realised,	 including:	 	(i)	the	number	of	proceedings	in	respect	of	movable	
assets,		(ii)	the	number	of	proceedings	in	respect	of	immovable	assets.			
(b)	 	the	 length	 of	 the	 proceedings	 from	 notification	 to	 settlement,	 arranged	 	by	 means	 of	
realisation	(public	sale,	private	sale,	or	appropriation);			
(c)		the	average	costs	of	each	proceedings,	in	EUR;			
(d)		the	settlement	rates.			
3. Member	States	shall	aggregate	the	data	referred	to	in	paragraph	2	and	compile	statistics	from	
that	aggregate	data	 for	 the	 full	 calendar	year	beginning	DATE	 [OP:	Please	 insert	a	date	of	 the	
January	1	following	adoption	of	this	act].			
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4. The	statistics	referred	to	in	the	first	subparagraph	shall	be	communicated	to	the	Commission	
on	 annual	 basis	 and	 by	 31	 March	 of	 the	 calendar	 year	 following	 the	 year	 for	 which	 data	 is	
collected.			
TITLE	VI.	Safeguards	and	duty	to	cooperate			
Article	34.		Modification	of	the	credit	agreement			
Without	prejudice	to	the	obligations	to	inform	the	consumer	pursuant	to	Directive	2014/17/EU,	
Directive	 2008/48/EC	 and	 Directive	 93/13/EEC,	 Member	 States	 shall	 ensure	 that	 prior	 to	
modifying	the	terms	and	conditions	of	a	credit	agreement	either	by	consent	or	by	operation	of	
law,	the	creditor	communicates	the	following	information	to	the	consumer:		
(a)		a	clear	and	comprehensive	description	of	the	proposed	changes;			
(b)		the	timescale	for	the	implementation	of	those	changes;			
(c)		the	grounds	of	complaint	available	to	the	consumer	regarding	those	modifications;			
(d)		the	time	period	available	for	lodging	any	such	complaint;			
(e)		the	name	and	address	of	the	competent	authority	where	that	complaint	may	be	submitted.			
	
Article	41.	Transposition	
1. Member	 States	 shall	 adopt	 and	 publish,	 by	 31	 December	 2020	 at	 the	 latest,	 the	 laws,	
regulations	 and	 administrative	 provisions	 necessary	 to	 comply	 with	 this	 Directive.	 They	 shall	
forthwith	communicate	to	the	Commission	the	text	of	those	provisions.			
2. They	shall	apply	those	provisions	from	1	January	2021.	However,	Articles	4(1),	7,	9	to	12	shall	
apply	from	1	July	2021.			
3. When	Member	States	adopt	those	provisions,	they	shall	contain	a	reference	to	this	Directive	
or	 be	 accompanied	 by	 such	 a	 reference	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	 their	 official	 publication.	Member	
States	shall	determine	how	such	reference	is	to	be	made.			
4. Member	 States	 shall	 communicate	 to	 the	 Commission	 the	 text	 of	 the	 main	 provisions	 of	
national	law	which	they	adopt	in	the	field	covered	by	this	Directive.			
	
Article	42.	Entry	into	force			
This	Directive	shall	enter	into	force	on	the	20th
	
day	following	that	of	its	publication	in	the	Official	
Journal	of	the	European	Union.		
Article	43.	Addressees	
This	Directive	is	addressed	to	the	Member	States.		
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Annex	II.	Council’s	Action	Plan	
In	 Council’s	 Action	 Plan	 of	 July	 2017,	 the	 Council	 called	 upon	 various	 institutions	 to	 take	
appropriate	measures	to	further	address	high	stocks	of	NPLs.	More	specifically,	
	
i)	The	Council	 invited	the	Commission	to	issue	an	interpretation	of	existing	supervisory	powers	
regarding	banks'	provisioning	policies	 for	NPLs	under	Council	Regulation	EU	No	1024/2013	on	
prudential	supervision	of	credit	institutions	(Article	16:	Supervisory	powers)	and	under	the	CRD	
IV	 (Directive	 2013/36/EU	 on	 access	 to	 the	 activity	 of	 credit	 institutions	 and	 the	 prudential	
supervision	of	credit	institutions	and	investment	firms,	Article	104:	Supervisory	powers).	Within	
the	framework	of	the	ongoing	review	of	the	CRR/CRD	IV,	the	Commission	was	called	upon	to	set	
prudential	backstops	applicable	to	newly	originated	loans,	in	the	form	of	compulsory	prudential	
deductions	from	own	funds.	Therefore,	the	Commission	adopted	a	Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	
the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 amending	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 575/2013	 as	
regards	 minimum	 loss	 coverage	 for	 Non-Performing	 Exposures,	 COM/2018/134/	 final,	
14.03.2018,	Procedure	reference	2018/0060	(COD).		
	
ii)	 The	 Council	 invited	 the	 ECB	 Banking	 Supervision,	 together	 with	 national	 competent	
authorities,	to	implement,	by	the	end	of	2018,	a	guidance	similar	to	‘Guidance	to	banks	on	Non-
Performing	 Loans’	 issued	by	 the	 Single	 Supervisory	Mechanism	 (SSM	Guidance)	 for	 significant	
institutions,	 with	 targeted	 adaptations,	 where	 appropriate.	 See:	 ‘Guidance	 to	 banks	 on	 Non-
Performing	Loans’,	ECB	Banking	Supervision,	March	2017,	available	at:		
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/guidance_on_npl.en.pdf.	
	
iii)	 The	 Council	 called	 upon	 the	 European	Banking	Authority	 (EBA)	 to	 issue,	 by	 summer	 2018,	
general	 guidelines	 on	 NPL	 management,	 as	 well	 as	 detailed	 guidelines	 on	 banks'	 loan	
origination,	 monitoring	 and	 internal	 governance,	 addressing	 issues	 of	 transparency	 and	
borrower	 affordability	 assessment.	 See:	 ‘Final	 Report:	 Guidelines	 on	 management	 of	 Non-
Performing	and	Forborne	Exposures’,	EBA/GL/2018/06,	31.10.2018,	available	at:		
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2425705/EBA+BS+2018+358+Final+%28Final+report+
on+GL+on+NPE_FBE+management%29.pdf/371ff4ba-d7db-4fa9-a3c7-231cb9c2a26a	
and	 ‘Consultation	 Paper:	 Draft	 Guidelines	 on	 management	 of	 Non-Performing	 and	 Forborne	
Exposures’,	EBA/CP/2018/01,	08.03.2018,	available	at:		
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https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2150622/Consultation+Paper+on+Guidelines+on+ma
nagement+of+non-performing+and+forborne+exposures+%28EBA-CP-2018-01%29.pdf.	
	
iv)	The	Council	called	upon	the	EBA,	in	consultation	with	the	ESMA	and	competent	authorities,	
to	implement,	by	the	end	of	2018,	enhanced	disclosure	requirements	on	asset	quality	and	Non-
Performing	Loans	to	all	banks.	See:	‘Consultation	on	Guidelines	on	disclosure	of	Non-Performing	
and	Forborne	Exposures’,	EBA/CP/2018/06,	27.04.2018,	available	at:		
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2200407/Consultation+Paper+on+Guidelines+on+disc
losure+of+non-performing+and+forborne+exposures+%28EBA-CP-2018-06%29.pdf.	
	
v)	 The	 Council	 invited	 the	 European	 Systemic	 Risk	 Board	 (ESRB)	 is	 to	 develop,	 by	 the	 end	 of	
2018,	macro-prudential	 approaches	 to	 prevent	 the	 emergence	 of	 system-wide	NPL	 problems,	
while	considering	procyclical	effects	of	measures	addressing	NPLs'	 stocks	and	potential	effects	
on	 financial	 stability. See:	 ‘Approaching	Non-Performing	 Loans	 from	a	macroprudential	 angle’,	
Javier	Suárez	and	Antonio	Sánchez	Serrano,	Reports	of	the	Advisory	Scientific	Committee,	ESRB,	
No	7,	September	2018,	available	at:		
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc181001_7_ApproachingNPLsmacroprudential
angle.en.pdf.	
	
vi) The	Commission	 is	 called	upon	 to	develop	a	 ‘blueprint’	 for	 the	potential	 set-up	of	national	
asset	management	companies	(AMCs),	which	would	set	out	common	principles	for	the	relevant	
asset	 and	 participation	 perimeters,	 asset-size	 thresholds,	 asset	 valuation	 rules,	 appropriate	
capital	 structures,	 the	 governance	 and	 operational	 features,	 both	 private	 and	 public.	 See:	
Commission	 Staff	 Working	 Document	 AMC	 Blueprint,	 accompanying	 the	 document	
‘Communication	 from	the	Commission	 to	 the	European	Parliament,	 the	European	Council,	 the	
Council	 and	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 -Second	 Progress	 Report	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 Non-
Performing	Loans	in	Europe’,	SWD/2018/072/Final,	14.03.2018.	
	
vii)	 The	 Commission	 was	 called	 upon	 to	 develop,	 by	 summer	 2018,	 a	 European	 approach	 to	
foster	the	development	of	secondary	markets	for	NPLs,	in	particular	to	remove	impediments	to	
the	 transfer	 of	 NPLs	 by	 banks	 to	 non-banks	 and	 to	 their	 ownership	 by	 non-	 banks,	 while	
safeguarding	 consumers'	 rights,	 as	well	 as	 to	 simplify	 and	 potentially	 harmonise	 the	 licensing	
requirements	 for	 third-party	 loan	 servicers	 and	 to	 take	 legislative	 initiative	 in	 this	 respect,	 as	
appropriate.	See:	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	 European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	on	
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credit	 servicers,	 credit	 purchasers	 and	 the	 recovery	 of	 collateral,	 Text	 with	 EEA	 relevance,	
COM/2018/135	final,	14.03.2018,	Procedure	reference	2018/0063	(COD).	
	
viii)	 The	 Commission	 was	 called	 upon	 to	 publish,	 before	 the	 end	 of	 2017,	 the	 results	 of	 the	
benchmarking	 exercise	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 national	 loan	 enforcement	 (including	 insolvency)	
regimes	from	a	bank	creditor	perspective,	providing	comparable	metrics,	as	precise	as	possible,	
for	 recovery	 rates,	 recovery	 times	 and	 recovery	 costs	 across	Member	 States.	 Progress	 on	 the	
benchmarking	 exercise	 was	 presented	 to	 and	 discussed	 with	 Member	 States	 experts	 at	 the	
September	 and	December	 2017	meetings	 of	 the	 expert	 group	on	NPLs,	 including	 the	 issue	of	
lack	of	access	to	meaningful	data.	See:		Commission	Staff	Working	Document,	accompanying	the	
document	 ‘Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	and	
the	European	Central	Bank-	First	Progress	Report	on	the	reduction	of	Non-Performing	Loans	In	
Europe’,	 SWD/2018/033/Final/2,	 23.01.2018,	where	 it	 is	 noted	 that	 the	management	 of	NPLs	
would	 benefit	 from	 more	 efficient	 and	 predictable	 loan	 enforcement	 and	 insolvency	
frameworks,	 therefore	 this	 benchmarking	 exercise	 of	 such	 regimes	 shall	 establish	 a	 reliable	
picture	of	the	delays	and	value	recovery	that	banks	experience	when	faced	with	borrowers.	
	
ix)	Member	 States	were	 invited	 to	 consider	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2018	 to	 carry	 out	 dedicated	 peer-
reviews	on	insolvency	regimes	across	the	EU.	See:	Annex	1:	 Insolvency	Issues	 in	2017,	Country	
Specific	Recommendations,	Commission	Staff	Working	Document,	accompanying	the	document	
‘Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 Council	 and	 the	
European	 Central	 Bank-	 First	 Progress	 Report	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 Non-Performing	 Loans	 in	
Europe	{COM/2018/037/	Final},	SWD/2018/033/	Final,	18.01.2018.	
	
	
